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Abstract
In this thesis I attempt to develop a basic model of the causes and
consequences of paranormal belief and experience, drawing upon the
seminal work of Irwin (1992). From an examination of that literature I
conclude that research in to paranormal belief in particular, and
paranormal experience also to some extent, suffers from being
conducted in a piecemeal, atheoretical, and often methodologically
weak way. However, firsdy I demonstrate that measures of
paranormal belief are in a bad state by providing a critique of the most
prevalent measure of paranormal belief, Tobacyk and Milford's (1983)
Paranormal Belief Scale. I then commence the main empirical
component of my thesis. Covariance structure modelling is identified
as an excellent tool for the development of models based on
correlational survey data, and three studies are conducted which
successively refine the modelling of Irwin's (1992) childhood factors
model of paranormal belief development. The first study examines a
highly simplified version of Irwin's model looking at the role of
childhood trauma and fantasy in the development of paranormal
experience and belief. The second study provided a small sample
confirmation of the results of the first study, in as exact a manner as is
statistically possible, and also permitted the piloting of the survey
questionnaire that would form the large scale third study. The third
study, based on a random street survey of houses in Edinburgh,
permitted the final decisive test of both the simplified childhood
factors model oudined by Irwin, and my own extended model of the
causes and consequences of paranormal belief. In addition the last
study tests my own specified trauma hypothesis developed from an
examination of results in the first study. This model is found to fit
well the final study data, and suggests that there are indeed two routes
to the development of paranormal experience; one through fantasy
that depends on loss of control trauma, and one direct route from
bereavement related trauma. This is probably one of the most
important new findings from the thesis. In examining the
consequential import of paranormal belief and experience I examine
its role in the maintenance of well being and purpose in life, as
mediated through personal and interpersonal locus of control. The
evidence gained suggests a weak role for paranormal experience in
well being and purpose in life, and almost no role for paranormal
belief. However, of greater import is the discovery that women and
men differ in the direction of their relationship between paranormal
factors and well being and purpose in life. Finally I stop to consider
the possibility that paranormal experience may be genuine, in order to
address this possibility I examine the literature pertaining to the so
called sheep-goat effect in ESP testing. A meta-analysis of 73 sheep-
goat studies shows that an apparendy genuine but very weak sheep-
goat effect does exist, and that we can not therefore lighdv dismiss the
possibility that genuine paranormal phenomena do occur. In
concluding I offer up the model developed for further examination,
consider its validity in the light of autobiographical accounts of
psychics, and allude to several studies by other researchers which have




"It is wonderful that five thousand years have now elapsed
since the creation of the world, and still it is undecided
whether or not there has ever been an instance of the spirit of
any person appearing after death. All argument is against it;
but all belief isfor it. "
Samuel Johnson, related by hisfriendJames Boswell
The Psychology ofParanormal Experience and Belief
For the last twenty years or so psychologists have been paying ever greater
attention to the possible causes and consequences of belief in the paranormal
(see Irwin, 1993, for a comprehensive and balanced review of research in this
area). One suspects this interest is due largely to the persistence of paranormal
beliefs despite the great successes of science over the last one hundred years.
At the very least this much is said by sceptics seeking to understand why
people should hold such 'irrational' beliefs. Of course, parapsychologists have
had an interest in paranormal belief almost since the experimental science of
parapsychology began, being most specifically concerned with one particular
consequence of paranormal belief- its effect on one's ostensible psychic ability
(see Schmeidler, 1943; Palmer 1971, 1972; and most recently Lawrence, 1993).
Research into the ostensible paranormal causes and consequences of belief in
the paranormal is in itself important enough to justify our interest in this area
of investigation, but there are many other lines of research available to the
psychologist that justify taking the topic of belief in the paranormal very
seriously. Indeed, psychological research on belief in the paranormal has
important consequences for our understanding of these commonly held views
and the people who hold them. For example, sceptical researchers have made
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some fairly strong claims about the psychological constitution of the
paranormal believer. Amongst such claims are that paranormal believers are
gullible, socially marginal, deficient in powers of rational thought, prone to
misperception (in a variety ofways), and of low self-esteem. All of these claims
have been made by sceptics in addition to the much stronger claim that
paranormal experiencers (especially psychics) are just plain frauds.
When we stop to include those researchers into paranormal belief who are
open to the paranormal, the big picture portrays a mixed bag of
parapsychologists and psychologists attempting to understand the nature of
paranormal belief and experience with a mixed bag of methods, and a mixed
bag of results to match. Thus, despite a considerable body of research into the
academically correct area of 'belief in the paranormal', we have gained little
coherent insight in to the mind of the paranormal believer, and it is perhaps
fairer to say that we have often leamt more about the researchers than about
their research. As a consequence, we have failed to shed light on an important
aspect of human nature. Not parapsychological enough for parapsychologists,
and too parapsychological for psychologists, research into paranormal belief
and experience has occupied an intellectual no-man's land between the
heterodox and the orthodox. To make matters worse, this is a disparate and
disjointed community, occupied not by a coherent body of researchers sharing
a common outlook but by the more moderate members of the
parapsychological and sceptical community, actively pursuing their interests and
agendas, and paying little heed to each other.
Parapsychologists have typically ignored the kind of research that forms the
basis of this thesis, and there are probably two reasons for this. Firstly, research
of this kind is largely conducted by those who are sceptical of the paranormal
and thus the broad thrust of what has been found has been neither flattering
nor germane to parapsychologists concerns for paranormal phenomena.
Secondly, given that parapsychologists' are mostly concerned with the empirical
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evidence for paranormal phenomena they have principally advocated a strong
experimental approach to these phenomena, in contrast to their Victorian
forefathers, the psychical researchers (see Gauld, 1968) who adopted a more
eclectic and idiographic approach. Nevertheless, for whatever reason,
parapsychologists have typically avoided survey based research, and one can
not escape the feeling that the main reason for this is that both psychical
researchers and parapsychologists have viewed such research as being irrelevant
to the central task of finding firm direct evidence for paranormal phenomena.
I beg to differ however. Parapsychology has attempted for the past fifty years
to obtain firm experimental evidence for psi phenomena in the laboratory.
That enterprise, for all the effort given over to it, has yielded mixed results.
There is a sense of some progress, in some areas, but in general the field has
failed to achieve the kind of success that some might initially have expected.
Indeed, a number of parapsychologists both sceptical and pro-paranormal have
argued that the experimental paradigm be ditched (e.g. Braude, 1986;
Blackmore, 1988; White, 1990) in favour of new approaches and paradigms. I
myself have also written and spoken on the problems facing contemporary
parapsychology (though those efforts are only of oblique relevance to this
thesis, see Lawrence, 1995) and my own feelings lie with those who feel that
parapsychologists who try and study psi only in the laboratory are casting their
net too narrowly. The situation is akin to a hunter who stalks his quarry paying
sole reference to the tracks it leaves. Tracks are important, but prey usually
leave a great many other clues as to their whereabouts, and the hunter who
ignores these signs builds only half a picture. If parapsychologists build only
half a picture of their problem area, then it should come as no surprise if they
can tell only half a story and consequently catch their quarry only half the time.
In this thesis then, I am concerned with introducing new techniques that will
allow parapsychologists to build richer narratives. Indeed, the central
theoretical and empirical contribution to be outlined in this thesis will be the
introduction and use of covariance structure modelling (CSM) to build
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'graphical narratives' referring to the hypothesised causes and consequences of
paranormal belief.
Covariance structure modelling is no new technique, though its real utility has
only become apparent over the last ten years or so. Indeed, psychologists and
sociologists have been building causal models using CSM or structural equation
modelling for over twenty years now. But parapsychologists have been
particularly slow to exploit the new methodological developments in other
disciplines, with the consequence that when they have strayed outside the lab
and conducted surveys, the results have rarely received the rigorous,
theoretically-framed analysis that they have deserved. But let us turn now to a
more detailed examination of their effort, as we review the literature on the
psychology of paranormal belief and experience.
In the early phase of my researches I quite naturally planned to review the
empirical literature on paranormal belief and experience, as would any
intending doctoral student. However, in January of 1993 (some three months
into my research) Harvey Irwin, noted Australian parapsychologist, produced a
quite excellent, comprehensive and balanced survey of just this literature.
Consequently, I shall offer here a summary of that review by way of
introduction to the area of research into paranormal belief and experience,
before going on to delineate my own area of interest, such as will constitute the
empirical core of this thesis.
A Review of Research into the Psychology of Paranormal Belief and
Experience
This is not a historical work, and I am not given over to the skills and crafts of
the historian. Nevertheless a simple acquaintance with the literature of
psychology suggests that the psychology of paranormal belief proper began
some twenty years ago, with the work of the psychologist Gustav Jahoda in his
small book, The Psychology ofSuperstition, published in 1974. The earliest inklings
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of such a psychology however, are to be found in the works of another Gustav;
Carl Gustav Jung, who in his work The Psychological Foundation ofBelief in Spirits
wrote (somewhat presciently as we shall see),
"The 'haunted house' has not yet become extinct even in the
most enlightened and the most intellectual cities, nor has the
peasant ceased to believe in the bewitching of his cattle. On
the contrary, in this age of materialism - the inevitable
consequence of rationalistic enlightenment- there has been a
revival of the belief in spirits, but this time on a higher level.
It is not a relapse into the darkness of superstition, but an
intense scientific interest, a need to direct the searchlight of
truth on to the chaos ofdubious facts. The names ofCrookes,
Myers, Wallace, Zollner, and many other eminent men
symbolize this rebirth...
These men typify the reaction of the human mind against the
materialistic view of the world. Looked at from the historical
standpoint, it is not at all surprising that they used the belief
in spirits as the most effective weapon against the mere truth
of the senses, for belief in spirits has the same functional
significance also for primitive man. His utter dependence on
circumstances and environment, the manifold distresses and
tribulations of his life, surrounded by hostile neighbours,
dangerous beasts of prey, and often exposed to the pitiless
forces of nature; his keen senses, his cupidity, his
uncontrolled emotions - all these things bind him to the
physical realities, so that he is in constant danger ofadopting
a purely materialistic attitude and becoming degenerate. His
belief in spirits, or rather, his awareness of the spiritual
world, pulls him again and again out of that bondage in
which his senses would hold him; it forces on him the
certainty ofa spiritual reality whose laws he must observe as
carefully and as guardedly as the laws of his physical
environment.'
Even at this prenatal moment in the history of interest in paranormal belief,
Jung was placing the prevalence of such beliefs firmly at the door of humanity's
struggle with nature. As we shall see, Jung strikes a vein here which has only
recently been rediscovered, and which forms the central empirical and
theoretical component of this thesis, but I should not reveal the moral before
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the story! So, turning to Irwin's (1993) review, he begins by defining the term
paranormal;
'The term paranormal refers to hypothesizedprocesses that in
principle are physically impossible or outside the realm of
human capabilities as presently conceived by conventional
scientists (Thalbourne, 1982) (Irwin, 1992, pp. 1) '
As far as definitions of paranormal go, Irwin's definition seems to me to be a
very good one. I am most impressed by Irwin's definition, over that of others,
by the fact that it stresses the human nature of paranormal phenomena.
Unfortunately, as Irwin himself acknowledges, many researchers in this area
have often employed definitions of the term paranormal that include such
things as UFOs, the Loch Ness monster, and Bigfoot. This all-inclusive
definition of paranormal is, I think, all too often used to discredit the more
credible paranormal phenomena by associating them with anomalous
phenomena of less evidential worth. In any case, I shall have cause to touch
upon the issue of defining paranormal in a later chapter.
Having defined what he means by the term paranormal, Irwin goes on to
discuss the variety of measures that have been developed (I use that term
loosely) to assess paranormal belief, and notes in particular their lack of
consistency. This presents considerable problems for the interpretation of
results drawn from this literature, as we must pay great attention to just what
was being measured as paranormal before we can claim to draw any general
findings. As we shall see, a considerable portion of my research came to be
taken up with a methodological critique of the most prevalent of the present
measures of paranormal belief, the Paranormal Belief Scale (PBS) of Tobacyk
and Milford (1983; & Tobacyk, 1988), and a good part of that critique focused
on the problems of defining paranormal. Nevertheless, we should now turn to a
concrete discussion of Irwin's review.
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Irwin breaks the main body of his review in to four sections; demographic
correlates, other belief systems, cognitive variables, and dimensions of
personality. In the first of these, the section on demographic correlates of
paranormal belief, Irwin notes that for the most part such research has been
informed by the social marginality hypothesis. According to the adherents of this
view (e.g. Bainbridge, 1978; Wuthnow, 1976) people assume paranormal beliefs
because they have a marginal social status. Thus the poor, unemployed, and
members of ethnic minorities may all show a higher endorsement of
paranormal beliefs. This is presumably because such beliefs are hypothesised to
be akin to more traditional notions of religious belief, such as that our lot is
predestined, the lord will provide, or that the meek will inherit the earth. In this
sense paranormal beliefs (in particular beliefs about magical forces or psychic
type powers, and beliefs about an afterlife) may offer the socially marginal
person some compensation against their lowly social status.
The social marginality hypothesis offers itself up for a fairly clear empirical
examination, and Irwin goes on to examine a number of areas where the
hypothesis has been, wittingly or unwittingly, put to the test. Thus with respect
to age one might expect there to be some association between levels of
paranormal belief and one's age. Reviewing the evidence, Irwin notes that
several studies have indeed found a significant negative correlation between age
and level of paranormal belief. Thus, Emmons and Sobal (1981, p. 52) report
age to be the strongest demographic correlate of paranormal belief (negatively
so) in their American sample, with findings in agreement from several other
studies also (Randall, 1990; Tobacyk, Pritchett, & Mitchell, 1988). However, the
negative correlation does not hold up for all of the beliefs that might be termed
paranormal (e.g. UFO beliefs, see Randall, 1990).
A significant problem, which Irwin notes, with all previous studies looking at
this relationship is that they have been cross-sectional rather than longitudinal,
and thus it is very difficult to know whether the correlations that are found are
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due to life-long developmental changes, or generational influences, or both.
And Irwin is quite right to note that a negative correlation between belief and
age is in contradiction to any viable prediction of the social marginality view. If
ageism tends to marginalise the elderly, as is generally agreed, then it is they and
not the young who should show the highest levels of paranormal belief. In
short, the evidence for a relationship between paranormal belief and age fails at
all to support the marginality hypothesis.
Nevertheless, there are many ways in which one might be regarded as socially
marginalised, and perhaps the most salient of these (insofar as it affects the
largest number of people) is the issue of gender differences. In the West at
least women are regarded widely as having occupied a position of social
marginality for many centuries. Though the women's movement, through
feminism, has lead to greater awareness of the problem, and some change in
women's equality in the workplace, one could argue that women still have a
socially marginal role in an essentially patriarchal world. If this view can be
upheld then it would seem the social marginality hypothesis might have an
explanatory role, for women do indeed show consistently higher levels of
paranormal belief than men (see Blackmore, 1991, for a review).
Interestingly, research has tended to show that whilst women show stronger
paranormal belief for humanly relevant paranormal phenomena (like ESP and
PK, especially the former) men show a much stronger endorsement than
women for more naturally relevant phenomena, such as UFOs and the Loch
Ness Monster. The social marginality hypothesis needs to be able to account
for this fact, and no one has offered any particularly compelling explanation of
this differentiation that would fit with social marginality. Indeed, the so called
gender difference in belief may not be a gender difference at all, but a basic sex
difference having more to do with cognitive differences between men and
women. Nevertheless, the evidence for gender/sex differences in paranormal
belief broadly falls in with the social marginality hypothesis.
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Socio-economic status is potentially an important variable in explaining
paranormal belief from the marginality perspective. Though it is a tricky
concept to operationally define, it is best thought of as a classically latent
variable (i.e. one that is not readily apparent, and which only becomes tangible
through acquaintance with a number of its most salient indicators, e.g.
occupation, income, class. Given the problems of measurement though, one
would expect lower socio-economic status to be negatively correlated with
paranormal belief. Unfortunately, few studies have looked at socio-economic
status and paranormal belief in anything like a satisfactory way. Sheils and Berg
(1977) did not find any relationship between global paranormal belief and
socio-economic status of students. There are a number of problems with this
study though. Firstly, the students' socio-economic status was measured using
their father's income, occupation and education. Secondly, given the first
problem, the lack of any correlation may simply be due to a restriction of range
in socio-economic status, especially with a student sample.
In a study by Emmons and Sobal (1981) unemployment was used as an
indicator of social marginality, itself an aspect of socio-economic status. The
only aspect of paranormal belief that related in a theoretically meaningful way
to unemployment was belief in angels. Belief in ghosts, extraordinary lifeforms,
and ESP were all less prevalent and salient in the unemployed, contrary to the
marginality view.
Apart from these two studies there are a few studies that have explored fairly
specific aspects of belief and socio-economic factors (Lundeen and Culdwell,
1930; Ter Keurst, 1939; Zusne and Jones, 1982; Wuthnow, 1976) but I shall not
dwell here on their (generally uninteresting) findings as they used dubious
indicators of paranormal beliefwhich we shall have later cause to challenge.
Of the other variables that Irwin examines in relation to the marginality
hypothesis, there seems to be essentially no good support for the view that
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members of ethnic minorities are prone to paranormal belief (Tobacyk, Miller,
Murphy and Mitchell, 1988; Emmons and Sobal, 1981; Murphy and Lester,
1976), although differences between cultural and national groupings do occur
(Otis and Kuo, 1984; Tobacyk and Pirtilla-Blackman, 1992; Davies, 1988; Irwin,
1991a; Haraldsson, 1985a). However, these difference are much more likely to
be due to the positive differences in those cultures, than to the negative
differences. Thus, unless one can argue that Australian culture conveys a
manifest sense of cultural superiority to its members over that of American
culture, then the finding that Australians report generally lower paranormal
belief than Americans (Irwin, 1991a) can not be taken to support the social
marginality hypothesis.
In summary, there seems to be little good evidence to suggest that paranormal
beliefs develop as a response to self-perceived social marginality. Perhaps then
the explanation for paranormal beliefs is simply that they stem from, and are
part of, a general human perspective on the world, one of several which a
person might come to adopt. Zusne and Jones (1982) suggest that belief in the
paranormal is basically an aspect of a more general subjectivist worldview.
Paranormal believers are simply folks who are characterised by an
introspective, philosophical, and imaginative outlook on the world, as opposed
to an empirical, analytic and determined outlook. Paranormal belief then is to a
general worldview what talkativeness is for extroversion, merely a facet. If this
is the case then, so Zusne and Jones argue, paranormal belief should be found
to cluster along with other subjectivistic beliefs and behaviours.
Once again, Irwin takes it upon himself to review the evidence for this
assertion. He starts, rather blandly some may feel, by suggesting that evidence
for the worldview hypothesis can be found by looking at the tendency to
which strongly held paranormal beliefs go along with strong involvement in
paranormally related activities. On this score, one can cite a whole host of
evidence to the effect that people who show strong to moderate belief in the
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paranormal also show more interest in media relating to the paranormal
(books, films, TV programs, etc.), are more likely to take courses on
parapsychology, are prone to interpret anomalous experiences as paranormal,
have more paranormal experiences, are more likely to use mind altering drugs,
and are more likely to practice as a medium or psychic.
It seems to me that from the evidence Irwin cites very little of it can be taken
to lend unique and unequivocal support to the worldview hypothesis alone.
Indeed, so much of it should be taken as obvious that it can hardly be brougjht
to bare in any explanation; it is rather the thing to be explained. It does
perhaps show, as Irwin would have it, that paranormal beliefs are not simply
idle philosophies but that they have real associations with the things that
people do. Nevertheless, only the finding that paranormal believers show a
greater interest in the production of altered states of consciousness (Roney-
Dougal, 1984) can be taken as any kind of non-trivial evidence for the world
view hypothesis - the rest could be accepted as the basic evidence upon which
any good theory of paranormal belief and its concomitants should depend. But
the evidence is not all of this trite form, and Irwin goes on to look at the
relationship between religious belief and paranormal belief. Although some
notable paranormal belief scales include religious beliefs as paranormal beliefs
(see my critique of the Paranormal Belief Scale later for some discussion of this
problematic point) they are sufficiently different domains of belief that their
relationship, or lack of one, would provide suitable grounds for a test of the
worldview hypothesis. Thus, if religious belief and paranormal belief didn't
correlate to some extent then the worldview hypothesis would be sorely put to
find an explanation.
The evidence here is fairly good, but it is complicated by the rather too
multidimensional nature of paranormal belief. Thus, in studies of religiosity
most studies show that it correlates positively with paranormal belief. The
picture is complicated however by the fact that certain subscales of some
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paranormal belief scales do not show positive correlations with paranormal
belief. Research in to other areas of belief that covary with paranormal belief
have shown that ESP belief tends to correlate with dualist mind/body beliefs
(Stanovich, 1989), that paranormal believers are more prone to believe in an
after life (r=0.42-0.63, Haraldsson, 1981; r=0.26-0.48, Irwin, 1985a), and that
they are more prone to self-reflective or absorbing internal experiences (Irwin,
1985b; Irwin, 1989). Lastly, Zusne and Jones developed a World-view scale to
test their hypothesis. They found that believers tended to score highly on the
subjective component of the scale.
Although Irwin (1993) feels that diverse evidence generally supports the
worldview hypothesis, he notes that the theory leaves many things to be
desired. On this I agree, only more so. The worldview hypothesis, as for many
hypotheses about paranormal beliefs, seems too trite to be taken seriously. It is
far too general, and much of the evidence in support of it can be explained
equally well, if not better, by other theories. What is essentially lacking in the
worldview hypothesis is any interest in what causes certain people to tend
towards a subjective worldview. As Irwin is quite right to point out, what
fundamental determinants of subjective worldviews give rise to paranormal
belief? This kind of enquiry requires a move away from merely establishing that
paranormal beliefs go along with other kinds of beliefs that have a subjective
basis, to looking at the basic cognitive and personality characteristics that might
support such beliefs. That, after all, is what constitutes the true psychological
enquiry. It is this kind of evidence that Irwin surveys next, in his section on the
cognitive correlates of paranormal belief.
Turning to the cognitive correlates of paranormal belief one comes directly to
the centre ground for research conducted by sceptical psychologists. Though
by no means driven by an explicit theory, the greatest component of this kind
of research can be seen to fit in to a general framework. Thus, sceptical
psychologists argue that given that surveys suggest that paranormal belief is
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widespread (a well attested fact), and that evidence of the paranormal is at best
weak (a somewhat less well attested opinion), then there is a high likelihood
that paranormal believers who claim to base their beliefs on experience, or
indeed on any evidence, are not doing so on the basis of real experience, but
on some kind of ersatz constructed experience. And finally, so the argument
goes, much of this ersatz experience and evidence must be a function of the
paranormal believer's particular personal makeup. In short, there must be
something about believers that predisposes them to believe in the paranormal.
Naturally, questions of this sort have lead researchers to examine potential
cognitive and personality variables that might predispose people to paranormal
like experiences, or bias their interpretation of second hand evidence of
paranormal phenomena.
Because of this emphasis on bias, illusion, gullibility and incredulity in the
development of paranormal belief, Irwin (1993) has wryly termed this vein of
research cognitive deficits research. A review of this specific area of research is also
provided by French (1992), himself a moderately sceptical psychologist
workingwithin the cognitive deficits domain. Irwin (1993) reviews the evidence
for cognitive correlates of paranormal belief on a broad front. He partitions his
discussion of these correlates in to four sections; educational attainment,
scientific and other specialist education, intelligence and reasoning skills, and
creativity and imagination.
For the first of these cognitive correlates, educational attainment, Irwin points
out a number of studies that have addressed this issue in a variety of ways.
Thus, Messer and Griggs (1989) correlated grade point average in US college
students with paranormal belief and found a negative correlation, implying that
the relative sceptic was a better student than the relative believer. Tobacyk
(1984) reports a similar negative relationship between college student grade
point average and superstition and spiritualist beliefs on his PBS. Then again,
for somewhat younger high school students Tobacyk, Miller and Jones (1984)
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found that grade point average correlated positively with belief in psi and
traditional religious belief. Irwin argues that further research is warranted to
look at the relationship between paranormal beliefs, grades, and developmental
stage.
Whilst not wishing to prejudge the issue, I do not share Irwin's optimism about
the import of these studies. Firstly, it may well be the case that traditional
religious belief and psi beliefs are indicative of a generally well educated mind,
whilst superstition and spiritualist beliefs are less positively indicated on this
front. Certainly the PBS shows differential relationships between its subscales
and a number of traits (see Davies and Kirby, 1985, in particular for evidence
of this kind). In short, the above findings may simply reflect genuine
differences in the way these PBS subscales relate to educational attainment.
Secondly, given the well attested relationship between extroversion and belief
in ESP (e.g. Thalboume, 1981; Thalboume and Haraldsson, 1980) and
extroversion and educational attainment (Kline, 1993) the possibility that the
relationships found (especially the negative ones) are the result of the
underlying connection with extroversion cannot lightly be dismissed. One
simple way to test this would be to calculate the partial correlation of
educational attainment and paranormal belief with the variance due to
extroversion partialled out. If a very small, or no, correlation was found this
would strongly suggest that extroversion is the key variable here.
Nevertheless, Irwin goes on to look at other variables that might index
educational attainment. The highest level of education achieved is one other
way of assessing educational attainment. Here, Irwin notes that previous
research had been quite inconsistent. Tobacyk et aL (1984) found that
paranormal belief was positively related to attainment according to this index.
In a related vein, a number of studies (Emmons and Sobal, 1981; Haraldsson,
1985a, p. 149; Tobacyk et aL, 1984) have found that psi belief is positively
related to highest level of education, whilst a fairly equal number of others
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(Gray, 1987; Haraldsson, 1985a, p. 149, Otis and Alcock, 1982; Pasachoff,
Cohen, & Pasachoff, 1970) have found a negative relationship. The same mixed
pattern is found for most other subscales of paranormal belief, with only
Spiritualist beliefs showing any truly consistent (negative) relation to
educational attainment (Otis and Alcock, 1982).
One major problem with this whole body of research is that it lacks resolution.
Educational attainment is such a gross index of cognitive functioning that it
may be far too broad a variable to aid in the identification of those areas of
cognitive functioning that relate strongly to paranormal beliefs. As Irwin (1993)
himself points out, the problems with educational attainment and paranormal
belief are legion; '...depending on the context of its measurement it could be
confounded with age, socio-economic status, generational differences,
developmental level, social roles associated with particular vocations, and
exposure to forms of social indoctrination other than education' (p. 17). Given
this, it may be better to identify aspects of educational attainment that would
more readily relate to paranormal belief. In the next section, on scientific and
other specialist education Irwin does just this.
On first appearances the more scientific education one has, the less likely one is
to believe in the paranormal. A scientific education, so the story goes, is the
antidote to superstitious thinking of all kinds (Valentine, 1936). Indeed, Singer
and Benassi (1981), with a breathtakingly careless disregard for the subtleties of
paranormal beliefs, argue that the quality of science teaching in the US can be
indexed against the prevalence of paranormal beliefs. A number of studies
show that some or other type of paranormal belief is less prevalent amongst
those with a college science education (Happs, 1987; Padgett et aL, 1981; Otis
and Alcock, 1982; Gray and Mill, 1990; Za'rour, 1972) in comparison to those
with a humanities background.
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However, although differences do occur, these can hardly be explained easily in
terms of basic cognitive functions, for once again educational attainment in
terms of the faculty of one's education is hardly a sensitive measure of
underlying cognitive function. In addition, it is difficult to tease out the causal
direction of any possible relation between these variables. What is needed here
is a more specific and precise test that directly addresses the question of the
basic underlying determinants of paranormal belief. More basic measures of a
range of cognitively relevant variables are needed. IQ (visual and verbal, fluid
and crystallised), imagery, creativity, and reasoning ability would form the core
variables.
Intelligence as measured by IQ tests of various kinds has been identified as one
of the most fundamental determinants of human behaviour and thought
(Kline, 1991). If one was searching for a basic cognitive trait that might have
some bearing upon the development of paranormal belief then IQ would
provide an obvious possibility.
Strangely, practically no research has been conducted to look at the
relationship between paranormal belief and IQ, visual, verbal, or otherwise
defined. Irwin (1993) himself remarks on this dearth of evidence. Though early
studies did look at the relationship between IQ and superstitious beliefs
(Emme, 1940; Zapf, 1945; Killen, Wildman, and Wildman, 1974), finding them
to be negatively related, very few studies have looked at paranormal belief in
other contexts. Indeed, what little research does exist is involved primarily with
investigating the claim that paranormal believers can't think straight, measured
in terms of their ability to perform well in syllogistic reasoning tasks and the
like.
Interestingly, one more recent study that has looked at general paranormal
belief and IQ was conducted by Jones et al. (1977). In that study they found
that IQ correlated positively with belief (r=0.22). Smith, Foster and Stovin
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(1995) however, found that IQ (as measured by the Advanced Raven's
Progressive Matrices) correlated negatively with paranormal belief. Smith's
study is interesting in that he specifically tried to test Irwin's (1993) claim that
the experimenter's expressed belief in the paranormal would moderate the
relationship found between IQ and paranormal belief. Smith et al. (1995) did
not confirm this view, and so the IQ/belief relationship, though scantily
evidenced, does tend to support the view that sceptics show slightly higher IQs
than believers, at least for those components of IQ tested (they have tended to
be weighted in favour of verbal IQ measures). Other studies have looked more
generally at critical reasoning ability (Alcock and Otis, 1980; Gray and Mill,
1990; Polzella, Popp and Hinsman, 1975; Wierzbicki, 1985; Tobacyk and
Milford, 1983). These studies tend to find that believers are less critical in their
thinking than sceptics.
Some caution needs to be expressed about this kind of finding however, as
Tobacyk and Milford (1983) found that only those who scored highly on
traditional religious belief and superstition showed significantly poorer critical
thinking. Irwin himself argues that these studies, conducted solely by
researchers of a sceptical persuasion, may suffer from a particular artefact. In
short, if the researcher impresses his or her scepticism upon the participant too
much then they may well force otherwise rational believers to profess a false
scepticism, in a way which is clearly reminiscent of the socially desirable
response. The result will be that but for the sheep in goats clothing there
would in fact be little difference between the sheep and the goats on measures
of critical inference. This is indeed an interesting proposition, and might help
explain why Irwin (1991a) has found little evidence for critical thinking
differences between believers and sceptics (save for strong religious beliefs).
Unfortunately for Irwin, the only critical test of this hypothesis has found it
wanting (Smith, Foster and Stovin, 1995).
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To summarise, though there is practically no good research looking at IQ and
belief in the paranormal, some research looking at more general cognitive
constructs has shown believers to perform poorly on tests of critical and
conditional reasoning. This research itself is piecemeal and highly mixed in
quality, and it is very difficult to say whether the results obtained so far
represent a body of data of central or peripheral importance in understanding
paranormal belief.
The previously discussed research addressing cognitive correlates of
paranormal belief has been primarily concerned with cognitive deficits, and
primarily it is the believer who has been argued to suffer from them.
Nevertheless, other kinds of cognition exist apart from the purely
propositional, analytic, and numerical kinds (i.e. the kinds that appeal to
staunch ratiocentric sceptics), and a fair amount of research has been
conducted to look at these. Irwin's final section on the cognitive correlates of
paranormal beliefs deals with creativity and imagination. It should come as no
surprise that these more positive aspects of cognitive function have been
suggested by more moderate or pro-paranormal researchers to be related to
paranormal belief and experience. Thus, both Krippner (1962) and Murphy
(1963) have suggested that paranormal phenomena are associated with
creativity. Likewise, Moon (1975) found that ESP belief was higher in artists
than in non-artists. More directly relevant to the creativity issue, Joesting and
Joesting (1969) found a positive correlation between ESP belief and a standard
measure of creativity, and Davis, Peterson and Farley (1974) found a similar
result for psi belief generally.
The data on creativity provide quite unequivocal support for the view that
believers are more creative than sceptics, but they do much more than this.
Though Irwin fails to note this, these data accord well with experimental tests
of ESP that have examined the influence of similar cognitive variables on actual
ESP performance. Thus, Schlitz and Honorton (1992) found a stunning 50%
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hit rate for artists at the world renowned Julliard School for the Performing
Arts in New York, when they tested them in their Ganzfeld laboratory at
Psychophysical Research Laboratories (this result was replicated by Radin,
McAlpine and Cunningham 1994). This study has spawned a number of other
ESP Ganzfeld studies that report results in a similar vein. Creativity actually
seems to be associated with laboratory ESP results. For once a cognitive
correlate of paranormal belief and experience in self-report measures is found
to hold true for controlled laboratory tests. This kind of result surely warrants
more serious consideration given its capacity to switch the focus of
psychological research on belief more clearly, and honestly, on to paranormal
experience.
A second variable that has been found to correlate positively with paranormal
belief and experience is fantasy proneness. Irwin (1990, 1991b) found that
fantasy proneness as measured by Myers' (1981) ICMI:C scale correlated
positively with paranormal belief (range of r = 0.32-0.48 for core components
of paranormal belief). More generally Wilson and Barber (1983) found that a
group of highly susceptible hypnotic subjects (all female) reported having quite
florid fantasy lives and often reported plenty of psychic experiences. Hypnotic
susceptibility has been found to correlate with paranormal belief and
experience in a number of studies (Haraldsson, 1985b: Nadon, Laurence &
Perry, 1987; Wagner and Ratzenberg, 1987). This whole body of results
suggests that paranormal beliefs are related to introspective, absorbing, imagery
based experiences, and the capacity to entertain these fairly easily. More
interestingly still, Irwin goes on to note the relationship between fantasy and
childhood trauma, as previously noted by Hilgard (1974), Rhue and Lynn
(1987) and Wilson and Barber (1983). For example, Rhue and Lynn (1987)
argue that, 'It may be that fantasizers' imaginative involvements represent an
autistic retreat into a fantasy world as a result of an inability to cope effectively
with reality.' (pp. 327). However, Rhue and Lynn (1987) did not find that high
fantasy was strongly associated with psychopathology, although 10-20% of high
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fantasizers displayed some symptoms of psychopathology. Logically, so Irwin
argues, trauma may have an influence on the development of paranormal
beliefs, via the influence of fantasy proneness. Support for just such a notion is
found in a number of studies (Hilgard, 1974; Wilson and Barber, 1983; Rhue,
Lynn, Henry, Buhk and Boyd, 1990-91, Council and Huff, 1990). To further
examine this claim Irwin introduces the last of his four major correlates of
paranormal belief - the personality correlates.
Of obvious interest when dealing with personality correlates of paranormal
belief are the main components of personality - extroversion, neuroticism and
psychoticism (at least if one adopts an Eysenckian enumeration of personality).
Firstly, with respect to extroversion most of the evidence does not support a
relationship with paranormal belief (r=0.05, Windholz and Diamant, 1974;
Lester, Thinschmidt, and Trautman, 1987), though Thalbourne and his
colleagues have consistently found a small correlation between extroversion
and belief in ESP (Thalboume, 1981; Thalbourne, Beloff, Delanoy, and
Jungkuntz, 1983; Thalboume and Haraldsson, 1980). Interestingly extroversion
has been implicated in the susceptibility to paranormal experience (Eysenck,
1967) and a meta-analysis of the experimental ESP-Extroversion literature
appears to show a small but genuine relationship (Honorton, Ferrari and Bern,
1991). There has been practically no research examining the other scales of
personality according to the three factor structure that Eysenck favours.
However, a study some colleagues and I conducted at St. Andrews University
did show that extroversion correlated with Thalboume and Delin's (1993)
Australian Sheep-Goat Scale (r = 0.268) and the revised Paranormal Belief
Scale (Tobacyk, 1988) (r=0.185). Neither neuroticism or psychoticism
correlated with the ASGS or PBS (although Windholz and Diamant, 1974,
reported an r=0.21 with their SOBEP scale). Extroversion alone then seems to
be related to paranormal belief and experience.
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According to Eysenck (1967) the relation between extroversion and
paranormal experience can be explained in terms of the low arousal
characteristic of extroverts facilitating the receipt of paranormal information.
Strangely, researchers, apart from Sargent (1981), have been slow to follow up
this type of research, perhaps because an adequate test of the hypothesis would
require access to psychophysiological recording techniques that
parapsychologists have neither the money nor the expertise to employ. Irwin,
however, chooses to think of the extroversion data from a social perspective,
and from that perspective he notes that the evidence for the social dimensions
of personality in paranormal believers depict an apparently outgoing individual
who derives much of their stimulation from their own inner life, rather than
their social relationships with others. Irwin feels this characterisation is almost
psychopathic, though it is not at all clear to me the evidence Irwin cites either
individually or collectively supports this notion. However, there is more direct
evidence bearing upon the psychological adjustment of the paranormal
believer. Early studies carried out in the thirties on superstition found negative
relationships between superstitiousness and adjustment (Mailer and Lundeen,
1934; Ter Keurst, 1939; Zapf, 1945), but superstition is one component of the
present day Paranormal Belief Scale that shows little variation in response and
very low endorsement - few people are superstitious these days it seems. Thus,
Irwin (r=0.05; 1991a) and Tobacyk and Milford (1983) both fail to support a
link between modem day superstition and poor psychological adjustment.
Oddly, Schumaker (1987) argues that paranormal beliefs should lead to
enhanced psychological adjustment, and claims to have support for this from
studies he has conducted (r=+0.39), but Irwin rightly points out that
Schumaker has simply interpreted his measure of adjustment incorrectly - when
the correct interpretation is used the relationship that Schumaker claims to
have found is the reverse (Irwin, 1991a, reports an r=+0.19 for his own
replication attempt). It should be noted also here that Schumaker's supporting
21
arguments are so poor, and his hatred for paranormal belief so fervent, that his
argument barely warrants scrutiny at all.
More interesting than the evidence for general psychological adjustment is the
evidence for a more specific proto-psychopathology in paranormal believers.
Evidence does tend to suggest that paranormal believers score more highly on
Eckblad and Chapman's (1983) Magical Ideation Scale than do non-believers
(Thalbourne, 1985; Anderson, 1988; Thalboume, Dunbar and Delin 1989;
Williams, 1989; Tobacyk and Wilkinson, 1990; Thalboume, 1994, r=0.54). Most
important here is Thalboume's (1985) finding that the relationship between
magical ideation and paranormal belief holds up even when items directly
referring to parapsychological phenomena on the magical ideation scale are
removed from the analysis. The magical ideation scale is regarded as an
indicator of schizotypy, or schizoid personality disorder, a less pronounced
variant of full blown schizophrenia. Interestingly, Thalboume (1994) finds that
the correlation between belief and magical ideation were generally much higher
for males over females.
Irwin notes that the studies on magical ideation could be taken to mean that
believers are just crazy. He quite rightly cautions against this interpretation,
citing two possible objections. Firstly, one could be a paranormal believer in a
number of ways, and only some kinds of paranormal believer may show a
strong magical ideation profile. Thus, Williams and Irwin (1991) compared
members of an Australian psychical research group with a sample of
schizotypes on a measure of paranormal belief and schizotypy. Whilst both
groups had similar belief scores, the psychical researchers' schizotypy scores
were the same as those for normal members of the adult population, whilst of
course the schizotypy sufferers' scores were reminiscent of an abnormal
population. We may therefore need to identify just what kind of paranormal
believer we are dealing with, before we jump to the conclusion that they are all
crazy. This is precisely a point I bring out in far greater detail in chapter 4. Our
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present conception of paranormal belief is simply too clumsy to allow really
incisive research to discover what is going on.
Secondly, clearly magical ideation is a relevant variable for understanding (some
class of) paranormal believer, but the simple correlation in itself does not tell us
anything other than that the two variables are related. As Irwin (1993) points
out, recalling points I have raised earlier, 'That paranormal believers tend to be
psychologically maladjusted is more an observation to be explained than a
sufficient explanation in itself. Given that paranormal beliefs have some
attraction for relatively maladjusted (and other) people, under the
psychodynamic functions hypothesis the question still remains as to the
functions served for these people by paranormal beliefs. It is in such terms that
an effective theory of paranormal beliefs should be couched.' (p. 25).
Here at last Irwin takes twenty years of paranormal belief research one step
further, by pointing out that it would be nice at this stage to pause and consider
what the data so far have been telling us. The fact of the matter is that up until
quite recently the level of theorising in paranormal beliefs research was
shockingly poor. As we have seen, the research can just be organised around
loose themes, cognitive deficits, worldview, social marginality, but none of
these attempts has been particularly successful, save perhaps for selected
studies within the cognitive deficits vein.
In considering the functions that paranormal beliefs might serve Irwin is quick
to note that whilst social and interpersonal factors may well influence the
development and expression of paranormal beliefs, it is in the psychodynamic
(intrapersonal) domain that paranormal beliefs are most likely to find their root
cause. A whole host of sceptical researchers have argued that paranormal
beliefs may serve an important role in the development of a sense of security in
an uncertain world. Thus, if the world is thought to be chaotic or capncious,
this can easily overwhelm one's will to cope with life events, creating the sort
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of existential angst that beset William James (Fancher, 1979), the great
American psychologist. Paranormal beliefs provide a template for
understanding capricious and traumatic events. For example, 'only the good die
young' is an expression we may use to console those who have lost a son or
daughter, but its consolatory value lies in nothing concrete and real, but merely
in the quasi-religious assertion that nature (or god) knows our deeds, and can
claim us early if we accrue a positive balance of good ones. The thought
consoles us because it plays to our better sentiments (our son was a good lad,
we should be proud he led such a worthwhile life, he was too good for us etc.).
The role that paranormal beliefs play then is just that of 'only the good die
young' abstracted and writ large.
Sceptics have not been slow to aver to this potential raison d'etre for
paranormal beliefs (Alcock, 1981; Frank, 1977; Marks and Kammann, 1980;
Schumaker, 1990; Singer and Benassi, 1981; Zusne and Jones, 1982). Few
however, have really sought to test this claim properly. Nevertheless, the work
of Blackmore and Troscianko (1985) is pertinent in this respect. Blackmore and
Troscianko argued that paranormal beliefs would provide an illusion of control
over events which were otherwise controlled by chance alone. To test this they
asked study participants to estimate the degree of control they had over a
computer coin tossing task. In a repeated measures design participants took
part in trials where some control was permissible, whilst in others no control
was permissible. They found that believers felt they had more control over the
computer task than sceptics felt they did, whether they actually did or not, and
irrespective of their actual success in the task. Irwin cites his own study (Irwin,
1992) as additional support for the claim that control is a prime concern for
paranormal believers. Irwin (1992) argued that the believer's need for control
over the world might be manifested in a higher need for control in
interpersonal relationships. To test this he administered Schultz's (1957; 1978)
FIRO-B scale to some psychology students. Amongst other things, the FIRO-
B claims to measure a person's need for control in their interpersonal
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relationships in the form of an expressed control score. Irwin, concerned about
the potential fakeability of the FIRO-B (in my view unnecessarily), provided
duplicate forms of the scale to the respondent and a close friend of theirs, in
order to obtain two perspectives on the respondents' need for control. Whilst
the expressed control scores did correlated positively with respondent
paranormal belief when the associate estimated the respondents' need for
control, it did not do so when the respondent provided their own responses.
Irwin nevertheless argues that the results support the notion that paranormal
belief is in some way tied up with a need for control over the world, and feels
that these results point to a psychodynamic source for paranormal beliefs.
Strangely, Irwin neglects to mention the findings of another study which bears
directly on the control theme, that of Davies and Kirby (1985). Davies and
Kirby provided 95 liberal arts college students with Paulhus's (1983) Spheres of
Control Scale and Tobacyk and Milford's (1983) Paranormal Belief Scale, in an
attempt to measure the extent to which perceived control and paranormal
belief were related. In a canonical correlation analysis of the two scales they
found that internal control in the interpersonal and personal spheres was
associated most strongly with psi belief and witchcraft, whilst external control
(control by others) in the personal and socio-political spheres is associated
most strongly with traditional religious belief, superstition and spiritualism. This
study clearly indicates that the more experientially relevant paranormal beliefs
are associated with concerns about the personal, and moreover interpersonal
domains. To the extent that the core paranormal beliefs (psi and witchcraft
being representative here) correlate with control related measures, they seem to
be most strongly related to interpersonal control of just the kind that the
expressed control score of the FIRO-B is designed to measure.
Given the relation between paranormal belief and the need for control over
the interpersonal domain then it is pertinent to ask why this should be the
case. Irwin squarely places the cause of this relationship at the door of its
potential relevance to the relationship between childhood trauma and fantasy.
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Thus, given that studies (previously discussed) implicate trauma in the
development of fantasy proneness, and given that fantasy proneness is a trait
that is clearly relevant to paranormal belief, then it is not such a great
inferential leap to suppose that control over the interpersonal domain may be a
feature of paranormal belief because that belief finds its basis in fantasy
proneness and fantasy finds (some of) its basis in childhood trauma. This is at
least the hypothesis that Irwin puts forward strongly both in his 1993 review
and in his 1992 paper that explicitly addresses this issue.
Irwin's childhoodfactors model (as I choose to call it in this thesis) is a reasonably
bold hypothesis, because it is both reasonably specific in its claim, and (a priori)
sufficiently novel (even exotic) as to warrant the claim that on first appearances
it should be found wanting. Nevertheless, Irwin (1992) did find evidence to
suggest that childhood trauma has some role to play in explaining the
development of paranormal beliefs. Irwin administered Council and Edwards'
Survey of Traumatic Childhood Events (STCE) to a group of university
students along with Tobacyk's (1988) revised Paranormal Belief Scale. He
found that global paranormal belief correlated significantly and positively with
intrafamilial physical abuse during childhood, and that overall trauma correlated
positively with paranormal belief, although at a marginal level of significance.
As a result of this study, Irwin (1992) proposed a model of the development of
paranormal belief that he felt might act as a stimulus for further research. This
model is represented exactly as Irwin depicted it in his 1993 review, in figure 1.
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Figure 1. Irwin's (1992) model of the origins and
functions of paranormal belief.
From figure 1 we can see that Irwin's model clearly addresses the
developmental history of the paranormal believer, and some aspects of
psychological functioning that may be deemed to be a consequence of
paranormal belief. Clearly there is a central mediating role for fantasy in the
development of Paranormal Experiences and Beliefs as far as Irwin is
concerned, though Irwin sees this role itself as being influenced by a large
range of social factors, his social context. Moreover, fantasy is seen to be
equivalent with respect to its influence on both paranormal belief and
experience. As for paranormal belief and experience themselves, Irwin sees
them as correlating with one another, and thus seems shy of actually causally
prioritising one or the other. In fact, no causal relationship between belief and
experience is implied at all by Irwin's model. Nevertheless, Irwin's model does
place paranormal belief and experience in to a model that shows some promise
in the explanation of many key findings in research in to paranormal belief.
For example, the cognitive deficits hypothesis implies an essentially
attributional role for such deficits in the promotion of ersatz paranormal
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experiences which then form the basis of paranormal beliefs, which themselves
form a yet firmer basis for the promotion of yet more paranormal experiences.
The source of paranormal experiences is attributional in that nothing in the
experience in itself needs to appear paranormal.
For example, deficits in one's appreciation of chance events might lead one to
suppose that the receipt of two identical birthday cards is a minor miracle,
demanding some synchronistic or telepathic collusion between two
independent senders. In fact such an event may be much more likely than is
supposed. What is interesting here is that this kind of experience is constructed
out of a set of independently mundane facts of the world. The unusual nature
of the two card event is derived purely as an epiphenomenon of certain
mundane events being coupled with a biased interpretation of them. However,
commonly when someone claims to have seen a ghost this is precisely not the
way such an experience could have occurred. Ghosts and apparitions, if seen
clearly (as most seem to be), are seen as a distinct objects in one's field of view,
that simply could not have been there (Tyrell, 1949; Wilson, 1995). Ghosts are
thus truly experiential in a direct way; a way in which the birthday card
experience can not be.
So, to bring this rather elliptical discussion to its conclusion, what is interesting
about Irwin's model is that, with its emphasis on fantasy as the central
mediating variable in the development of paranormal belief and experience, it
appeals directly to the ghost-esque view of paranormal experience; the view
that implies an experiential source for belief in the paranormal (Hufford, 1982).
To believe in the paranormal and base this belief on experience then, the
believer must have had a paranormal experience of the ghost-like kind, and not
merely the birthday kind. Indeed, an experience of the birthday kind may well
be something entirely consequential, happening only after one had developed
paranormal beliefs. Further still, the (early) life long developmental view that
Irwin's model encourages has the potential to account for all the other main
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theories of paranormal belief (cognitive deficits, marginality view,
personality/psychopathology view). Trauma is clearly implicated in the
promotion of psychopathology, and must also surely have effects on childhood
educational achievement, and for that matter one's social status.
I think for these reasons then, that Irwin's model represents a major step in the
development of a truly useful model of the development not just of
paranormal belief, but of paranormal experience also. As a consequence, I
devote the greater part of this thesis to an attempt to confirm and extend
Irwin's model. It should now be clear that research in to paranormal belief and
experience suffers from precisely those problems I outlined in the beginning of
this introduction. As I have said, what is required if research in this area is to
progress from a merely descriptive stage is a decent model of the development
of paranormal belief and experience and a method for sensitively and
rigorously testing this model. Irwin has provided the basis for this model, and
in the next chapter I outline the method I shall use to try and achieve to
provide it with a sensitive and rigorous test.
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Chapter 2
COVARIANCE STRUCTURE MODELLING IN THE ANALYSIS OF
PARAPSYCHOLOGICAL SURVEY DATA: AN INTRODUCTION
Covariance structure modelling (CSM) represents a relatively new, powerful
statistical technique for the analysis of correlational data, which should be of
special interest to parapsychologists conducting surveys of paranormal
experience and belief. With the capability to combine factor analysis,
regression analysis, and path modelling, this technique has gained prominence
amongst psychologists, sociologists, and other social scientists concerned with
drawing conclusions from complex multivariable datasets. In particular, the
capacity for CSM to aid the development of rigorous, theory driven
approaches to survey data is emphasised.
Parapsychologists, like other behavioural scientists, have often turned to
surveys to examine the psycho-social factors underlying people's experience
of, and attitude towards, paranormal phenomena as will be abundantly clear
from the previous chapter. The general need to understand the nature and
function of paranormal experiences and beliefs in everyday life, has meant that
a considerable body of survey based research, conducted by both
parapsychologists and sceptics, has grown up over the past three decades.
Typically these studies have employed simple regression and correlation
techniques in order to assess the relationships between the variables of concern
(e.g. Irwin, 1985; Thalboume, 1984; Glicksohn, 1990). However, in contrast to
experimental techniques, a common problem with surveys in general, and
correlational survey data in particular, is that such studies often seem unable to
tell us anything of genuine interest, beyond the fact that variable x seems to be
correlated with variables y , Y2—Yd, to a more or less significant degree. In short,
the old problem of inferring causes from correlations raises its head.
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Arguably as a result of the relatively unsophisticated way in which
contemporary survey type research has been conducted, it has largely failed to
enhance our understanding of the nature and functions of paranormal belief
and experience. Although the number of these studies is quite high, the field
seems to have developed no theoretical consistency. Indeed, all too often
correlational studies suffer from the researcher's piecemeal and somewhat
ambiguous interpretation, based upon visual inspection of the correlation
matrix or at best some type of hierarchical multiple regression analysis (to his
credit Irwin, 1992, has actually been quite successful using just this type of
approach).
That our understanding of paranormal experiences and beliefs should falter as a
result of this kind of 'intuitive causal modelling' approach should come as no
surprise. The answer to our problems lies in finding a technique which
combines the theory driven, causally oriented, rigour of the laboratory
experiment, with the convenience, diversity, and flexibility of the survey study.
Fortunately, such a technique already exists, although to date its presence has
gone unnoticed amongst survey researchers in the field, and it is to a discussion
of the utility of this technique that I now turn.
Covariance structure modelling in the behavioural sciences
Until the late sixties, regression analysis and factor analysis constituted the two
main ways of treating correlational data, and the choice of either one was
largely constrained by the goals of the investigation. If one wanted to predict
some variable's outcome in terms of one or more others, then regression
analysis was used. If one's aims were to reduce a complicated multi-variate
dataset to a smaller set of underlying or 'latent' variables then factor analysis
was used.
However, there arose amongst social and behavioural scientists a general need
to combine both the descriptive and predictive power of the regression
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analysis, with the summarising power of the factor analysis. In particular it was
felt that there were many weaknesses of the former that could be solved by the
latter, and vice-versa. Consequently, over the last twenty years a new approach
to the analysis of correlations, known variously as Structural Equation
Modelling, LISREL, or Covariance Structure Modelling, has revolutionised the
treatment and interpretation of correlational data. Amongst other things, this
approach (which from now on I shall refer to as CSM) constitutes an extension
of path analysis (a technique for analysing a hypothesised causal path
underlying correlational data, often using hierarchical multiple regression
analysis). With CSM a factor analytic model (the measurement model) is used
to assess which variables load on which factors, and a regression type model
(the structural model) is used to assess the interrelations between factors, in
order to test these interrelations against the hypothetical causal model input by
the researcher. This approach thus promotes the rational, statistical testing of
hypothesised causal relations between data from correlational studies. In detail
the approach is highly mathematical, requiring a good general understanding of
matrix algebra in order to really follow the mechanics of the technique.
However, given my own lack of familiarity with all but the basics of matrix
algebra, and the constraints of space, I shall employ an intuitive, example based
approach to covariance structure modelling, showing concretely how CSM can
significantly enhance the validity and utility of studies using correlational data.
Those who wish to delve into the mathematics of CSM may find Long (1994),
Bentler (1989), and Bollen (1989) useful. A particularly good introduction to
CSM (using Bender's EQS program) for non-mathematicians is Byrne (1994).
Covariance Structure Modelling in Practice
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Figure 1. A path diagram of Irwin's (1992) childhood factors
modeL
When using CSM to test causal models1 on some particular data set the
problem arises as to what model to test. If our research is pioneering, like we
all think it should be, then there may be no explicit models or theories to
account for the findings in the field being investigated. In this case we just have
to plough through the studies and the reviews and come up with a naive model
of what's going on. This model may bear close relation to folk psychological
notions (i.e. we may be using common sense to guide our theory). This is fine,
as the important thing is to have something to test (even if its wrong).
1 No amount of statistical sophistication will glean causation from correlation. The imputation of
causality within a causal model stems from the background research and theory underlying the model,
and does not reside within the technique itself.
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However, usually when we come to attempt CSM we do so because some basic
model has been postulated to account for the phenomena in which we are
interested. Given that a basic model exists, the first thing to do to turn it into
something suitable for use with CSM is to draw it as a graphical model (i.e. set
up a path model specifying the causal relationships between the variables
modelled). In figure 1. we can see a graphical model, produced by Irwin (1992),
which attempts to outline the early childhood causes of paranormal belief and
experience. How can we use CSM to test Irwin's model? In what follows I shall
guide the reader through the process of specifying Irwin's model in the
language of CSM used by EQS.
According to Irwin's path diagram childhood trauma causes childhood fantasy
(as a means of escape from a harsh reality), and childhood fantasy leads to both
paranormal experience and paranormal belief. In addition, paranormal
experience causes paranormal belief. A basic premise in EQS is that any
variable said to be caused by another variable can be expressed as a linear
function of the causative antecedent variables. Thus, if we say that trauma
causes fantasy, we are saying that fantasy proneness scores can be expressed as
a linear function of trauma scores (plus some error) thus;
fantasy=trauma+random error.
but as EQS refers to variables as Vs and error terms as E's then we can
reexpress this equation in EQS speak as;
V2=*V1+1*E2.
where V2 is fantasy and VI is trauma, E2 is error associated with the prediction
of fantasy.
Readers familiar with simple linear regression will see that this equation is
broadly similar. A full model is 'specified' by providing a series of equations of
varying complexity, like the one above, for all of the features of the model that
demand specification. The trick in specifying a model is to know which parts of
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the model should be freely estimated and which parts should be fixed (usually
at zero, and in that case this is done by not specifying them at all).
Relationships in a model which are to be estimated are prefixed by an asterisk.
Thus the relationship between VI and V2 above is to be estimated because the
equation contains the expression *V1 rather than 1V1 (fixed at 1) or 0.5V1
(fixed at 0.5). In contrast, the relation between V2 and E2 is fixed at 1, because
it makes sense to suppose that V2 is responsible for all of the error associated
with its own prediction2. Once Irwin's model has been fully specified it might
look something like this;
/EQUATIONS
V6 = + *V9 + *V13 + E6;
V7 = + 1F1 + E7;
V8 = + *F1 +E8;
V9= + *V13 + E9;









2 This will not always be true. Sometimes errors between variables are correlated, and Bender (1989)
discusses some interesting cases where error terms were themselves modelled as causally efficacious
on other normal variables.
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There are some other features of the above that need to be noted. Thus, we
can see the statement F1 = + *V6 + Dl. This refers to a causal effect of a
measured variable upon a latent variable (one that is made up of a number of
measured variables and is thus a factor - F). Factors in covariance structure
models have error terms referred to as 'disturbances' (D). We can also see that
V7 (EPBS) has a loading fixed at 1.0 on its factor (F1 - paranormal belief). This
is done to 'scale' that factor, and it also aids in identifying the model
mathematically. A model is said to be identified when only a single set of
parameter values can be obtained from the observed covariances and variances
of the original variables. Identification is related to the notion that a simple
equation in two unknowns can not be solved with only a single piece of
information (data), e.g. A*B=1 cannot be solved because their are two free
parameters A and B but only one data point. If we add another equation
involving B though, say B=3, then the parameters become just identified.
This model incorporates a very straightforward conception of the covariance
structure model, known as the Bentler-Weeks representation. Thus, according
to the Bentler-Weeks representation a model variable is said to be dependent
when it is depicted as a linear function of any other variable in the model (i.e. is
placed on the left hand side of a linear equation in the equations section of the
EQS model file. Conversely, a variable is said to be independent when it is not
specified as a linear function of any other variable (i.e. it exists only on the right
hand side of a linear equation in the equation section of EQS). Thus, the
variances and covariances of a model are also, in the Bentler-Weeks
representation, independent variables. This conception of the CSM is
straightforward in that it describes models in terms that any one familiar with
regression analysis would understand, as opposed to the jargon ridden matrix
algebra conceptualisation favoured by proponents of LISREL. Using a model
like this EQS is able to specify a structural matrix of coefficients that represent
3 Equivalently one could fix the variance of the factor to 1.0, a more appropriate technique when
confirmatory factor analysis is used and the precise value of factor loadings is required.
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the theoretically relevant relationships in the model. Without getting too
heavily in to the matrix algebra, what EQS does is attempt to reproduce the
observed correlation matrix O using just these coefficients and a technique for
manipulating their values. The immediate end product of an EQS analysis is an
estimated correlation matrix S which when subtracted from the actual
correlation matrix O gives an intuitive measure of the degree to which one's
model reproduces the observed data4. Most of the other fit statistics that EQS
produces are based upon calculations drawn from this residual correlation
matrix.
A variety of specialised programs exist that can perform CSM. Generally the
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Figure 2. Example of subtraction of estimated correlation matrix S from
observed matrix O to give residual matrix R.
best known CSM packages are LISREL (Joreskog and Sorbom, 1981), MILS
(Schoenberg, 1982) and EQS (Bender, 1989). Of these LISREL is the most
famous, MILS the cheapest, and EQS the most user friendly. EQS combines
factor analysis, multiple regression, and path analysis techniques, providing a
powerful system to test and confirm various causal or structural models.
Traditionally covariance structure modelling involved the arduous specification
of the model using a tricky programming language to specify the various
measurement and structural (i.e. model) equations that form the model to be
tested. Fortunately, the latest version of EQS has an 'easy build' option which
brings causal modelling within reach of those not maths minded (although one
4 Though the actual measure of fit used to determine the success of any modelling attempt may vary
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can still specify the model directly). Our model is then converted into the
language of mathematics that EQS understands, and a hefty dose of matrix
algebra later we have some output.
Whilst the maths involved is too complicated for a general introduction, the
basic principle behind CSM is easy to grasp. A researcher gathers together data
from a variety of measured variables, and puts these into a matrix of
intercorrelations. The researcher is concerned to explain the observed
relationships between the variables in terms of some theory. This theory,
when specified appropriately, can be used to construct a second matrix of
estimated intercorrelations. The aim of CSM then is to find a system of linear
structural equations, in the form of a model, which are able to reproduce as
much of our observed correlational data as possible. An estimated correlation
matrix which accounts for almost all of our observed correlations is said to be a
good 'fit'. One which leaves much of the variability in our data unexplained is
said to be a poor 'fit'.
Consequently, the most important output from a test of any causal model is a
list of goodness of fit statistics, indicating how well the hypothesised model
accounts for the observed correlational structure of the data. When assessing
the goodness of fit of a causal model there are a number of statistics which we
have at our disposal. For the first of these, the chi square goodness of fit
statistic, we require that the chi square be non-significant for our model to be
considered a good fit. Next we have the residual statistics, of which the off
diagonal average standardised residuals are the most important. These may be
treated like residuals in regression analysis, indicating unexplained variance, and
are particularly useful in comparing the differences in fit between two or more
alternative models. Aikaike's Information Criterion (AIC) (Aikaike, 1987) chi-
square provides an estimate of goodness of fit that takes into account the
parsimony of the underlying model (in terms of the number of parameters that
according to the fit optimisation technique used (e.g. ordinary least squares, maximum likelihood).
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must be estimated to arrive at a particular solution). Thus the smaller the value
the better. Lastly we have the fit indices. Of these, Bentler and Bonett's non-
normed fit index (NNFI) (Bentler and Bonett, 1980) provides a particularly
good estimate of model fit with small sample sizes (appropriate for our
example sample size). To even be considered as a reasonable fit, any fit index
should show values of greater than 0.9.
In addition to these fit indices, a useful feature of causal modelling is the
suggestion of model modifications, whereby EQS suggests changes to the
model in order to provide a better fit. Used cautiously, this feature is helpful in
achieving models which fit the data well. Thus, EQS provides the Wald test for
dropping parameters which can aid the user in removing non-significant or
non-important parameters from a model, whilst the Lagrange multiplier test
suggests individual or multivariately significant parameters which if added in to
a model might substantially improve model fit. For cautionary discussion of
these modification indices see MacCallum, Roznowski, and Necowitz (1992).
We should note at this juncture that covariance structure modelling is not
viewed rosily by all. Biddle and Marlin (1987) present a number of reasons why
CSM should be approached warily. Firstly, they raise the old cause-correlation
problem, arguing that all too often researchers speak as though one wave of
the CSM wand over their correlational data will magically reveal causal relations.
This argument holds a certain degree of truth, although it is often used too
liberally to entirely discredit the CSM approach. Thus while it is certainly the
case that mere correlations do not imply causations, it is also quite correct to
note that causations always imply correlations. The question then becomes one
of establishing, by means which lie outside of any particular analytical
technique, the a priori plausibility of the causal statements derived from a
model. As always, data by themselves say little outside of the context of a
background theory. One important point made by Biddle and Marlin is that the
weakest form of 'causal modelling' is that which is based on cross-sectional,
single wave field studies. Given time constraints that is the only kind of study
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we will find in this thesis. Biddle and Marlin also criticise the misuse of the
term confirmatory when used to describe the aims and goals of CSM.
Specifically, they argue that researchers often confuse failure to reject a causal
model with 'proof of that model's veracity in a way which leads them to
suggest that the model has been confirmed. Their arguments tell most strongly
against claims for the absolute confirmation or 'proof of a model, but are very
much weakened in the case where relative confirmation of model fit is sought
against one or many competing models. The testing of a preferred model
against competing alternatives is regarded as good practice by MacCallum,
Wegener, Uchino and Fabrigar (1993).
Biddle and Marlin also point out that the use of path diagrams with causal
models is often confusing, and that as yet no conventions regarding the
construction of these diagrams is forthcoming (though there is more
consistency now than there was at the inception of the path diagram).
CSM with latent variables (variables derived from the factoring of manifest
variables which we directly measure) also concern Biddle and Marlin, in the
sense that path coefficients based on latent variables often have larger
coefficients than equivalent models based on measured variables alone. Biddle
and Marlin agree with Bookstein (1984) that this is like '...making "something
out of nothing,"'. However they note that their position on latent variable
modelling 'enhancements' depends upon the stance one takes with respect to
measurement error in regression coefficients. My own understanding is
distinctly less sceptical than Biddle and Marlin's. I was brought up to
understand that, providing one's measured variables were reasonably reliable
and valid, factoring them in to a latent variable would remove the specific
systematic and random error variance of each, thus giving a cleaner variable
with less diluted coefficients. Nevertheless, one must be aware of the
differences that arise in estimation of path coefficients between ordinary least
squares CSM and other techniques. Lastly, Biddle and Marlin point out the
expense and time cost of CSM techniques. However, in the ten years since
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their paper was published the advent of Pentium PC's has made CSM
something within the computational reach of almost everyone (the longest
analysis to be reported in this thesis using CSM was around 30 seconds, most
took no more than ten seconds!).
Despite Biddle and Marlin's caveats about the use of CSM, the advantages for
theory development and analysis of survey data using this technique offer a
considerable improvement over previous analytic strategies. Unlike previous
correlational work in the area of paranormal belief, which has tended to be
weakly theoretical and hopelessly fragmented, CSM offers the possibility of
coherent, rigorous, single stage, multivariate tests of precisely specified
hypotheses concerning paranormal belief and experience. We will never be able
to make the jump from correlational to causal using such techniques, but we




HOW MANY FACTORS OF
PARANORMAL BELIEF ARE THERE?:
A CRITIQUE OF THE PBS1
In this chapter I take something of a detour from the main empirical path of
the thesis. This chapter started simply with the idea of surveying the range of
measures of paranormal belief, and ended up with an academic debate with the
main author of one of the most widely used measures of that construct, Jerome
Tobacyk. By the time 'battle' had been joined it became clear that I would have
to devote some additional empirical effort to resolving our debate, and so two
large scale confirmatory analyses were conducted which largely supported my
critique. They are also included as an integral part of the thesis.
Psychological research on belief in the paranormal has important consequences
for our understanding of these commonly held views and the people who hold
them. But research conducted on belief in the paranormal is only as good as
the devices used to measure paranormal belief. There are numerous
questionnaires available to assess paranormal belief (Jones, Russell, and Nickell,
1977; Randall and Desrosiers, 1980; Scheidt, 1973; Thalbourne and Delin, 1993;
Tobacyk, 1988). However, the most popularly used measure of paranormal
belief is Tobacyk and Milford's (1983, 1988) Paranormal Belief Scale (PBS).
Perhaps the PBS' greatest contribution to the area of paranormal belief
measurement is its emphasis on the multidimensional nature of paranormal
belief. For early researchers, belief in the paranormal was a unitary
phenomenon—a generalised trait much like intelligence—-and unlike
personality (e.g. Randall and Desrosiers, 1980, found a single main factor of
'supematuralism' accounted for 70% of the variance in their factor analysis).
1 This chapter appeared as a published paper in the Journal of Parapsychology, followed by a counter
reply by Tobacyk (1995a;1995b).
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But despite early enthusiasm for a unidimensional construct of belief in the
paranormal, later factor analyses of paranormal belief have tended to support
the view that belief in paranormal phenomena is multi-faceted (Sobal and
Emmons, 1982; Grimmer and White, 1990; Clarke, 1991; Thalboume and
Delin, 1993).
Indeed, Tobacyk and Milford's (1983, 1988) PBS has seven dimensions of
paranormal belief. These subscales are (in descending order of percentage of
variance accounted for); Traditional Religious Belief, Psi Beliefs (mostly
Psychokinesis questions), Witchcraft, Superstition, Spiritualism, Extraordinary
Life Forms, and Precognition. Since the development of the original scale a
number of changes led to a revised scale (Tobacyk, 1988). The revised PBS
incorporates a 26 item, seven point scale (as opposed to 25 item five point
scale) and has changes to the Precognition scale, Witchcraft scale, and minor
changes to the Extraordinary Life Forms scale.
The arguments expressed in this chapter stem from the suspicion that seven
dimensions of paranormal belief is simply too many. Whilst several researchers
(e.g. Irwin, 1993) have raised specific concerns about the PBS, no one has as
yet actually examined in depth its construction and content, to see if the claims
for seven dimensions are accurate. Consequently, in the remainder of this
chapter I present an in depth critique of the PBS, and its revised variant. In the
first section I attempt to determine precisely how the factor analysis of the PBS
could have arrived at seven factors. Factor analysis is a complicated statistical
technique, and in reconstructing the original factor solution of the PBS the
technical details presented may be skipped by those who are of a less technical
persuasion. These readers are advised to move on to the last (summary)
paragraph of the next section, and then to read on from 'The Revised PBS'.
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The development and factor analysis of the PBS
In constructing their paranormal belief scale Tobacyk and Milford (1983) gave
sixty-one items that in their judgement "...would sample as wide a range of
paranormal beliefs as possible." (pp. 1030) to 391 students at Louisiana Tech
University. Items were scored on a five point scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to
5 (strongly agree). These items were intercorrelated and factor analysed by the
principal axis method. Promax oblique rotation was performed to assess for
dependencies between factors but "revealed little evidence of dependence
between factors, which allowed for the use of orthogonal rotations." The
orthogonal transformation solution gave 13 factors, accounting for 60.7% of
total variance.
Tobacyk and Milford (1983) do not state whether any statistically based means
of factor selection were used to arrive at the original 13 factor solution, except
that they go on to select only 7 of the 13 factors on the basis that these factors
'...appeared meaningfully interpretable as common factors.' However, Dr.
Tobacyk kindly informed me that, 'I used several criteria for the selection of
factors concurrently: eigenvalue > 1.0; scree plot of eigenvalues, proportion of
total variance accounted for, conceptual meaningfulness of the factor
dimensions' (personal communication, 1994).
It would be worthwhile to note at this juncture that Tobacyk's set of four
criteria for selecting factors, whilst reasonable in an early perusal of the analysis,
fall short of adequacy in the construction of the final scale. The trouble is that
these four criteria, taken together, are likely to produce far too many factors.
Also, whilst selection of factors that "...appeared meaningfully interpretable" is
a valid procedure (providing that one is clear about what would constitute a
meaningful factor a priori), in Tobacyk and Milford's case use of this criterion
actually contradicts their explicit aim to let the factor analysis describe the
structure of paranormal beliefs, rather than impose any a priori dimensions
upon the data (a la Randall and Desrosiers, 1980). Indeed, it is hard to see how
one can select factors that appear meaningfully interpretable without having
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-some a priori conception of what should constitute a factor of paranormal
belief. With at least four criteria for selecting factors from their analyses,
Tobacyk and Milford's factor selection procedure may have assumed the
characteristics of a projective test.
We can find out just how many factors there would most likely be had only
one, statistically reasoned, factor selection procedure been used. To start with,
we can reject the simple use of the Kaiser-1 criterion on the grounds that it is
too liberal (see Horn, 1965; & Zwick and Velicer, 1986), giving too many
factors, and indeed, in Tobacyk and Milford's analysis, it would have accounted
for 13 factors alone . Alternatively, looking at the proportion of variance
accounted for by each variable is a redundant procedure, as an eigenvalue is
simply an indirect measure of proportion of variance accounted for, so any
procedure that analyses eigenvalues to select factors is looking' at proportion
of variance accounted for. Also, we cannot use the most accurate selection
procedures, such as Minimum Average Partial Technique (MAP) or Parallel
Analysis (PA), as these techniques require access to original data, which
Tobacyk no longer has (Tobacyk, personal communication, 1994).
We are thus left with the use of a scree slope analysis which involves plotting a
visually judged line of best fit through the smallest eigenvalues, and taking only
those which come above the line In order to do the analysis, we need to
reconstruct the 13 factors of the original factor solution. We know the
eigenvalues of the first seven factors from data presented in Tobacyk and
Milford (1983), and by making certain assumptions we can piece together the
likely distribution of the original 13 factors. The assumptions that permit us to
do this are as follows:
1) Factor seven (precognition) is the seventh largestfactor- we are given no reason
to believe that Tobacyk and Milford did not select the seven largest
2 We can reasonably assume that the first 13 factors stemmed from the default application of Kaiser-1 by
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Figure 1. A plot of the thirteen factors of Tobacyk and Milford's (1983) Paranormal Belief Scale.
factors from their 13 factor solution, and it seems unlikely that they did
otherwise.
2) Factor thirteen had an eigenvalue ofexactly one- if this was the smallest factor
to make the Kaiser-1 'cut' then it is most likely that it was on or very
near the criterion division of one.
3) Factors 8 to 13 were roughly linearly distributed (i.e. triangularj- this assumption
is not unreasonable. It is the weakest assumption I make however.
We know that Tobacyk and Milford's original thirteen factor solution
accounted for 60.7% of the total variance in their analysis. And, by summing
the percentage variance accounted for by each of their seven selected factors,
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we know that these seven factors accounted for 48.2% of the total variance.
This means that, of the thirteen original factors, the six 'unknown' factors that
did not make the cut accounted for 12.5% of the total variance. By invoking
assumption 1 we can deduce that Factor eight had an eigenvalue no more than
that of Factor seven (Precognition). In this case that is 1.281 (2.1/100*61). So
Factor eight must be less than 1.281. From assumption 2 we can suppose that
the smallest of the thirteen factors selected had an eigenvalue very close to one.
However, I shall suppose that the eigenvalue for Factor thirteen was in fact one
(in any case these calculations are unlikely to be far out). Assumption 3 may be
invoked to determine the distribution of the unknown 'six' factors. To do this
we simply suppose the distribution of these factors to be linear and work out
the gradient of the slope for these factors using basic mathematics. In this the
'distance' the slope must travel is six factors, and the height the slope must
reach is from an eigenvalue of 1 to an eigenvalue of 1.281 (or 0.281 units). The
gradient for this slope is given by 0.281/6 = 0.0468166. This value is then the
average distance between factors seven to thirteen. So using those first three
assumptions we can now get some idea of the distribution of Factors eight to
thirteen. The results of this analysis, expressed in eigenvalues, along with the
known eigenvalues of the seven factors of Tobacyk and Milford's PBS, are
given in figure 1 (N.B. Factors eight to thirteen are inferred).
Now that we have a rough plot of the eigenvalues in Tobacyk and Milford's
PBS we may try to use the more accurate and discerning scree slope criterion
to select out the factors in their analysis. Using just the scree slope analysis
they would have selected Traditional Religious Belief, Psi Belief, Witchcraft and
possibly Superstition (depending on where exactly one supposes the line to be
a best fit). So on these most basic analyses there are only four factors at most.
3 Some earlier commentators on this chapter have expressed doubts about the accuracy of the scree test
over that of the Kaiser-1 criterion. However, Zwick and Velicer (1986) found it to be, on average,
35% more accurate than the Kaiser-1 criterion in selection of predetermined factors (57% vs. 22%
respectively). Earlier reports also attest to a high degree of accuracy (Cliff, 1970; Cattell and Jaspers,
1967; & Zwick and Velicer, 1982) and generally good interrater reliability among expert and naive
judges (Cattell and Vogelman, 1977; Zwick and Velicer, 1982).
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The other factors might be meaningfully interpretable, and have eigenvalues
above one, but they do not contribute much understanding to the concept of
paranormal belief over the first three or four factors, nor for that matter do
they express much more summarising value than any one of the original 61
items. Indeed, there are conceptual reasons to suppose that the precognition
factor should not be a separate factor at all, but a part of psi belief as it surely is
[see later], I shall now move on to the second major area of problems with the
development of the PBS scale, where I discuss in particular concerns about the
smaller factors.
The revised PBS
In 1988 Tobacyk produced an as yet unpublished paper outlining changes
made to the original PBS, and declared on this basis a new revised PBS. The
changes made are summarised as; (1) original 25 items made up to 26, (2) new
seven point scale, (3) replacement of original 3 item Precognition scale with a
four item scale of all new questions, (4) replacement of two of four Witchcraft
items, and (5) replacement of one of three Extraordinary Life Form items.
It is argued that the changes result in greater reliability and validity, less
restriction of range, and greater cross-cultural validity in Western cultures. The
inclusion of a seven point rating scale seems fairly straightforward and makes
good sense. In what follows I shall address problems with the various subscales
of the PBS, before going on to consider whether Tobacyk and Milford's early
evidence for construct validity is acceptable. Some of these problems are
minor, and can be easily remedied. Some however, threaten the very existence
of the PBS. First I begin with the second most important factor of the PBS,
the Psi subscale.
The Psi subscale
Parapsychologists define 'psi' as an unexplained human extra-sensorimotor
capability comprising telepathy, clairvoyance and precognition, for ESP; and
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psychokinesis (mind over matter) for PK. Thus as a minimum criterion for that
name, any psi factor should meet the requirement that its items broadly and
comprehensively deal with belief in telepathy, clairvoyance, precognition, and
psychokinesis. Yet the PBS Psi belief factor has only four questions; of which
three address PK belief, and one refers to telepathy alone. Clairvoyance is not
addressed, and precognition appears on its own as the smallest factor. Plainly,
the so called Psi belief scale is poorly named - it is, for all intents and purposes,
a PK belief scale. The second most important factor of the PBS is simply too
shallow to warrant its title, or its importance. Lest it be renamed the TK belief
factor' a new Psi belief scale is needed.
Precognition subscale
Precognition is a particular kind of psi phenomenon that involves psychic
perception of a future event, and along with clairvoyance and telepathy is
characterised and commonly understood to be a form of extra-sensory
perception. Thus one might expect people who respond affirmatively to
questions about belief in telepathy to also respond affirmatively to questions
about belief in precognition, and vice versa. In short, responses to questions on
precognition belief should correlate positively with those on other forms of
extra-sensory perception. Thus, there are sensible a priori reasons to suppose
that belief in telepathy, clairvoyance and precognition should be expressible in
terms of a common factor of ESP beliefs (and to a lesser extent for PK
beliefs). That the PBS showed precognition to be a separate factor from psi
beliefs is perhaps the single most puzzling outcome of Tobacyk and Milford's
factor analytic assessment.
It is notable that for the revised PBS (1988) Tobacyk totally replaces the three
questions on precognition with four new ones (hence accounting for the
increase of PBS items from 25 to 26). The reasons for doing this are outlined
by Tobacyk as; 1) the original Precognition subscale has the lowest test-retest
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reliability of the original seven subscales (rtt - .60 over four weeks)4. 2) The
original questions were ambiguous and could have referred to non-paranormal
means of predicting the future. Tobacyk himself gives good reasons to believe
that all three original questions suffer from ambiguities of this sort. Thus in the
original PBS the ambiguity of the questions would likely have meant that a large
number of respondents were not viewing these questions as being about
"psychic prediction of the future" but merely about the likelihood that people
could predict the future in general (say perhaps with meteorological
techniques). And obviously these responses are not likely to covary
meaningfully with the psi scale items. In fact they are not likely to covary
meaningfully with any of the sub-scales in the PBS. These questions are just
going to sit as a separate factor on their own. Which is precisely what they do.
It is clear then from Tobacyk's (1988) own paper that the Precognition sub-
scale was far from satisfactory: both in its item content and reliability. The key
issue was that the items that went in to the original factor analysis related to the
concept of paranormal belief only ambiguously. Tobacyk's (1988) solution to
this problem is to replace these ambiguous questions with questions that are
obviously related to precognition. These new questions were taken from a
study (Tobacyk, Nagot and Mitchell, 1989) that had 349 college students rate
60 beliefs about the prediction of future events. A factor analysis of these sixty
items revealed seven independent dimensions of belief about the prediction of
future events. According to Tobacyk (1988), "The two clearest marker items
were selected from each of the two largest paranormal precognition
dimensions to form a new Precognition subscale. These dimensions and items
were: Paranormal Divinatory Systems (Astrology is a way to accurately predict
the future. The horoscope accurately tells a person's future.) and Psychically
Gifted Persons (Some psychics can accurately predict the future. Some people
have an unexplained ability to predict the future.)." ( pp. 6).
4 Kline (1986) notes that for a minimum acceptable level of reliability one should try to get at least a
retest reliability of .7.
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Thus from this study the four questions above were used to form the new
Precognition subscale. The test-retest reliability for this scale is a reasonable .81
over four weeks. However, there are numerous errors and flaws with the
approach to the new Precognition subscale that must render it invalid as a
separate scale altogether. I shall now outline these problems with the
Precognition subscale in the revised PBS.
1. Original evidence for a factor ofprecognition was flawed - As Tobacyk (1988)
agrees the original items in the PBS Precognition subscale were
ambiguous. Therefore the possibility that the Precognition subscale
does not actually measure belief in paranormal precognitive powers
must be taken seriously. If evidence for a separate dimension of belief
in precognition depends upon such ambiguities then this raises serious
questions about the validity of the precognition dimension. A separate
factor of precognition can not be upheld if the items that contributed
best to that factor do not actually relate in an obvious way to
precognition. Evidence for a separate factor of precognition must be
derived anew. So an error is made in supposing that whilst the items
composing the original Precognition subscale were in need of change
the actual status of the factor of precognition needed no such scrutiny.
This supposes that factors are more than the sum of their parts. In fact
the existence of factors depends crucially upon the quality of their
components- the subscale items come first, the factor is always a latent
variable that is to be inferred.
2. The factorial independence of the new precognition items is not established - This
criticism stems from what has previously been argued. One should
really attempt to determine anew that precognition belief is a separate
aspect of belief in the paranormal. Only then can the claim be made
that a separate factor of belief in precognition exists, and only then can
the new precognition items be placed into such a factor. Instead, in
choosing to develop new PBS Precognition scale items only with
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reference to items that have 'prediction of future events' content
Tobacyk and his colleagues lose all possibility of establishing that a
factor of belief in precognition does exist, apart from other kinds of
belief in paranormal phenomena. And this is precisely what is needed
to justify the inclusion of a separate factor for precognition in the first
place.
3. The Tobacyk, Nagot andMitchell (1989)factor analysis contradicts the notion ofa
single factor of precognition - The idea of having a single factor of
precognition in the original PBS was surely that those items that were
in the Precognition subscale correlated highly with one another, but not
with anything much outside that subscale. Tobacyk and Milford's
(1983) justification and use of orthogonal rotations implies this much.
Basically the items chosen for the original Precognition subscale
represented different ways of asking the question- Do you believe
people can predict the future paranormally? This is reasonable if there
is good reason to suppose that a single factor exists in the factor
analysis. In their development of the Belief in Prediction of Future
Events Scale (BPFE) Tobacyk et al. (1989) found seven independent
factors of belief in the prediction of future events. These factors
underwent orthogonal rotation, producing factors that shared the least
amount of variance. Subsequently, Tobacyk et al. took the strongest
two marker questions from the clearest two factors of the BPFE to
form their new Precognition subscale. However, in doing this they
destroy wholeheartedly the notion of a single factor of precognition.
This is because the four new questions from the BPFE are taken from
two independent factors (Paranormal Divinatory Systems and
Psychically Gifted Persons). In fact two of the questions in the new
Precognition subscale refer to belief in astrology and not precognition.
Only one of the other two questions actually refers in a clear and
definite way to precognition. In short the new 'factor' of precognition,
despite its improved reliability, measures two different factors
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altogether, only one of which assesses belief in precognition
(Psychically Gifted Persons). Changes made to the Precognition
subscale may have improved the scale's reliability, but only at the
expense of a near total lack of validity.
The Precognition subscale: Conclusions
The conclusion that one must draw from an understanding of this section is
that there is no good evidence for a single factor of belief in precognitive
powers. Had the construction of the original PBS precognition items been
conducted differently then it is most likely that no separate factor of
precognition would have been found. But there may be another reason why
the precognition subscale did not form a part of a wider psi scale. As noted
previously, the Psi Belief subscale contained three questions on psychokinesis,
and only one on ESP. Whilst precognition belief correlates highly with ESP
belief in general, it has persistently correlated less well with PK belief in
previous analyses, for reasons that should be intuitive. If items relating to Psi
Belief had been truly comprehensive, the precognition items would most likely
have loaded onto the factor of Psi Belief- as they have in almost every other
factor analytic assessment of paranormal belief to date (see Sobal and
Emmons, 1982; Clarke, 1991; Grimmer and White, 1990; Thalbourne, 1981 and
most recently Thalboume and Delin, 1993; but see also Thalboume and
Haraldsson, 1980).
The Witchcraft subscale
The Witchcraft subscale of the revised PBS consists of four statements
obviously relating to witchcraft and black magic. The original Witchcraft
subscale had been changed because two of the original items (Voodoo is a real
method to use paranormal powers. There are actual cases of voodoo death.)
were often not familiar to foreign respondents (specifically Finish, German and
Polish). These items were replaced by the statements 1) There are actual cases
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ofwitchcraft. 2) Through the use of formulas and incantations, it is possible to
cast spells on persons.
Of these two replacement items the first is basically fine, if a little equivocal
(one could support the assertion that there are actual cases of witchcraft and
still suppose that magic doesn't really exist). The second statement is excellent
and taps into the factor ofWitchcraft without actually mentioning it explicitly,
which is always a good way of constructing one's items. However, of the
remaining two statements in the revised Witchcraft subscale (Black magic really
exists. Witches do exist.) it seems clear that the statement "Witches do exist."
is obviously true whether or not they really have magical powers and it is likely
to be endorsed as such by sceptic and Wicca worshipper alike. Perhaps this
statement could be changed for something else like "Witches possess genuine
magical powers". For the most part however there are no particular problems
ofmajor significance with the Witchcraft subscale.
The ExtraordinaryLife Forms subscale
This subscale consists of the questions; (1) The abominable snowman of Tibet
exists, (2) The Loch Ness monster of Scotland exists, (3) There is life on other
planets. The items in this scale are simply of arguable paranormality. The
mystery surrounding the existence (or not) of the Yeti and Nessie stems more
from their apparent elusiveness, than it does from any intrinsically inexplicable
process of nature. If these creatures exist then they do so as a matter of natural
historical fact and are as unlikely to herald a new principle of science as they are
likely to warrant discarding an old one. However, the third statement in the
Extraordinary Life Forms factor is probably quite useless for another reason
altogether. Anyone—even a Royal Society astronomer—could agree with the
statement that there is life on other planets to some degree. The real question
that taps into the Extraordinary Life Form dimension should not have been
whether there was life on other planets but whether life on other planets was
regularly making trips to our planet! I suspect that very few astronomers would
agree with that contention. So at the very least the factor of Extraordinary Life
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Forms, which accounts for the second least percentage of variance in Tobacyk
and Milford's original factor analysis, rests upon shaky foundations,
theoretically and methodologically.
The subscales ofthe PBS
If one wishes to develop a psychometric measure of anything of import it is
usually the case that one needs a large number of items to sample the particular
latent variable of interest, be it belief in the paranormal or extroversion. One
needs an even larger number of items to begin to narrow down the best items
to go in to the refined measure. A scale which needs only 26 items to sample
no less than seven independent latent variables is probably not valid5. Indeed,
we have seen that the Psi belief subscale suffers from a lack of comprehensive
coverage of the core psi phenomena, showing instead a prevalence of items
relating solely to psychokinesis. If four or five items can get to grips with the
complex attitudes and feelings underlying belief in the paranormal then either
belief in the paranormal is trivially simple or our approach to item selection is
wrong.
Problems ofsubscale independence (orthogonality)
In this section I draw on evidence from the old and new versions of the PBS.
In the original paper on the old PBS Tobacyk and Milford presented a matrix
of intercorrelations between the subscales of the PBS that shed light upon the
question of whether the subscales are truly uncorrelated. Clearly from
examining this matrix there are some correlations large enough to warrant
concern over subscale orthogonality. For example, Psi belief correlates .49 with
Spiritualism, .40 with precognition (where orthogonality has already been
questioned), and .34 with Witchcraft. Tobacyk and Milford (1983) dismiss these
larger correlations, not by dealing with them directly, but by noting that
"Because these correlations are based on a 424-subject sample, statistical
5 This is a point well made to me in correspondence from Paul Kline, Professor of Psychometncs at the
University of Exeter, England.
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significance alone is not an appropriate procedure to determine relatedness
between subscales....The amount of shared variance (r2) between scales appears
to be a more appropriate index of relatedness." (p. 1034).
Certainly even the most minor correlations are likely to be significant with such
a large sample size and t2 is a useful estimate of the import of the relation
between two variables, but one needs to be very wary indeed in throwing out
evidence for relatedness (obliqueness) of subscales when the subscale
correlations approach .40 and above. This wariness is especially advised given
that subscale intercorrelations can only be as high as subscale reliabilities will
allow. Indeed, it is a general psychometric principle that a test cannot correlate
with another separate test any higher than it can correlate with itself, i.e.
estimated subscale intercorrelations will always be lower than the true value for
the subscale intercorrelation, because of what psychometrists call 'attenuation
due to unreliability'. So given that generally the test-retest reliabilities for
Tobacyk and Milford's original subscales fell somewhat short of being
satisfactory (only Psi Beliefs and Extraordinary Life Forms were above Kline's
(1993) accepted minimum of .80) we should note a particular degree of caution
in dismissing evidence for relatedness in the subscales. In fact, if one calculates
corrected Pearson correlations (using the formula for correction of attenuation
due to unreliability given on page 14 of Kline, 1993) then we see that, for
example, the revised estimate of intercorrelation between Psi Beliefs and
Spiritualism lies at around the .66 level, and that for Psi Beliefs and
Precognition is around .56. These figures certainly cannot be dismissed lightly,
though I would advise caution in placing too strong a faith on an estimate of an
estimate! Nevertheless, the original correlations are sufficient evidence for
relatedness between factors for most psychometricians.
Perhaps the most revealing evidence for lack of orthogonality in the revised
PBS is the fact that Tobacyk (1991) reports significant correlations between
the two largest factors of his Prediction of Future Events Scale and the
Superstition subscale of his PBS. As the reader will be aware, Tobacyk (1988)
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used the two largest factors of his Prediction of Future Events Scale to form
the new questions for his PBS Precognition subscale. Clearly we must regard
the orthogonality of these two subscales with some suspicion. Unfortunately,
Tobacyk (1988) provides no new evidence to suggest that the revised PBS
contains truly orthogonal factors. Presumably orthogonality was assumed from
the previous analysis of the old PBS. But as the discussion in the first half of
this section shows, the evidence for orthogonality in that scale was based on a
too premature dismissal of the (in some cases quite strong) evidence for
correlations between subscales.
Evidence for construct validity assessed
Much of the above discussion of the subscales can be regarded as an in depth
examination of the general validity of the PBS subscales, and we have seen that
there is cause to challenge both the face validity (e.g. the item 'There is life on
other planets' does not even look like it taps into UFO type beliefs), and
construct validity (e.g. both Psi beliefs and Precognition are poor measures of
their respective constructs, for reasons of comprehensive coverage and item
content respectively) of these subscales. However, Tobacyk and Milford (1983)
devote a substantial portion of their paper to demonstrating the construct
validity of the PBS and its subscales empirically. Construct validity was first
introduced into the psychometric literature by Cronbach and Meehl (1955) in
an attempt to get around the difficulties in establishing certain specific types of
validity for certain sorts of test. Construct validity refers to whether the
concept or construct being measured by the scale is in reality what our scale
measures. Evidence for construct validity may subsume evidence for all other
kinds of validity (concurrent, predictive, face, incremental and differential) and
may be regarded as the most general sort of validity that one can demonstrate.
Thus to show evidence for construct validity one needs to show quite generally
that the empirical evidence derived from use of one's scale accords well with
the definition of the psychological trait one has proposed.
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Tobacyk and Milford (1983) established the construct validity of their scale by
collecting together seven other measures of psychological traits; the Internal-
External Locus of Control Scale (Rotter, 1966), the Sensation Seeking Scale
(Zuckerman, 1971), the Threat Index (Hays, 1974), a self-esteem measure
(Hays, 1974), the Uncritical Inferences Test (Haney, 1954), the Dogmatism
Scale (Rokeach, 1960), and an Irrational Beliefs Questionnaire (Newmark,
Frerking, Cook and Newmark, 1973), and go on to correlate these measures
with the global score and subscales for paranormal belief on the grounds that,
"...due to theoretical considerations, they were hypothesized to be related to
paranormal beliefs." (pp. 1034).
Tobacyk and Milford report correlations for these variables with the PBS
ranging from 0-.34, and argue that these results broadly support the construct
validity of the PBS. I could at this point discuss in detail the discussions of the
evidence for construct validity given by Tobacyk and Milford, but I shall not
do this for a very simple and basic reason; none of the evidence reported by Tobacyk
and Mifordfor construct validity is in fact evidence for such validity. Instead I want to
explain why in fact such evidence cannot in principle be evidence for the
construct validity of the PBS.
To establish the construct validity of a paranormal belief scale one needs to
show that it is feasible to define a construct - 'paranormal beliefs' - and that the
behaviour of persons (both in surveys and in life generally) is consonant with
such a construct. So to show construct validity for the PBS one needs to
establish some basic facts. Firstly, one needs to show concurrent validity, i.e.
that this measure of paranormal belief correlates reasonably well with previous
measures of paranormal belief (assuming of course these previous measures are
valid). Secondly one needs to show that the PBS can account for differences in
persons that are essential and intrinsic to the notion of paranormal belief.
Thus, it must be essential to any concept of paranormal belief that to have
such beliefs one must have had some acquaintance with the topic of the
paranormal, from whatever source (experience being the most obvious). So, if
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our PBS could not account for differences in level of acquaintance with the
paranormal (which could take the form of differential or predictive validity)
then we would need to seriously question the validity of the scale. For example,
if we measure the degree of paranormal experience one has had we would
expect people with high experience to show high paranormal belief, and vice
versa. Any evidence to the contrary would suggest that our scale was not
measuring paranormal beliefs. And, of course, we could provide further
evidence of this type for such things as reading books on the paranormal,
visiting mediums, psychics, astrologers for advice, and taking seriously such
advice as given. Even more basically, we would need to predict such things as
that measures of paranormal belief taken now will continue to predict levels of
paranormal belief in the future, and that our measure of paranormal belief does
not correlate strongly with measures of things that are not intrinsic to
paranormal belief (i.e. are not measures of paranormal beliefs). Thus, we would
not expect a measure of paranormal beliefs to correlate strongly with a measure
of attitudes towards normal things (e.g. smoking, party politics, tax increases).
It should now be quite obvious that the 'evidence' for construct validity offered
up by Tobacyk and Milford is simply not evidence for validity at all. The fact is
that Tobacyk and Milford's analyses presume the validity of the PBS. None of
the scales used relate essentially or intrinsically to the concept of paranormal
beliefs (or events associated with paranormal phenomena). Indeed, the scales
that are used to support the validity of the PBS can only be used if it is a
defining characteristic of such beliefs (i.e. it is a part of the construct) that they
are intrinsically dogmatic, uncritical, irrational, sensation seeking, death threat
oriented, governed by a concern with external determinants of behaviour, and
are bound up with self esteem. That in general parlance and in Tobacyk and
Milford's definition of the paranormal none of these characteristics appear as
intrinsic qualities is clear evidence that these things cannot be brought to bear
on the evidence for the construct validity of the PBS. Of course these things
may certainly relate to paranormal beliefs for reasons which are of theoretical
59
interest, but to establish such relations requires that one has a valid measure in
the first place. Thus, Tobacyk and Milford (1983) provide no good evidence
that the PBS measures what it claims to measure - accepting some evidence for
face validity of some of the items - and one can make this claim even though I
do not doubt that had such evidence been looked for, it would have been
found to some extent.
To sum up this section we may reasonably conclude that beyond some
evidence for face validity and some content validity, the actual evidence for the
validity of the PBS is very poor. Subsequent evidence from other researchers
has shown some concurrent validity for the PBS (i.e. it correlates with other
measures of paranormal belief; Thalboume has several unpublished studies
reporting high correlations between the PBS and his sheep-goat scale, and see
Irwin, 1985) but this type of validity is on its own not sufficient to recommend
the use of the scale.
Problems ofpoor scale use
At times researchers have not used the scale in the spirit for which it was
designed. The revised PBS presents seven independent subscales of paranormal
belief for the researcher to use as such. The primary rationale in constructing
the scale was that paranormal belief is multi-faceted, and not just amenable to
analysis in terms of a general factor of Paranormal Belief (scales that have
treated belief in the paranormal as an all or none property have tended to seem
too simple and superficial, e.g. Scheidt, 1973, and Randall and Desrosiers,
1980). Nevertheless in an important and highly consequential area like the study
of reasoning and belief in the paranormal we can observe Wierzbicki (1985)
correlating subjects' scores on a syllogistic reasoning task with the global score
for paranormal belief and nothing else (see Irwin, 1991a, for a credible attempt
to approach the same issue, and then again Irwin, 1992, correlating childhood
trauma solely with the full scale PBS score).
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There is no particular problem with reporting full scale score correlations from
a multi-factorial scale (this is often done) when the meaning of the full scale
score is clear. However, I would argue that the meaning that one should give to
a full scale score on the PBS is not as clear as it might seem. The full scale
score may certainly be tapping into general paranormal belief. But let us
consider the sort of person who might score highly on general paranormal
belief as assessed by the PBS. This person would necessarily have expressed
strong belief in so many diverse phenomena, varying widely in exotic appeal,
that one might just as easily be tapping into mental health and gullibility factors
too. This is especially so given that the PBS was designed to assess as wide a
range of phenomena as possible. But the real problem here stems from the
expansive definition of the paranormal. This leads us directly to a discussion of
the definition of 'paranormal'. Indeed, in this discussion we may get to the
heart of the problems concerning the construct of "paranormal beliefs".
Problems in defining "paranormal"
Lastly, I would like to raise concerns about Tobacyk's (1988) definition of the
paranormal. In the revised PBS only Broad's (1953) definition of
paranormality- 'explicability achieved only by major revision of the basic
limiting principles of science'- is used. The problem with this definition is that
it does not seem to fit the scale items adequately. Thus, with respect to Big
Foot, Nessie, or extra-terrestrials, surely the existence (or not) of any of these
things is merely a matter of natural historical fact. Only detection of them with
certainty will show that they do exist, but their paranormal status would have to
be much the same as that of the Coelacanth fish discovered off the coast of
Southern Africa in the 1930's. Until its discovery the fish was not in principle
ruled out of all existence, just considered merely unlikely. But, as a matter of
natural historical fact, it still existed and was later discovered.
But Tobacyk and Milford (1983) do acknowledge that their definition of
paranormal is problematic. Indeed, Tobacyk notes (pp. 7), "....Extraordinary
Life Forms...does not strictly conform to the "basic limiting principles"
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definition of paranormality." It seems as though Broad's definition of
paranormal in terms of "basic limiting principles" is not as clear cut as it might
seem. As Braude (1978) points out, "Broad has failed to explain what, in
general, a phenomenon must conflict with in order to conflict with a B[asic]
Lfimiting] Pfrinciple]." (pp. 251). Clearly a better definition is needed.
I propose that we use the far more restrictive definition of paranormal offered
by Irwin (1993, he attributes it to Thalbourne, 1982, but this is not in fact the
case). Irwin defines a thing as paranormal if it "Refers to hypothesised processes
that in principle are 'physically impossible' or outside the realm of human
capabilities as presently conceived ly conventional scientists''' (pp. 1) [emphasis added].
On the grounds of this new definition Witchcraft, Psi Powers, Precognition
and Spiritualism would be retained as factors. They clearly refer to human
capabilities and hypothesised processes and all of them share a certain
fundamental relationship: the dependence on unexplained principles of nature
(Psi processes apply to Psi, Precognition and Spiritualism - Magical Energies to
Witchcraft).
Conclusions
From what I have outlined in this chapter we can only conclude that one of
psychology's most widely used scales for the assessment of belief in the
paranormal, the PBS and revised PBS, is less than satisfactory for its intended
purpose. I have outlined what I believe are serious objections to the view that
paranormal belief can be accounted for by seven dimensions. These objections
are based in part on problems with selection of questionnaire items, and for
the most part result from the all-encompassing factor selection procedure used
in the original factor analysis. Quite simply, according to a more accurate factor
selection criteria there are not seven separate factors of paranormal belief,
there are four; Traditional Religious Belief, Psi Belief, Witchcraft and
Superstition. Further still, whilst there are most certainly less than seven
significant factors in the PBS, those that would remain on more accurate
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criteria would most likely not be orthogonal (based on a perusal of evidence
reported by Tobacyk and Milford, 1983, and Tobacyk ,1991).
Clearly we need a new PBS. Much useful and insightful research has been
produced with the old PBS and its revision, but the problems present in those
scales necessitate a new scale, adequately designed, analysed and implemented.
Only with this can a firm foundation be made for further research in this area,
and as there are no signs that research on the topic of paranormal belief (in
either psychology or parapsychology) is slowing up, we can only hope to see a
new PBS in the not so distant future.
However, before we begin to construct a new PBS I want to note a number of
concerns that may influence the exact nature of such a scale. My first concern
is that our new PBS, suitably narrowed in content to contain less that is merely
strange and wacky and more that is in line with the kind of humanly relevant
definition of paranormal phenomena that I advocate, might run the risk of
containing subscales (say of ESP, PK, and Life after Death) that contain little
more than a series of bloated specifics. Catell (1973) has shown that scales with
excellent reliabilities can be obtained merely by filling each scale with items that
do nothing but paraphrase each other. Thus, the two items 'ESP allows people
to know each other's thoughts' and Teople use ESP to read other's thoughts'
are little more than minor modifications on the same theme. They would
correlate highly with each other, and give good internal consistency and test-
retest reliability, but either question alone would work just as well! My suspicion
is that it is all too easy to construct face valid and reliable belief scales using
bloated specifics. This worry is compounded by a related piece of evidence,
taken from the meta-analysis of the sheep-goat effect that I have previously
reported (Lawrence, 1993). In that meta-analysis, Schmeidler's (1943) single
question measure of belief'Do you believe ESP can occur under the conditions
of this experiment?' gave effect size estimates for ESP success better than
almost every multi-item measure of belief in the paranormal. Clearly some of
this success can be attributed to the enhanced consistency of attitude-
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behaviour relations found when highly specific measures of attitude are used
(and it's fair to say that Schmeidler's question puts the subject on the spot). But
the implication may also be that you can tap in to belief just as well with one,
two or three questions as you can with 25 or 50.
There are two solutions to the problem of the bloated specific scale if it exists
(we need to be sure that the problem exists by comparing, say, a six item
measure of paranormal belief; measuring clairvoyance, precognition, telepathy,
PK, life after death and magic, with a full blown multi-item multi-factorial scale.
The present PBS could be used for this purpose. If they give rise to similar
results then bloated specifics are a problem). Firstly, we could stick with the
smaller, more convenient scale. Secondly, we could try to produce a genuine
multi-factorial scale which does not contain bloated specifics. One way to do
this would be to index paranormal beliefs through behavioural indicators
coupled with more belief like statements, akin to the way that extroversion is
measured. However, in doing this we should be aware of yet a further difficulty;
to what extent can we treat paranormal belief like a basic personality trait at all?
Clearly paranormal belief is more akin to a socially held attitude, developed
through paranormal experience and socialisation by the wider culture. In short,
whereas to measure someone's level of extroversion is to assess directly certain
behaviours that are argued to result from a basic biological/social propensity
for such behaviour essential to that person, to measure someone's level of
paranormal belief is to measure a number of beliefs held upon evidence that is
diverse socially, culturally and psychologically.
There is a third option however. In the third option we retain the benefits of
the multi-factorial scale but change the function of the scale from simply
measuring beliefs to measuring beliefs in association with their most obvious
and immediate social and phenomenological causes. This third option does real
justice to the aim of measuring belief as socio-culturally and experientially
based, whilst actually enhancing our capacity to rationally dissect the results of
pure paranormal belief research! How does one do this?
64
Let us consider the basic causes of paranormal belief. Firstly and obviously
there is personal experience of ostensibly paranormal phenomena. Secondly,
one may be acquainted with relatives or close friends who have had paranormal
experiences. Thirdly, one may have experienced in the media popular/serious,
academic/occult, scientific/religious works relating to paranormal phenomena.
Lastly, one may not particularly have had or sought out any of the previous
things, but instead base one's beliefs on a general world view, provided by
one's education. These four basic areas then; personal, interpersonal, socio-
cultural and educational, are the most basic immediate causes of one's
paranormal beliefs. Note the diversity in sources of belief. Note that to have
based one's beliefs on influences from any one of these four does not
necessarily lead to the conclusion that one has influences from any of the other
three causes (in principle the four causes are independent). In practice, these
four basic influences will be moderately related.
At present all paranormal belief researchers use measurement devices relating
solely to the beliefs themselves. A most common procedure in research with
these scales is to correlate paranormal belief with other psychological factors
like paranormal experience in order to better understand the mind of the
paranormal believer. This endeavour is I would argue confounded by one
simple, but devastating flaw - someone who scores highly on a measure of
paranormal belief could do so for any combination of influences from the
basic four just outlined. Thus psychics score high on measures of paranormal
belief, but so do parapsychologists and people who read about the paranormal
in the Fortean Times. These various groups are a world apart in their influence
from the four basic causes, yet on our measure of paranormal belief and (most
perniciously) in our empirical data these diverse basic differences remain
undifferentiated. This obviously has disastrous, albeit hidden, consequences for
the development of understanding in paranormal belief research. Thus, our
basic failure to acknowledge the diversity of types of believer leads us to
develop multi-dimensional measures of belief which are at other levels more
65
strangely and subtly one dimensional! This point of course applies quite
generally to any of the present measures of paranormal belief.
Given that this is a major problem, a solution becomes particularly pertinent.
In short, I propose that we develop a measure more along the lines of a
paranormal beliefs and influences scale (PBIS). This scale would certainly measure
paranormal beliefs, but would also measure the weight of influence from our
four basic causes of belief (I realise that I am making a presumption in
supposing paranormal experience to be a cause of belief but evidence I have
reported elsewhere favours this experiential source hypothesis over other more
attributional hypotheses; see Lawrence et aL, 1995). Only then do we have a
realistic chance of getting inside the mind of the sheep and goats (whatever
species they might be!).
Such a scale is unlikely to be produced for some time yet. As we have seen,
building a valid and reliable measure of anything is a tricky business. Hopefully,
future efforts at scale construction can involve input from both
parapsychologist and psychologist alike, both paranormalist and sceptic. This is
indeed necessary if we are to break with the partisan and frankly irrational
'these are our scales and those are yours' distinction that has split scale use
between psychologists and parapsychologists with respect to paranormal belief.
Nevertheless, present circumstances accepted, Thalbourne and Delin (1993)
have most recently reported a revision of their Australian Sheep-Goat Scale
that shows some promise in the assessment of the core concepts of
paranormal belief (ESP, Psychokinesis and Life after Death). It remains for
that scale or any other to prove its worth as the scale to use. If the PBS is to be
even a contender for that distinction it will have to change. And if it does
change, then the enterprise undertaken in this chapter will seem to me all the
less negative, and all the more productive for it.
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At this stage in the thesis I wish to direct the reader's attention to the
appendix, where one may find two papers written by Tobacyk in response to
my critique (as it appeared in the Journal of Parapsychology). The reader is
advised to read Tobacyk's initial counter reply, before going on to read the
next chapter, which forms my own discussion of his counter. Then one may
read Tobacyk's final comments on my own reply, before we leave the critical
component of discussions of the PBS, and move on to chapter 5, where I
present the results of am empirical investigation of the factor structure of the
PBS, in an attempt to settle our disagreement of the nature of the PBS.
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Chapter 4
THE BATTLE IS JOINED!
TOBACYK'S DEFENSE OF THE
PBS AND THE ENSUING
DEBATE.1
In the March 1995 issue of the Journal of Parapsychology, after my own
critique of the PBS, Tobacyk presented a spirited, thought provoking, and
constructive reply to my criticisms (Lawrence, 1995a). His reply showed
perfectly how critical dialogue can lead to significant and constructive
suggestions for future research, and help to bring out problematic issues
relevant to the enhancement of our understanding of complex areas of
research. Also it became clear to me from his reply that there were many areas
where Tobacyk and I are were in agreement. Quite generally, we seemed to
agree that we needed an improvement to the PBS, and that the PBS has a
number of problems which only future research would be able to clear up,
though we differed over just how severe these problems are. More importantly
I think, both our papers made substantive contributions on the topic of how
new research in this area might proceed. In what follows I outline, with as great
a degree of fidelity and impartiality as possible, the substance of Tobacyk's
reply, and having done so deal primarily with those areas where we disagree,
before concluding my methodological efforts with some final comments.
1 The reader should acquaint theirself with Tobacyk's response to my critique, given in the appendix,
before proceeding with this chapter.
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Areas Where We Disagree
Problems ofdefining 'paranormal
Although I agree with much that Tobacyk says about the problems of defining
paranormal, Tobacyk picks up on a subtlety in Irwin's definition (the use of the
word 'or' rather than 'and') and goes on to show that, therefore, Irwin's
definition of paranormal is really not as restrictive as Broad's. If one sticks to
the letter of Irwin's definition then Tobacyk has a point: 'paranormal' Irwin-
style may be little different from 'paranormal' Broad-style. Given this subtlety,
perhaps I need to give my own definition. Something is paranormal if it is 'in
principle physically impossible and outside the range of human capabilities as
presently conceived by conventional scientists'. I prefer this more restrictive
definition not so much because I want it to restrict certain phenomena, but
because I believe it is important for our research to be humanly relevant. I do
not have space enough to go into detail however (instead I think the problem
of defining the paranormal needs sustained critical discussion - that will need
another paper!).
We both acknowledge that the extra-ordinary life forms subscale is not
paranormal (it is, to paraphrase Tobacyk, paranormal by association). Instead,
Tobacyk makes much of what I don't say about Traditional Religious Belief
and Superstition. In fact, I say little about the paranormal status of traditional
religious belief and superstition because my thoughts on the paranormal status
of these beliefs are equivocal. I can see reasons why religious beliefs might be
regarded as paranormal, but then again I see reasons why calling religious
beliefs paranormal might be problematic (e.g. religion depends upon socially
organised faith very strongly, paranormal beliefs depend much more on
personal\ human experience). As for superstition, there have been two ways of
defining it in the past. Firstly, superstition has been defined, mostly by
academics, in such a way that it is identical with paranormal belief (e.g. Planer,
1988). Secondly, superstition has been defined, mostly in folklore, as referring
more specifically to certain events and occurrences which have certain socially
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signified meanings (i.e. black cats are unlucky, one should throw salt over one's
shoulder if one spills salt). If one adopts the first definition then all one needs
to do is decide whether the PBS is the PBS or the SBS (Superstitious Beliefs
Scale). This is hardly a substantive contribution. If one adopts the second
definition then arguably superstition ceases to be paranormal. To say that black
cats are unlucky is not to say that humans are possessed of some unknown
capability to be unlucky in the presence of black cats. To conclude, I think
Tobacyk's reply establishes the need to discuss problems of definition as an
integral part of empirical research, and not as a separate component of purely
philosophical or conceptual interest.
Adequacy ofthe PBS FactorAnalysis:
My discussion of the adequacy of the PBS factor analytic evidence essentially
centres around three things; (i) problems of factor selection, (ii) problems of
factor rotation, and (iii) evidence for fewer factors from my scree slope
analysis.
(i) Problems of factor selection - On problems of factor selection maybe
Tobacyk and I are just going to have to differ over Kaiser-1. He can
give studies that attest to its accuracy in some circumstances, and I can
give studies which attest to the opposite. Thus, Kline (1993) notes that,
"Catell (1978) has shown that rotation of too few factors tends to
produce second order factors at the first order. Rotation of too many
factors causes factors to split. A common solution to this problem and
the default solution on many computer packages is to rotate all factors
with eigenvalues or latent roots greater than one. However Catell
(1978) has shown that with large matrices this is an overestimate of the
number of significant factors and Cliff (1988) has suggested that this
criterion be abandoned. Barrett and Kline (1982) examined a number
of methods of selecting the correct number of factors and showed that
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two methods appeared to reach the best solution ...These were the
Scree Test (Catell, 1966) and the Velicer method (Velicer, 1976)." (pp.
122)
At least one needs to be wary of the Kaiser-1 criterion, but given the fact that
Tobacyk uses three other criteria I think it quite fair to note caution over the
stability of the factor solution. Thus, with four criteria for factor selection, does
a factor have to satisfy all four criteria, or just three, or does one chop and
choose criteria in order to get the factors that one desires? I think these are
significant issues that may have played a role in determining the seven factor
solution.
Also, I don't think that a factor solution that accounts for 60.7% of the
variance with 13 factors can be seen as satisfactory. Quite generally, satisfactory
solutions, even taking into account error ridden social and psychological data,
tend to be more in the region of 60-70% variance with 4-5 factors. Factor
analysis is essentially about reducing complex sets of observed variables to their
essential latent causes. When one needs 13 factors to achieve 60%
accountability, or 7 factors to achieve 48% accountability (which is actually the
case with the PBS) then this is hardly a victory for parsimony. Rather, it
suggests the researcher has brought together a wide and disparate set of
unrelated variables, of little general explanatory consequence.
(ii) Problems of factor rotation - As my comments about the orthogonality
of the PBS show, the PBS does contain a core of beliefs which do
correlate together; strangely, precisely those factors which meet the
human capabilities definition of paranormal. Note that Tobacyk simply
doesn't address my concerns over subscale orthogonality however,
instead he simply reasserts that promax oblique rotations showed up
little evidence for correlated factors. At the least I would suggest future
researchers look strongly at the evidence for oblique factors in
paranormal beliefs research. Consequently, I maintain that the
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problems of factor selection and orthogonality/rotation in the PBS
remain.
(iii) Problems of the scree plot analysis - As Tobacyk points out in his
reply, "Lawrence's use of the scree plot analysis to determine the
meaningfulness of rotated factors is unconventional and probably
invalid' (pp. 6). In fact, the scree slope analysis, if performed on rotated
factors, is definitely invalid. The reason for this is as follows; as
Tobacyk himself notes, the scree plot analysis is used to determine the
number of factors for rotation, by plotting a visually judged line of best
fit through the smaller factors (expressed as eigenvalues) of the initial
unrotated factor solution. Although subsequent rotation of factors does
not change the overall amount of variance explained by the factor
solution, it does change the specific amount of variance accounted for
by each individual factor. Thus, in order for my scree slope to be valid,
we must be sure we have the initial solution eigenvalues. On the face of
it I appear to have made a mistake. However, two points were made to
me by a colleague who specialises in psychometrics that set me on a
quest, the resolution of which proves highly revealing. The two
'problems' pointed out to me are as follows ;
(i) Given Tobacyk's use of principal factor analysis with Varimax
rotation, the distribution of his eigenvalues is highly unlikely if they
are genuinely from the rotated solution.
Thus when we look at Tobacyk's plotted eigenvalues we see that
there are some marked factors which account for a great deal of
variance, and many other factors which account for a very small
amount. The problem is that Varimax rotation very rarely produces
this kind of factor distribution. Indeed, varimax rotations by
definition tend to maximise, and hence equalise the variance
2 Thanks to Dr. Ian Deary, Professor of Psychology at the University of Edinburgh.
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accounted for by factors in the rotated solution. In short,
Tobacyk's data look much more like they come from the initial
solution, and could only really have come from the rotated solution
if Tobacyk and Milford had markedly different numbers of items
for each factor.
(ii) Although the published data from Tobacyk and Milford (1983) are
given in percentages of variance accounted for, the list of factors
sent me by Tobacyk clearly give eigenvalues alone. But eigenvalues
are of no consequence in the rotated solution, and many factor
analysis packages do not give them for the rotated solution.
Now, these two pieces of evidence clearly suggest that Tobacyk has sent me
the details of his initial solution results. We can confirm this by finding out
whether Tobacyk's statistical package gave eigenvalues for the rotated solution.
If the Stats package used by Tobacyk did not give eigenvalues in the rotated
solution then the validity of my analysis stands. Tobacyk used a pre-1983
version of SAS to perform his factor analysis, so I contacted the SAS Institute
in Britain to ask if that version gave eigenvalues for the rotated solution. SAS
were very helpful, and Mark Dawson, technical support advisor, contacted
SAS in the US where details of earlier versions were kept.
SAS US still had a mainframe running a pre-1983 version of SAS(l), so they ran
a principal factor analysis with Varimax rotation on some old sample data, and
the results were clear. SAS pre-1983 does not give eigenvalues for the rotated solution.
Thus, from the two points made above, and the confirmation from SAS, we
can only conclude that Tobacyk has unwittingly sent me the eigenvalues for the
initial solution, and would appear to have used them also in his published
report. I should perhaps add that it is not at all uncommon to find researchers
reporting initial solution eigenvalues as though they were the rotated solution
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results (indeed, I gather that with SPSS the way data are presented often leads
to this error).
The above discovery validates my use of the scree slope analysis. However,
Tobacyk argues that even if the analysis were valid, the accuracy of the slope is
dubious. Thus, Tobacyk suggests that the data from factors 14 to 25 are needed
to really do the scree plot. This statement reveals two basic errors however,
thus;
(1) Tobacyk forgets that he performed principal factor analysis, and
not principal component analysis, so 13 factors is in fact how many
factors need to be analysed by the scree slope method, and not
25.
(2) Indeed, even if principal component analysis had been used
Tobacyk is wrong in saying that there would be 25 factors, as
principal components extracts as many factors as variables,
which in Tobacyk's original unfactored sample was 61.
In any case, Tobacyk's claim that we need those factors to identify the
departure from linearity (i.e. random factors) is not appropriate. Thus if the
smaller factors were essentially random (as is usual and as Tobacyk seems to
indicate) then they would quite generally show a linear increase in value from
close to zero to close to one, in which case approximating this rough linearity
with a smooth line will not give great inaccuracy. But even if my estimation of
the plot of unknown factors is inaccurate, how much room for a radical
departure from linearity is there between an eigenvalue of just above 1 (for
factor eight) and exactly one (for factor thirteen)? It is in fact impossible for
there to be a jump in the smaller factors larger than the jump that is clearly
evident in the larger factors (from 2.31 for Superstition to 4.09 for Witchcraft -
an increase in accountability larger almost than the whole range of
accountability possible in the factors from Spiritualism to factor 13).
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Indeed, one could even argue that my placing of the line is conservative, because
the rationale of the scree slope is to identify a marked increase in variance
explained sufficient to show that the 'mountain' of genuine factors 'starts here'
- all the rest being mere rubble and debris. The first truly marked deviation
from linearity is represented by the jump from Superstition to Witchcraft, and
placing a line to reflect this gives only three factors! Thus I think that the scree
slope analysis is both valid and largely accurate (any error is unlikely to make a
difference). But we could argue over small details ad infinitum, so is there any
new evidence for the factorial structure of the PBS?
I have details of at least one attempt to factor analyse the PBS, performed
recently by the Dutch researchers Tomic, van der Sijde, and Snel
(unpublished), in which they found only five factors. Of Tobacyk and Milford's
seven factors, only two were reproduced without change in the Dutch study;
Traditional Religious Belief (their strongest factor) and Witchcraft (their third
strongest). Of particular interest is that the Dutch Psi scale consumed
Tobacyk's Psi, Spiritualism, and Precognition subscales, and Superstition and
Extra-ordinary lifeforms loaded onto the same factor (which the Dutch group
termed 'Superstition'). The last factor, which the Dutch group termed
'Impossible' is a strange little factor composed of items that were negatively
phrased. In general then, the Dutch data, based on a moderately large sample
of over 300 Dutch men and women, supports fewer than seven factors.
Interestingly, the Dutch Psi subscale shows a clear degree of relatedness
between just those subscales of the PBS which come under the human
capabilities definition of paranormal.
In short, the problems of factor selection and orthogonality remain, and on
deeper analysis my scree slope analysis appears to be valid also. When we
incorporate new empirical evidence bearing on the number of factors problem, we
once again find fewer than seven factors.
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The correct dimensionality of paranormal beliefs:
In a somewhat paradoxical manoeuvre Tobacyk resorts to
relativistic/constructionist arguments to challenge the notion that one can
determine the correct dimensionality of paranormal beliefs. This attempt to
bypass the substance of my critique is however thoroughly unsatisfactory.
Thus, if we take the relativist position seriously then we simply cannot
legitimately ask questions about the factorial structure of paranormal beliefs at
all. But Tobacyk's efforts surely presuppose that factor analysis has some value
for research purposes.
Perhaps Tobacyk means to advocate a weak relativist position whereby
cultures, people, and societies will simply differ in some or other respect on the
PBS. But this weaker position turns out to express little more than trivia; we all
know that people and cultures differ, the question is whether there is some
invariant factor structure of beliefs within which we can express these
differences. The PBS is highly problematic when viewed from this non-
relativistic perspective (e.g. how can African natives be expected to express
agreement with an item on the Loch Ness monster?). I feel, in contrast to
Tobacyk, that we can ask legitimate questions about the general structure of
paranormal beliefs, and that it is a challenge to devise such scales in a way
which makes their underlying factors culturally invariant, even if average level
of belief on the scales differs across cultures.
The reasonableness of my critique of the PBS:
This section of Tobacyk's reply deals largely with my comment on the extra¬
ordinary life forms and precognition subscales. I believe I've said about as
much as I need say about the extra-ordinary life forms subscale in my original
paper; thus, (a) ELF is strictly not paranormal (as Tobacyk agrees), and (b) it is
clear that some of the items in that scale are far from adequate.
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As for Tobacyk's lengthy defence of the PBS precognition section, I would say
it is excellent save for one thing; unfortunately, all the points made by Tobacyk
only really bite if his precognition subscale actually measures precognition. As
I've already noted in my earlier paper, the precognition subscale of the revised
PBS barely measures precognition. Firstly, the precognition subscale is
composed of two factors one of which is totally unrelated to the notion of
precognitive prediction of the future whilst the other contains only one definite
item on precognition. Secondly, and worse still, the two factors which make up
the 'factor' of precognition are unrelated to each other! Consequently,
anything Tobacyk says about the validity of precognition in the revised PBS
needs to be weighted against the fact that his revised precognition subscale
barely measures precognition, and anything he says about the validity of the old
precognition subscale needs to be weighted against Tobacyk's own admission
that the items in that subscale were ambiguous enough to warrant a new scale.
Under these circumstances it is highly debatable whether one can say anything
of consequence about the validity of the precognition subscale.
The construct validity of the PBS:
Tobacyk doubts my assertion that his evidence for construct validity of the
PBS is in principle not such evidence, and asserts that in any case the PBS has
'strong face and content validity'. I do not doubt that the items on the PBS are
face valid, although I am sure some of the items on the PBS have no content
validity (i.e. the precognition items of the new PBS, or the Extra-ordinary life
form item). Even if the PBS did have strong face and content validity, I do
not think this is sufficient to recommend its widespread use. Ultimately,
construct validity is required, and I maintain that Tobacyk's initial evidence for
this was no such evidence at all. Also, I disagree that construct validity is
established through the construction of a rich nomological network of
interrelations with other non-paranormal factors. In so far as Tobacyk
genuinely intends this to mean that the PBS interacts with other types of scales
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which do not themselves refer to the concept of the paranormal, then the
reasoning behind such evidence could only presume construct validity, and not
establish it. Thus, ifwe establish that the PBS correlates with gullibility, as some
might predict from their construct of paranormal belief, this may only establish
that our PBS is an obscure indicator of gullibility.
Nevertheless, Tobacyk suggests that evidence for the construct validity of the
PBS is present, and cites one example (Tobacyk and Mitchell, 1987). I think
this evidence is instructive in that it does establish some construct validity, but
not of the sort that Tobacyk's construct of paranormal would require
(whatever that might be). Instead, Tobacyk's evidence for construct validity
supports a notion of paranormality with which we should now be quite familiar
- namely, the view that a cluster of paranormal beliefs are evident which take
as their focus the fact that they all refer to 'hypothesised human capabilities or
processes'! Just take a look. They all fit this definition. Obliqueness rears its ugly
head again. But given the remarks of Beloff (1963, p. Ill) we should perhaps
not be surprised at the human focus, thus, '...paranormal phenomena...almost
invariably occur in connection with a human person. Now there is no a priori
reason why this should be the case. One could conceive of a world in which
inanimate objects took an occasional paranormal holiday during which they
behaved entirely capriciously.' Thus, the human connection seems to be a
central defining element in paranormal phenomena, of just the sort that a solid
construct of the paranormal could be built on.
Final Comments
Despite our disagreement over the substance of my critique, Tobacyk makes
many valuable points. Thus, Tobacyk has many good suggestions to make
about how future research might proceed. My own recent efforts to improve
the methodological and theoretical rigour of paranormal beliefs research echo
many of the points raised by Tobacyk (see Lawrence et al, 1995). Perhaps most
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importantly however, is the fact that Tobacyk clearly sees a greater role for
understanding paranormal beliefs than merely enhancing knowledge. Indeed, in
his parting statement emphasising the fundamental human questions and the
relevance of paranormal experiences/beliefs research in answering these
questions, Tobacyk displays a sensitivity to the wider issues sadly lacking in
much contemporary parapsychology. In this respect Tobacyk and I share the
same basic attitude. It is precisely because these issues are important that we
must devote sustained critical attention to the improvement of our scales for
the measurement of paranormal belief (and indeed, of any variable). What is
more, lest we waste time improving scales which are beyond improvement, we
must focus our critical efforts on those scales which do show promise.
I wish to thank Tobacyk for the dignified, temperate, and productive nature of
his reply. May we soon see someone produce a new PBS, rising like the
proverbial Phoenix from the ashes of the old!
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Chapter 5
CONFIRMING THE FACTOR STRUCTURE
OF THE PARANORMAL BELIEFS SCALE:
BIG ORTHOGONAL SEVEN OR OBLIQUE FIVE?1
As we saw in the last chapter, despite its widespread use in research into the
psychology of paranormal belief, the Paranormal Belief Scale (PBS) (Tobacyk
and Milford, 1983; Tobacyk, 1988) has more recently come under criticism on
statistical, methodological and conceptual fronts (see also Lawrence, 1995a; and
the subsequent replies from Tobacyk, 1995a; and Lawrence, 1995b). The
essence of my criticism was that the original evidence for seven independent
factors of paranormal beliefwas flawed, and that in addition there were serious
problems with the scale's validity, sufficient to warrant construction of a new
scale. I argued that, in contrast to Tobacyk and Milford's seven factor solution,
a more realistic description of the factor structure of paranormal belief was a
four factor solution with oblique (i.e. correlated) factors. Such a view can be
justified on two separate grounds; statistical and conceptual.
Statistically, I argued that Tobacyk's four criteria for selecting significant factors
were too liberal, and hence prone to over-extraction. If one took these
considerations into account, and applied a more conservative criterion for
selecting factors, then four factors are suggested. In addition, I argued that
evidence for correlations between factors had been overlooked, and that
consequently the subscales of the PBS were unlikely to be uncorrelated.
1 The first study in this chapter was carried out as part of a wider study conducted in collaboration with
my colleagues Dr. Chris Roe, who collected the data, and Dr. Carl Williams, who had independent
variables included in the study unrelated to this thesis. All the reported analyses and interpretations
are wholly mine. The first study was subsequently published in the Journal of Parapsychology, see
(Lawrence, Roe and Williams, 1997). The second study was carried out in collaboration with Pio De
Cicco, my project student at Coventry University. I extend my thanks to him for the hard work he put
in collecting the data.
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Conceptually, I challenged the paranormality of the Extraordinary Lifeforms
scale, and expressed doubts about the definition of paranormality used by
Tobacyk (1988), suggesting a new definition of paranormality based upon that
of Irwin (1993). With such a new definition there would be four definite factors
of paranormal belief - Psi, Spiritualism, Precognition, and Witchcraft; the
paranormality of traditional religious belief and superstition being a matter of
some dispute.
Whilst my critique (Lawrence, 1995a+b) served to establish some serious
difficulties and uncertainties with respect to the factor structure of the present
PBS, I was unable to come to any firm empirically based conclusion about the
veracity of Tobacyk's 'orthogonal seven' or my suggested 'oblique four',
primarily because Tobacyk's original data were unavailable for reanalysis.
Indeed, a common conclusion reached as a result of the debate between
Tobacyk and myselfwas the need for future research to use more confirmatory
techniques to resolve speculations about the factor structure of the PBS. In this
chapter I do just that, using the technique of confirmatory factor analysis using
EQS (Bentier, 1989).
Confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) is a particular method of factor analysis, in
which the researcher's aim is to confirm some hypothesised factor structure,
given a set of correlational data. Thus, a researcher may suspect that the
correlations between a set of measured variables can be accounted for by a
three factor structure. In this case the researcher might suppose that measured
variables one to ten are all indicators of factor one whilst variables 11 to 20 are
indicators of factor two, and 21 to 30 indicators of factor three. In addition the
researcher may suspect that certain pairs of factors in one's study are
correlated, whilst certain other factors are not. Thus in my three factor
example the researcher might suppose that factors one and two, and two and
three are correlated, but not one and three. Also the researcher may suspect
that some of the variables are valid indicators ofmore than one factor.
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CFA permits the researcher to test the appropriateness of these kinds of
assumptions for the observed data by letting the researcher impose meaningful
constraints upon the factor analytic process. Typically this is done in two
practical steps. In the first step, the researcher specifies exactly which measured
variables are indicators of which specific underlying factors (in statistical
language the researcher is said to be specifying the 'measurement model').
Once the factors have been identified with certain variables, the researcher
goes on to specify which of the factors are correlated with each other, and
which are not. This is in stark contrast to exploratory factor analysis which
allows the researcher almost no freedom to specify the factor analytic process.
Instead, exploratory factor analysis assumes (usually incorrectly) that all
variables are indicators of all factors, and that all factors are either orthogonal
(i.e. uncorrelated) or oblique (i.e. correlated). In addition, in order to achieve
any solution at all, principal factor analysis has to make use of a number of
generally arbitrary principles. Without these principles it would not be possible
to arrive at any determined factor solution (this is the so-called factor
indeterminacy problem). Indeed, Long (1994b) notes that, 'The exploratory
factor model's inability to incorporate substantively meaningful constraints, and
its necessary imposition of substantively meaningless constraints, has earned it
the scornful label of garbage in/garbage out model.' (pp. 252).
In this chapter I am not especially concerned with finding out the factor
structure of the PBS anew. Rather, Tobacyk and Milford (1983) have claimed
(on the basis of their original exploratory factor analytic results) that the
structure of the PBS is best represented by seven orthogonal factors (I shall
refer to this model henceforth as the "Big Orthogonal Seven'). In contrast, I
very much suspect that the factor structure of the PBS is best described by a
smaller number of factors, some of which may well be correlated. In the
remainder of the introduction I outline my reasons for developing this
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Figure 1. The Big Orthogonal
Seven.
specified in terms of a confirmatory factor model postulating five oblique
factors (my 'Oblique Five').
How the Big Orthogonal Seven are really the Oblique Five
Before I go on to show how, in the PBS, seven is really five and orthogonal is
really oblique, I wish to briefly clear up some potential sources of confusion.
Firstly, as I noted in the beginning of this chapter, there are both
statistical/methodological and conceptual reasons to suppose that there are
fewer than seven factors in the PBS, and that these factors are correlated. In
this chapter however I am concerned only with implementing
recommendations based upon my statistical/methodological critique of the
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PBS. The reason for this is fairly straightforward: if one attempted to build a
CFA model of the PBS based on my conceptual critique of that scale then one
would begin by omitting the Extraordinary Lifeforms subscale altogether, and
one may well decide against modelling Traditional Religious Belief and
Superstition as well! Although such a model may well be preferable on
conceptual and (ultimately) empirical grounds, a test of such a model would not
provide a fair comparison with Tobacyk and Milford's (1983) Big Orthogonal
Seven. Instead, one needs to show that even with Tobacyk's (1988) original
subscale items all present there is still more support for the Oblique Five than
for the Big Orthogonal Seven. In any case, as we shall see, the empirical
resolution of my statistically motivated modelling attempts will lend weight to
the conceptual model. Now I discuss my attempt to model the structure of the
PBS proper.
In the previous chapter I identified a number of reasons why the factor
structure of the PBS might be smaller than that found by Tobacyk and Milford
(1983);
Firstly, I argued that Tobacyk and Milford's criteria for factor selection resulted
in the extraction, and subsequent rotation, of too many factors. I suggested
(somewhat speculatively) that perhaps four factors were more appropriate.
Had four factors been extracted the resulting solution would most certainly
have aggregated certain subscales, in particular those with higher correlations,
such as the Spiritualism, Precognition and Psi Beliefs subscales, all of which
come under the general rubric of 'psychic beliefs'. Thus, I chose to model all
the Spiritualism subscale items of the PBS (5, 12, 19 and 25) and two of the
Precognition subscale items of the PBS (21 and 26 -see below) as loading on a
general factor of Psychic Beliefs.
Secondly, methodological problems with the development of the Precognition
subscale almost certainly throw into doubt the status of that scale. Of particular
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importance is the fact that the revised Precognition subscale is composed of
two orthogonal factors (Psychically Gifted Persons and Paranormal Divinatory
Systems). Thus at the very least one has reason to suspect that a better model
would be obtained by dismantling the Precognition subscale to take cognisance
of the fact that it is not unifactorial. One is left, however, with the question of
where the two sets of items representing these factors should go. The items
referring to psychically gifted persons (21 and 26) are clearly relevant to the Psi
Beliefs subscale and in this chapter I model items 21 and 26 as loading on a
wider Psychic Beliefs factor. Items (7 and 14) refer to astrological prediction
rather than psychic prediction and consequently I model these items as loading
on a factor of Anomalous Natural Phenomena along with the Extraordinary
Lifeform subscale items (6, 13, and 20).
Thirdly, statistically and methodologically the status of the Traditional Religious
Belief, Superstition, and Witchcraft factors passed largely unchallenged.
Consequently these factors retain their former identities, but I allow them to
have certain correlations with the other factors as indicated below.
Lastly, given that the original evidence for subscale orthogonality in the PBS
was of dubious validity, and given also that there was some evidence for
moderate correlations between subscale factor items, I think it prudent
statistically and conceptually to allow for correlations between factors.
However, I shall initially be fairly conservative with respect to which pairs of
factors I allow to correlate. Thus, I shall allow Traditional Religious Belief to
correlate with Witchcraft on the grounds that for most people witchcraft is
traditionally considered to be an alternative to Christian worship. Also, in
accepting the existence of a devil, many people with traditional religious beliefs
accept that witchcraft is one way in which the devil's power may be made
manifest. It would be surprising then if there was not a correlation between the
factor of religious belief and witchcraft. As I have argued, Witchcraft and Psi
share a certain fundamental similarity; dependence on some unexplained or
occult human ability to influence people's minds and everyday matter. Psi belief
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as a folk psychological concept then may be regarded as a twentieth century
expression of older magical beliefs. Consequently, I allow for a correlation
between my hypothesised factor of Psychic Beliefs and Witchcraft. Finally,
though superstitious beliefs are of dubious paranormality my own and Irwin's
(1993) definition, some (e.g. Planer, 1988) would see superstitious beliefs as
being essentially psi-like beliefs. As I remain uncertain over the status of
Superstition I permitted that factor to correlate with the Psychic Belief factor
but reserved judgement about its dependence with other factors, and thus
constrained all other correlations with that factor to zero.
I have now outlined the substantive assumptions and reasons which lead me to
postulate a radically different model of the structure of Tobacyk and Milford's
PBS. Taking these considerations in to account in my specification of an actual
model, I was able to produce a five factor oblique model of the PBS which I
present in Figure 2 . Tobacyk and Milford's original seven factor orthogonal
solution is represented in Figure 1. My main claim is that the Oblique Five will
provide a better fit to a sample of data from the PBS than will the Big
Orthogonal Seven. This claim may be tested by factor analysing both models
and comparing their fit statistics, in particular the degree to which the Oblique
Five are a significant improvement over the Orthogonal Seven.
Methods
Subjects
131 new first year undergraduate students at the University of St. Andrew's
filled out a large questionnaire as part of a research methods course dealing
with attitude measurement. This questionnaire contained Tobacyk's (1988)
Revised Paranormal Belief Scale. The students had no prior formal
2 Readers should ignore the numbers placed next to arrows in Figures 1, 2, and 3 for the present These
are parameter estimates (Le. results) and thus do not have any bearing on the specification of the
model until after the results have been discussed.
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Figure 2. The Oblique
Five.
acquaintance with the topic of the paranormal, or with Dr. Roe's views on the
paranormal.
Materials
Tobacyk's (1988) 26 item Revised Paranormal Beliefs Scale.
Procedure and Statistical Analysis Details
A table of inter-item covariances was calculated and analysed using the
technique of covariance structure analysis using EQS (Bender, 1989). EQS
combines factor analysis, multiple regression, and path analysis techniques,
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providing a powerful system to test and confirm various causal or structural
models, including the more basic confirmatory factor model used here.
The most important output from a test of any confirmatory factor analysis is a
list of goodness of fit statistics, indicating how well the hypothesised factor
model accounts for the observed correlations (or covariances) in one's data.
When assessing the goodness of fit of a confirmatory factor model there are a
number of statistics which we have at our disposal. For the first of these, the
chi square goodness of fit statistic, we require that the chi square be non¬
significant for the model to be considered a good fit. Next we have average
standardised residual statistics, ofwhich the off diagonal residuals are the most
important. These may be treated like residuals in regression analysis, indicating
unexplained covariance, and are particularly useful in comparing the differences
in fit between two or more alternative models. Aikaike's Information Criterion
(AIC) chi-square provides an estimate of goodness of fit that takes into
account the parsimony of the underlying model (in terms of the number of
parameters that must be estimated to arrive at a particular solution). Thus the
smaller the value the better. Lastly, Bender and Bonett's non-normed fit index
(NNFI) provides a particularly good estimate of model fit with small sample
sizes (appropriate for my sample size). To even be considered as a reasonable
fit, the fit index should show values of greater than 0.9. Where two competing
models are to be tested one against the other, a simple test of the difference in
fit between the models may be obtained by subtracting the chi-square value for
the better fitting model from the chi-square value for the worse fitting model
and comparing the new chi-square on ^(model 1) minus d.f.{model 2) degrees
of freedom.
Lastiy, a useful feature of EQS when developing models is the suggestion of
model modifications in order to provide a better fit. Used cautiously, this
feature is helpful in achieving models which fit the data well.
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Model 1: Model 2: Model 2a:
TABLE 1. Tobacyk and Lawrence's (1995a) Lawrence, Roe, &
Milford's (1983) Oblique Five Williams' Modified
MODEL FIT STATISTICS Big Orthogonal (see fig. 2) Oblique Five
Seven (see fig.3)
(see fig. 1)
Avg. off-diagonal absolute standardised 0.29 0.14 0.10
residuals
Independence Model Chi-Square (d.f) 2248.345 (325)
Independence AIC 1598.345
Model AIC 213.539 95.802 42.759
Chi-Square (d.f) 811.539 (299) 687.802 (296) 626.760 (292)
Chi-Square p-value <0.001 <0.001 <0.001
Normal theory RLS Chi-Square 920.57 694.37 642.20
Bentler-Bonett Non-Normed Fit Index 0.710 0.776 0.806
Significance Test of Model 1 Fit vs. Model 2
Fit
Not Confirmatory
Model Differences in Chi-Square (d.f) (p- 123.737(3) (<0.0001) NotConfirmatory
value)
Results
Table 1 provides model fit statistics for the confirmatory test of models 1 and
2, the Orthogonal Seven and Oblique Five models respectively. The fit statistics
for my exploratory modified model (model 2a) are given in the fourth column
of table 1. Figures 1, 2 and 3 show the path diagrams for their respective
models with standardised solution parameter estimates placed by the relevant
paths of influence. The little numbered "v's" in boxes indicate the items, whilst
the large named circles are the hypothesised factors. Arrows passing from the
factors to the items indicate that item loads on (or is 'caused' by) that factor.
The strength of this influence is given as a path coefficient (i.e. correlation)
above the respective path. The open numbers connected by arrows running to
the variables from the right hand side indicate the degree of error in the
estimation of the variables. Squaring the values of the parameter estimates for
the item loadings or unique errors indicates the percentage of variance
accounted or unaccounted for (in the case of errors) by that source of variance
respectively.
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As we can see, Tobacyk and Milford's (1983) Big Orthogonal Seven do not
provide a very good fit to the data. The average off diagonal standardised
residuals are particularly poor, indicating that on average the amount of
correlation between items left unaccounted for was 0.29. The non-normed fit
index also falls well short of the 0.9 Figure required for the model to be
regarded as even minimally acceptable. In brief, the Big Orthogonal Seven
almost certainly do not represent the underlying factor structure of the PBS,
even though examination of the standardised solution parameter estimates in
Figure 1 show that all items load their factors adequately.
The fit statistics for model 2, the Oblique Five, are clearly a considerable
improvement. The average off diagonal standardised residuals are half that of
those for the Orthogonal Seven model. The non-normed fit index is higher,
but still well short of being acceptable. Equally the chi-square goodness of fit
statistic is highly significant (x (2%)=687.802, p<0.001), indicating that the
model still fails to adequately reproduce the observed inter-item covariance
matrix. Comparing the AIC statistics, however, for the two models we see that
the Oblique Five represent a far superior fit to the data when the parsimony of
the solution is taken into account. Lastly, and perhaps most importantly, the
test of the difference in fit between the two models shows that the Oblique
Five are a significant improvement over the Orthogonal Seven, despite the
overall lack of fit for either taken separately.
Examination of the standardised solution parameter estimates show that
modelling the old Spiritualism, Psi beliefs and half of the Precognition factor
items as a Psychic belief factor was perfectly acceptable. In addition modelling
the correlations between factors (the two headed arrows linking factors) was a
good idea, and the values for the correlations are all significant according to
univariate tests of parameter significance. However, despite its improvement in
fit over the Orthogonal Seven, Lawrence's Oblique Five model can be
improved upon. In particular, we can see that the Oblique Five provide an
awful representation of the factor loadings for items 6, 13, and 20. These items
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simply could not be forced to load with items 7 and 14 (which refer to
astrological prediction). At this point I ordered a Lagrange Multiplier test on
the Oblique Five solution, in order to see whether freeing up certain
parameters might improve the fit of the model. Amongst the top twenty largest
changes suggested four involved permitting correlations between the remaining
uncorrelated factor pairs, and two of these fell in to the top ten of model
modifications. Indeed the most significant improvement in model fit suggested
was to free the correlation between the Anomalous Natural Phenomena factor
and the Superstition factor. As I had initially been over-conservative in the
modelling of factor correlations, and I felt that freeing up the correlations was
intuitively plausible, I decided to implement the suggested changes by freeing
up the correlations in those factors suggested.
According to MacCallum et al. (1992) over eager use of the Lagrange Multiplier
test may result in capitalisation on chance events in the data and consequently I
refused to model any further modifications. In particular three of the top ten
modifications were to allow extraordinary life form items in the Anomalous
Natural Phenomena scale to load on the Psychic belief, Superstition and
Witchcraft factors. I chose not to implement these changes, despite the fact
that significant improvements in fit would have occurred, for reasons that I
outline in my discussion. Of the other five top ten modifications only the
second most significant made any real sense and thus I chose to stick (some
would say over cautiously) with simply freeing up factor correlations. This new
modified Oblique Five model is displayed graphically in Figure 3, with fit
statistics given in the fourth column of table 1.
3 Item 14 is seen to load perfectly on its factor, and its error coefficient is zero. This is not in fact a
genuine parameter estimate. Due to problems in identification of the Anomalous Natural Phenomena
factor item 14 was constrained by EQS at its lower bound. Examination of correlations between
parameter estimates revealed that values for the loadings of items 7 and 14 on the Anomalous
Natural Phenomena factor had exceeded the maximum possible correlation with the estimate of error
variance for item 14 (+1). These problems stem from the fact that the present model did not permit
correlations between the Anomalous Natural Phenomena factor and the other factors. When these
correlations were allowed in the modified model, the identification problem clears up.
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Figure 3. The Modified Oblique Five
The modified Oblique Five model obviously improves over the original
Oblique Five (it was designed to do so). The improvement that results brings
the model close to adequacy in terms of the non-normed fit indices, but still
leaves much to be desired in respect of overall fit and residual statistics (good
values for residuals are down near 0.02-0.04; see Lawrence et al, 1995, for a
model with excellent fit statistics). The moral of my modifications is clear, the
PBS factors are most certainly oblique, not orthogonal, as Lawrence (1995a)
predicted they should be.
However, I have not been able to provide an adequate model of the structure
of paranormal belief. Despite these modifications a better model exists. I now
turn to a discussion of the results.
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Discussion - Study 1
In this study I have attempted to show that the factor structure of the PBS can
be represented more accurately by a five factor oblique model, in contrast to
Tobacyk and Milford's (1983) seven factor orthogonal model. My results for
the test of these two models clearly show that my Oblique Five fit the data
better than Tobacyk and Milford's Orthogonal Seven. Although the
improvement in fit is substantial, my original Oblique Five and my modified
Oblique Five still do not provide an adequate fit to the data. In short, some
other model exists which provides a better representation of the structure of
paranormal belief, and it remains for future research to track down that
structure. Further to this I wish to suggest some ways in which one might
achieve a model of paranormal beliefs which is a good fit.
In my modified Oblique Five model (MOF) it was clear that the model failed
to adequately specify the factor structure and loadings for the items referring to
Tobacyk's (1988) Extraordinary Lifeforms (ELF) subscale. Examination of the
largest standardised residuals showed that considerable covariance between the
ELF items and the Psychic Belief, Superstition, and Witchcraft items was left
unexplained. A further Lagrange Multiplier test confirmed this view with three
of the top five suggested modifications being the freeing up of loadings for
ELF items with the above mentioned three factors. Clearly then, the problem
for the MOF model is that ELF items are left dangling with nowhere to load.
There are at least three solutions to this problem.
Firstly, one could simply allow the ELF items to form their own factor, thus
reconstituting the factor of Extraordinary Lifeforms, which would almost
certainly then correlate with Psychic Belief, Superstition, and Witchcraft
factors. Secondly, one could retain the present MOF model and permit the
ELF items to load on those factors suggested by my Lagrange Multiplier test.
This would be equivalent to suggesting that belief in the Loch Ness monster,
the Abominable Snowman, and life on other planets was caused by an
underlying belief in psychic powers, superstition, and magical forces. This view
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is however deeply problematic, primarily because the ELF items are
intrinsically different in nature from the other factor items. Perhaps then the
relationship between ELF items and the other factors is not so much causal
but genuinely correlational. Thus, both psychic beliefs and ELF beliefs are
beliefs about strange phenomena. The same applies to superstition and
witchcraft beliefs. But if one person holds strong beliefs about, say, psychic
powers (maybe on the basis of paranormal experience of oneself or close
others) then that person's views about other strange (but not necessarily
paranormal) phenomena become more open simply because their 'boggle
threshold' has already been lowered. Effectively the paranormal believer is
saying Well, I've had to change my views about certain strange phenomena of
the paranormal sort, and I wouldn't be surprised then if the world were
generally far stranger than most would think.' As a result one finds positive
correlations between many diverse views about strange phenomena, of one
sort or another. But this is not to imply that views about ELF are intrinsically
of the same sort as views about paranormal phenomena proper.
According to this view then, permitting the ELF items to load on a mixed bag
of paranormal belief factors is not appropriate. Option two above is then ruled
out, even though it would improve the fit of MOF. Option 1 remains feasible
in a weak sense, in that it doesn't flagrantly flout notions about the intrinsic
nature of either psychic belief, superstition, or witchcraft. However, in a strong
sense the continued presence of an ELF factor in a scale purporting to
measure paranormal belief does present problems for the conceptual clarity of
the model. Consequently, we seem to be forced to accept a last radical measure
in order to improve our prospects of modelling accurately the structure of
paranormal beliefs - cut the ELF items out! This suggestion is no more than
the practical acknowledgement of the fact, agreed on by both Tobacyk (1995)
and myself (Lawrence, 1995a) that the ETF subscale does not measure
paranormal belief. Somewhat circuitously then, we are forced by the empirical
data to concede to my own stronger conceptual critique of the PBS.
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My final suggestion for future researchers aiming to model the structure of
paranormal beliefs then, is to omit items referring to extraordinary lifeforms.
Having done this for my own data in a casual exploratory way I was able to fit a
reduced Oblique Four model (omitting only the Anomalous Natural
Phenomena items) which provided an almost fully adequate reconstruction of
the remaining data. However, the main confirmatory results from my research
are clear - the factor structure of the PBS can be accounted for better by fewer
than seven factors.
Study 2
In the last few months ofmy Ph.D. write up I was able to test once again4 the
Orthogonal Seven and Modified Oblique Five Models analysed, or in the case
of the modified oblique five developed, in the study just discussed. This
replication would help to confirm that the superiority of the Modified Oblique
Five is not just capitalisation on chance. As the model specification process
here has already been detailed in the introduction to this chapter, I shall
proceed to the methods section without further ado, suffice to note that I shall




The participants were 225 students taken from four of the schools within
Coventry University. These students had no prior acquaintance with Mr. De
Cicco. All participants were assessed in a lecture hall as a group prior to the
scheduled lecture. The age range was from 18 to 50, with the mean age being
20'/2 years and the median age being 19. There were 118 men and 107 women.




All participants were issued with the 26 item revised Paranormal Belief Scale
(Tobacyk, 1988), and were also asked to give their sex and age.
Procedure
Once approval from the dean had been given, the author's assistant arranged
to administer the PBS to an available class of students, by arrangement with the
class lecturer. Four such classes were used, from four different schools within
the university (Health and Social Sciences, Art and Design, Mathematical and
Information Sciences, and Business Studies). All participants were given a very
brief description of what was required before the PBS was handed out for
completion. After completion the author's assistant thoroughly debriefed the
class about the study aims, fielded questions, thanked them and their lecturer
for their time, and departed.
Statistical Analysis
A table of inter-item covanances was calculated and analysed using the
technique of maximum likelihood confirmatory factor analysis using EQS
(Bender, 1989).
Results
All three models tested were analysed without technical difficulties. Table 1.
gives the results of the covariance structure analysis for models 1, 2 and 3, the
Orthogonal Seven, Modified Oblique Five, and Oblique Four models
respectively. It is clear that the pattern of results found in Lawrence et al.
(1997) confirmatory factor analysis of the PBS are repeated here. Thus, the
Orthogonal Seven Model advocated by Tobacyk and Milford (1983) gives an
abnormally large average off diagonal residual. This indicates that the
Orthogonal Seven fail to explain much of the correlation between items in our
sample data. The Modified Oblique Five leave, on average, half as much to be
explained in comparison to the Orthogonal Seven. The chi-square goodness of




Model 1: Model 2:
Tobacyk and Lawrence, Roe, &
Milford's (1983) Williams'













2832.313 (325) 2260.830 (210)
Independence AIC 2182.313 1840.830
Model AIC 601.021 284.320 186.349
Chi-Square (d.f) 1199.021 (299) 868.320 (292) 554.350 (184)
Chi-Square p-value <0.001 <0.001 <0.001





Significance test Model 1 vs. Model 2 Fit
330.701 (7) (<0.001)
sample correlational data, but the Modified Oblique Five are markedly less
discrepant in this regard, and the chi-square difference test (Ay^) indicates that
the Modified Oblique Five are significantly more accurate in their
reconstruction of the sample correlational data. The AIC chi-square tests
indicate that the modified oblique five represent a more parsimonious
depiction of our sample data. Finally, the Bentler-Bonett non-normed fit index
shows that the modified oblique five improve in their level of explanation over
the orthogonal seven, but as neither of these models reach the 0.90 minimum
for this index we cannot assume that an acceptable representation of the PBS
has been found. The results for the Oblique Four model show that when
extraordinary lifeforms and astrology items are excluded, the remaining
specification of items on their factors is less discrepant still. Comparatively, the
average residual, AIC and non-normed fit indices for the Oblique Four show
that this model provides the best reconstruction of the data relative to its dataset
than does either the orthogonal seven or the modified oblique five relative to
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theirs. Nevertheless, the NNFI still indicates an unacceptable level of
incremental model fit.
Discussion - Study 2
The results of this study confirm Lawrence's (1995a) critically inspired
suggestion and Lawrence, Roe and Williams' (1997) factor analytic evidence for
a five factor oblique structure to the PBS. This confirmation is a relative
statement of superiority however, as the fit statistics for all models tested in
this study and in Lawrence et al. (1997) study fall short of acceptance. Thus, the
PBS remains resistant to any straightforward representation of its factor
structure, even when construct validity 'challenged' items about extraordinary
lifeforms and Abominable Snowmen are removed. Given these problems, one
feels inclined to emphasise the need for a wholly new measure of paranormal
belief. For whoever chooses to develop it, a word of advice; go obliquely and
remember, seven is not the magic number.
Conclusions
My initial interest in the PBS began as a result of a need to pick a measure of
paranormal belief for use in my own research. I perused the various options
and realised that of all of these the PBS was the least problematic. However, on
deepening my analysis of the PBS I came to realise, as outlined in chapters four
and five, that even the PBS was not satisfactory. My initial critique of the PBS
was largely based on the application of certain basic principles in
psychometrics, and as such had precious little to do with any empirical
assurance that something was wrong with the scale. Thus, a truly convincing
demonstration of my case could only pertain if new evidence could be brought
to bear upon the number of factors problem, and the problem of
orthogonality in the PBS. In my initial critique of the PBS I had laid my cards
on the table, as it were, by suggesting that a more appropriate factor solution in
the PBS might have given fewer than seven factors, and that these would most
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certainly by correlated (i.e. non-orthogonal). In keeping with my advocacy of
CSM to resolve problematic areas of theory in this area, I chose to perform a
confirmatory factor analysis in order to compare empirically the validity of
Tobacyk's Big Seven and my own preferred 'flavour' the Oblique Five. CFA is,
after all, just CSM without the structural equation model component. Using
this tool, we can see that my expectations were fulfilled. This confirmation
does not show that my Oblique Five are correct, only that they are less
inadequate than Tobacyk's Big Seven.
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Chapter 6
PRELIMINARY ATTEMPTS AT MODELLING:
DEVELOPING THE CHILDHOOD FACTORS MODEL.'
"When it's grey I know all I want to do - resort to make believe."
(From the songA Fovefor all Seasons, by Right Said Fred)
Any particular person's history of paranormal belief and experience must have
some beginning, and some causative factor responsible for that beginning.
Until quite recently researchers on the topic of paranormal belief (PB) and
experience (PE) remained unaware, or uninterested, in the possible early
developmental causes of PB and PE, much of the research in this area
reflecting, as we saw in the introduction, what Irwin (1993) calls the cognitive
deficits hypothesis- the view, influenced by a broadly sceptical research agenda,
that those with high PB or PE are '...illogical, irrational, credulous, uncritical,
and foolish' (Irwin, 1993, pp.16). Recently, however, research conducted by
Irwin (1992) has shown the potential importance of childhood factors
underlying PB, and so it is to a subset of these potentially causative correlates
of PB and PE that this chapter is addressed- namely, childhood trauma and
childhood fantasy.
Research addressing the childhood causes of PB and PE can be traced back to
a small study reported by Wilson and Barber (1983). In their study Wilson and
Barber (1983) interviewed 27 women whom they had rated as excellent
hypnotic subjects (with a comparison group of 25 women not so rated). The
interviews centred around childhood and adult memories, fantasies and psychic
1 I wish to thank Claire Edwards, Nicholas Barraclough, Sarah Church and Francesca Hetherington for
diligently carrying out the research reported herein as part of their second year project (supervised by
myself). All the analyses and interpretations are mine however. This chapter may be found in
published form as Lawrence el at. (1995) in the journal Personality and Individual Differences, Vol. 19, No.
2, pp. 209-215.
100
experiences. As Wilson and Barber (1983) note, with reference to their
excellent hypnotic subjects,
"Their extensive and deep involvement in fantasy seems to be their basic
characteristic and their other major talents—their ability to hallucinate
voluntarily, their superb hypnoticperformances, their vivid memories oftheir
life experiences, and their talents as psychics or sensitives—seem to derive
from or to grow out of theirprofoundfantasy life." (Wilson and Barber,
1983, pp.340).
One of the most significant factors in differentiating between fantasisers and
non-fantasisers in Wilson and Barber's group was the incidence of childhood
trauma (previously found by Hilgard (1970, 1974)). Of the 27 fantasisers, nine
(33%) reported having experienced some difficult or stressful event in their
early life, ranging from physical abuse by parents, or a mother with emotional
problems, to unstable living conditions. No subjects in the comparison group
reported having experienced any childhood trauma (see Lynn and Rhue, 1988,
for a replication).
Since Wilson and Barber's study, two studies relating fantasy proneness to PB
have been conducted by Irwin (1990; 1991b). In the first study, Irwin (1990)
administered Myers' (1983) version of the Inventory of Childhood Memories
and Imaginings (ICMI:C) to 92 people, along with Tobacyk and Milford's
(1983) Revised Paranormal Belief Scale (PBS). Irwin found Pearson
correlations of .48, .58, and .43 for the Psi Belief, Spiritualism, and Precognition
subscales of the PBS respectively with scores on the ICMI:C (all significant at
p<0.001), suggesting a definite link between imaginal involvement and the core
constructs of PB. In a follow up study, Irwin (1991b) administered the ICMI:C
and PBS to a sample of 122 students and found a similar pattern of




Figure 1. A simplification of Irwin's (1992) model depicting the childhood causes of
paranormal belief.
correlated .40, .42, and .34 with the ICMI:C (all p<0.001). Another study by
Rao (1992) looked at the relationship between fantasy proneness and PE alone
as measured by Neppe's (1983) Subjective Paranormal Experiences
Questionnaire (SPEQ). Rao found a correlation of .46 (p<0.01) between the
SPEQ and the ICMLC, replicating Wilson and Barber's finding that fantasy
prone participants reported more psychic experiences.
On the topic of childhood trauma and PB Irwin (1992) administered the
revised PBS (Tobacyk, 1988), and the Survey of Traumatic Childhood
Experiences (STCE) (Council and Edwards, 1987) to 72 students. He found a
Pearson correlation of .21 (.05<p<.08) between the full scale PBS score
(including items of dubious paranormality about the Loch Ness monster and
life on other planets) and the STCE; a non-significant result which is at least
suggestive. Those items most strongly correlated with PB were the STCE items
relating to intrafamilial physical abuse (r= .31, p<.05). Thus there is evidence
to support the view that childhood trauma has an influence on the subsequent
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development of PB. In suggesting his own model of these relationships Irwin
concludes,
"..Fantasy proneness...is a central mediating variable in the development of
paranormal beliefs. Fantasy proneness may be kindled in early childhood
through parental encouragement andjor the incidence of traumatic
experiences. In particular, the latter will instil a strong need for
interpersonal control Given a conducive social context, fantasy proneness
and the associated needfor controlmay lead to theformation ofparanormal
beliefs. Fantasy proneness...also may be a factor in the occurrence andjor
acknowledgement ofparapsychological experiences." (pp. 206)
Figure 1 presents a reduced version of Irwin's childhood factors model, showing
only those relations between factors that I have chosen to model in the present
study. With respect to his larger model Irwin notes, "Most of the relationships
indicated by the arrows have now been documented in the empirical literature,
but there remains a need for a single study entailing a path analysis of all
variables encompassed by the model." (Irwin, 1992, pp. 205).
In this study I attempt a partial confirmation of Irwin's model, using a more
advanced technique than path analysis, namely covariance structure modelling
(CSM) using EQS (Bender, 1989), a program specifically designed to
implement and test structural equation models using covariances. Using the
reduced version of Irwin's model (see fig. 1) I aim to test the causal structure
underlying the relations between childhood trauma, childhood fantasy, PE and
PB. No study has to date looked specifically and exclusively at the role of
childhood fantasy involvement in the development of PB and PE, but I feel that
an emphasis on childhood fantasy, as opposed to the mixed effects of child
and adult fantasy (as measured by the ICMI) is important given the proximity




The respondents were 82 students and friends of the author's collaborators, all
at the University of Edinburgh. Unfortunately no information on sex or age
was taken, but the sample was broadly similar to those that one usually gets
from university students.
Materials
A 61 item questionnaire was constructed using items from the following three
scales;
(1) Survey of Traumatic Childhood Experiences (STCE) — This scale,
developed by Council and Edwards (1987), comprises 30 items dealing
with events that may cause trauma in a child's life. The full 30 item scale
was used in this study. The scale has items relating to intrafamilial
sexual and physical abuse, loss related to friends and family,
extrafamilial sexual abuse, assault, loss of home and property, isolation
and personal malady, adolescent abortion/miscarriage, and parental
divorce/separation. Responses are scored on a 5 point scale of
frequency, with (A) none, (B) one, (C) two to five, (D) six to ten, and
(E) more than ten traumatic experiences.
(2) Australian Sheep-Goat Scale (ASGS) — This scale comprises 18 items
referring to three common components of PB; ESP, PK, and Life after
Death. Thalbourne and Delin (1993) report reasonable reliability and
some evidence showing concurrent validity. Items refer to PB and PE
and were marked by a 7 point scale.
(3) Childhood fantasy—This construct was measured using only those
items from Myers' (1983) ICMI:C that refer explicitly to childhood
fantasy. Items are scaled dichotomously, in the true/false format. High
scores indicate high fantasy.
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Procedure
Participants were given the three-scale questionnaire to fill in, along with a
blank envelope for the completed questionnaire to be placed in to preserve the
participant's anonymity. Participants were asked to fill in the questionnaire as
honestly as possible. Once the questionnaire was completed and sealed in the
envelope the participant was briefed about the nature of the study. No
participants reported having any particular problem with the content of the
scales, though same pointed out that the Australian Sheep-Goat Scale was quite
contorted in its wording. Once the data had been collected they were entered
in to Statview for calculation of the correlation matrix, before being entered
into EQS for covariance structure modelling. At this stage two participants'
questionnaires were excluded from the analysis, as they constituted extreme
outliers on Trauma, and one of the subjects had (amongst other unlikelies)
claimed to have had more than ten abortions/miscarriages! Consequently, I
suspected that at least one of the two outliers was not responding honestly.
The remaining sample comprises 80 individuals.
StatisticalMethods
Correlational data from this study were analysed using the technique of
covariance structure analysis using EQS (Bentler, 1989). EQS combines factor
analysis, multiple regression, and path analysis techniques, providing a powerful
system to test and confirm various causal or structural models. The most
important output from a test of any causal model is a list of goodness of fit
statistics, indicating how well the hypothesised model accounts for the
observed correlational structure of the data. When assessing the goodness of fit
of a causal model there are a number of statistics which we have at our
disposal. For the first of these, the chi square goodness of fit statistic, we
require that the chi square be nonsignificant for the model to be considered a
good fit. Next we have average standardised residual statistics, of which the off
diagonal residuals are the most important. These may be treated like residuals
in regression analysis, indicating unexplained variance, and are particularly
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Table 1. Pearson correlations between the of the main variables
Variable Trauma Fantasy Experience
Fantasy .356*** — —
Experience .343*** .315*** —
Belief .215* .271* .534*****
* p<0.06>0.05, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01,
*****p<o.0001
(Standard Deviations: Trauma = 8.13, Fantasy -
6.46, PB= 5.75, PE= 9.55)
useful in comparing the differences in fit between two or more alternative
models. Aikaike's Information Criterion (AIC) chi-square provides an estimate
of goodness of fit that takes into account the parsimony of the underlying
model (in terms of the number of parameters that must be estimated to arrive
at a particular solution). Thus the smaller the value the better. Lastly, Bentler
and Bonett's non-normed fit index (NNFI) provides a particularly good
estimate of model fit with small sample sizes (appropriate for this sample size).
To even be considered as a reasonable fit, the fit index should show values of
greater than 0.9.
Lastly, a useful feature of causal modelling is the suggestion of model
modifications, whereby EQS suggests changes to the model in order to provide
a better fit. Used cautiously, this feature is helpful in achieving models which fit
the data well.
Results
From tables 1 and 2 we can determine how well the study has replicated
previous findings on the relation between PE and belief, with fantasy and
trauma. In table 1 we may note that the correlation between fantasy and PB is
r=.21 (p<.05). This fits reasonably with the studies of Irwin (1990; 1991b)
showing average correlations of around .44 between the ICMI:C and the PBS.
The relationship between childhood fantasy and PE was slightly stronger, r=.31
(p<.01). This result offers a fair degree of agreement with the findings of Rao
(1992) with the ICMI:C (r=.46). Further, these correlations for childhood
fantasy are likely to be smaller simply because we were solely measuring
106
childhood fantasy (the ICMI:C actually has adult fantasy questions too).
Obviously one cannot expect memory based estimates of childhood fantasy
to correlate as highly with present day PB or PE, as would contemporary
fantasy estimates.
With respect to childhood trauma and PB the correlation exactly replicates that
of Irwin (1992). This is particularly encouraging, given the use of a much
narrower measure of PB. However, we failed to replicate Irwin's post hoc finding
that the strongest specific traumatic correlate of PB was intra-familial physical
abuse. The data, presented in table 2, show that the strongest predictor of PB
were the items relating to 'loss of property' (scores for this predictor stemmed
mostly from answers to an item relating to the frequency of moving home as a
child).
Table 2 gives the descriptive statistics for childhood trauma, split into its
various sources. Whilst all of the four main variables gave reasonable
approximations to a normal distribution, this was not the case for the specific
traumatic variables presented in table 2. Of these, only intra-familial physical
abuse data showed evidence of being normally distributed, the other variables
being more chi-squared in their distribution. Indeed, it is clear that most
participants had neither experienced much childhood trauma, nor collectively
displayed much variation in trauma experienced. This is particularly the case for
familial sexual abuse, almost all participants reporting no sexual abuse in their
family as children. Consequently, for correlational analyses on the four main
variables I used Pearson product moment correlation coefficients, but for
analyses on specific traumatic factors I chose to use Spearman's rho, corrected
for ties.
Lastly, the correlations between the various factors of childhood trauma and
PB and experience are interesting in so far as they show that the strength and




Corrected Spearman rho Corrected Spearman rho
(Belief) (Experience)
Mean S.D.
Intra-familial sexual abuse 1.04 0.16 -.008 .058
Intra-familial physical abuse 2.49 0.92 .196* .194 *
Loss (friend) 1.28 0.45 -.024 .23 **
Extra-familial sexual abuse 1.28 0.47 -.038 .086
Loss (family) 1.63 0.56 .110 .164
Isolation 1.35 0.67 .064 .056
Personal Illness 1.40 0.54 -.039 .194 *
Parental Divorce/Miscarriage 1.09 0.19 .031 .137
Assault 1.57 0.69 -.094 .18
Loss ofProperty (Home Moving) 1.52 0.40 .379 **** .239 **
Robbery/Mugging 1.12 0.37 .065 .251 **
* p<0.09>0.05, ** p<0.05, **** p<0.001
Table 2. Descriptive statistics for specific sources of childhood trauma, with correlations given for paranormal belief and
paranormal experience.
and experience than for belief. Here we see the inklings of a model relating
these factors, and it is to the modelling of these factors proper that I now turn.
Results ofCausalModelling
First I ran EQS on a slightly simplified version of Irwin's (1992) model, given
in figure 1. The results for this model, in terms of fit statistics, are given in the
appropriate column of table 3. The chi-square of 5.544 on 2 degrees of
freedom indicates a near significant lack of fit between the model and the
observed data. Equally the non-normed fit index is poor; all the worse given
that this index is best for reflecting fit at low sample sizes. In short, Irwin's
model is a poor fit.
EQS recommended two changes to Irwin's model. Firstly, the Wald test for
dropping parts of the model suggested the exclusion of the direct causal link
from fantasy to belief. Secondly, the Lagrange Multiplier test for adding parts
to the model suggested the inclusion of a direct causal link between trauma and
PE. Consequently, I made these changes to the model, arriving at a much more
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Table 3. Fit Statistics for Irwin's (1992) childhood factors model and the new model
MODEL FIT STATISTICS Irwin's Model New Model
(figl) (fig-2)
Average off-diagonal absolute standardised residuals 0.05S 0.022
Independence Model Chi-Square (df) 52.332 (6)
Independence AIC 40.332 40.332
Model AIC 1.544 -2.691
Chi-Square (df) 5.544 (2) 1.309 (2)
Chi-Square p-value 0.0625 0.520
Normal theory RLS Chi-Square 5.354 1.298
Bentler-Bonett Non-Normed Fit Index 0.771 1.045
streamlined model whereby trauma causes fantasy causes experience causes
belief, with a direct link from trauma to experience (I had actually considered
modelling this model previously, minus the trauma-experience link).
The results for the test of this model are given in the last column of table 3.
The new model is a considerable improvement. Residuals and fit statistics
indicate an excellent degree of fit. AIC statistics, plus residuals, show that this
model is considerably better than Irwin's in reproducing the covariance found
in the original data. In figure 2 I provide a graphical representation of this new
model, with path coefficients. It is to a discussion of these results that I now
turn.
Discussion
The correlation between childhood trauma and PB, whilst of marginal
significance, was exactly the same as that found by Irwin (1992). Also the
previous findings of a relation between fantasy, PB and PE were confirmed,
whilst also being extended to the influence of childhood fantasy.
More importantly, Irwin's proposed model of the causes of PB, as it applies to
the variables I studied, did not provide a good fit to the data. The data
provided insufficient support for the link between fantasy and PB, and it
certainly makes more sense to suppose that any direct effects of heightened
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Figure 2. The new model of the childhood causes of paranormal belief and experience.
fantasy involvement would be felt upon PE, rather than PB. however, of
particular interest is the finding that a much better fit stems from the inclusion
of a direct link between trauma and PE, not an obvious result by any means.
According to the new model trauma has two causal routes in its influence on
PE, one direct, the other indirect.
The finding that trauma gives rise to PE directly, is something which one may
explain only once one has been able to determine the specific traumatic causes
responsible for the direct route to PE. From a post hoc perusal of the data I
would like to suggest a possible cause of the two routes to paranormal
experience (from trauma). It may be that the direct link stems from the victims'
response to bereavement related trauma. A pervasive wish to bring back a
loved one may be supposed to increase the likelihood of hallucinating their
presence (indeed, studies of bereavement have shown this to be the case for
some people, e.g. Rees (1971)). The indirect route to PE via childhood fantasy
almost certainly stems from the victims' concerns about the loss of control of
social and domestic domains, as Irwin's larger model suggests. Physical and
sexual abuse, frequently moving home, long periods of isolation due to travel
or illness, may all leave a child feeling as though they are powerless to control
events in their life. In the struggle to regain control, some may turn inwards to
their own uniquely private inner life of fantasy friends and make believe realms,
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and in doing so they may permanently open doors to heightened visualisation
ability.
Also, the new model shows that PB is best modelled as a consequence, rather
than a cause, of PE. This is an important result, if it can be substantiated by
further research on larger samples, precisely because Irwin's original model is
equivocal with respect to the effects of fantasy on PB and PE, and PB and PE
themselves are supposed to show reciprocal causation with one another. If, as
the model suggests, PE experience is more the result of fantasy proneness, and
PB is more the result of PE, then this suggests a more phenomenological
explanation for PB, over a more attributional one (i.e. that one has PB and
then attributes paranormality to hallucinatory experiences). In short, where PE
has previously been considered the younger brother to PB, my research
suggests that it is more the 'paternal cause' of PB. Whether these findings hold
true is something only further studies could show. The next two chapters
describe additional work seeking to confirm and extend this initial study.
Ill
Chapter 7
CONFIRMING CHILDHOOD CAUSES OF
PARANORMAL BELIEF AND EXPERIENCE:
A SMALL BUT SUCCESSFUL REPLICATION
"Ifelt it existed solelyfor me tofind strength, in order to survive the world
ofreality...it was my outletfrom the hells andpains of the realworld."
(Deborah, traumatised as a child, on herfantasy world).
In the previous chapter I reported the results of my first attempt to examine
the role that childhood trauma and fantasy play in the development of
paranormal experience and belief (Wilson and Barber, 1983; Irwin, 1992). As I
hope is now clear, research in this particular area represents a significant
theoretical departure from standard research on the psychology of paranormal
belief and experience, focusing as it does on the psychodynamic functions that
paranormal beliefs and experiences may serve for the individual. Thus, whereas
much present research asks the question 'How is it that people can believe in
the paranormal?' and goes on to look at how differences in believers now
might explain their beliefs, this new area of research asks the question 'What
role might paranormal experiences and beliefs serve in the life of the
individual?' and goes on to look more closely at various factors in a person's
life that might be responsible for their present day beliefs or experiences.
As we saw, according to Irwin, a key role in the development of paranormal
experience and belief is played by childhood fantasy. A child's level of fantasy
may be triggered by a number of things; innate ability, parental encouragement
of fantasy (or fantasy promoting activities such as art), and also by incidence of
childhood trauma. But the upshot of all this is that fantasy plays a causal role in
the development of paranormal belief and experience. For Irwin then fantasy is
causally equivalent in its effects on both paranormal belief and experience. It
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can cause both with equal measure. The role of fantasy is further enhanced in
Irwin's model by the fact that it is the 'central mediating' variable for all
childhood influences on the subsequent belief and experience. The effects of
trauma in childhood upon subsequent paranormal experience and belief, in
Irwin's model, are only felt indirectly through its influence on fantasy. A similar
pattern of causation is postulated once again for Irwin's other main childhood
cause - parental encouragement of fantasy (though here it must be said the
association is obvious). Though Irwin's full model encompasses a wide range of
variables, on a variety of levels; both social and cognitive, the model tested here
is simply a modified version of Irwin's original model that nonetheless
expresses its essence in the central role for fantasy. This model is presented,
using the typical format for presenting path models, in Figure 1. Boxes
represent measured variables, and circles represent latent or factored variables.
Arrows indicate the implied direction of 'causal' effects.
In the last chapter we found that Irwin's model provided a poor degree of fit
to the data, in particular the relationships between paranormal experience and
trauma, and paranormal belief and fantasy were misspecified. Post-hoc
exploratory specification searches lead to a modified model in which a direct
cause of childhood trauma on paranormal experience was the most novel
suggestion. By implementing the suggested changes a near perfect degree of fit
was obtained. According to this new model childhood trauma has two routes
to the development of paranormal experience. The first route is via the
mediation of childhood fantasy, the route that Irwin first explicated in any
detail. The second route, however, is a genuinely new development. Assuming
there to be no mis-specification present in the new model, then childhood
trauma also has a direct effect upon the development of paranormal experience.
In short, simply being traumatised has effects upon subsequent development of
paranormal experience devoid of any other mediating influence. If I hit you (as
a child) you are much more likely to develop paranormal experiences. If this is
a genuine finding then it should recur in future studies testing the new model.
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Figure 1. Irwin's (1992) model of paranormal belief
development
Of course, there is one possible problem with the previous study that threatens
the validity of its findings; the new model was based upon a specification
search. EQS simply searched exhaustively through all possible unspecified
model parameters for any additional parameters that could be added in order
to improve model fit. The link between trauma and paranormal experience was
just such a parameter, plucked blind to its conceptual import on the basis of
purely empirical factors. The problem with such a procedure is that it just as
easily selects spurious significant parameters as meaningful/genuine significant
parameters. The link between trauma and experience may therefore represent
nothing more than a type I error.
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If the link between trauma and experience is spurious, the result of mere
sampling error, then this particular link will fail to be significant in a
confirmatory test of the model (and the new model will likewise suffer some
decrement in explanatory power). In this chapter then, I outline the results of a
second study which served the sole purpose of enabling a confirmatory test of
the new model's explanatory superiority over that of Irwin's model. An
additional feature of Irwin's wider model is his suggestion that a need for
interpersonal control mediates the link between trauma and paranormal belief.
Irwin operationally tested this hypothesis by correlating Schultz's FIRO-B
expressed control measure with paranormal belief. He found that expressed
control on the FIRO scale correlated positively with paranormal belief only
when the repondent's friend completed the scale. This correlation was not
evident when the respondent completed the control measure. In this study the
full FIRO-B scale was administered as part of the questionnaire package, and
we shall therefore be able to provide evidence confirming this link (or not), as
well as looking at the influence of the other five components of the FIRO-B
scale. In addition, this new study served to help me pilot the larger
questionnaire that is to form the basis ofmy final study. The present study was
not without its problems however. It was to initially serve as a comparison of
the beliefs of sceptics and believers. However, I was unable to enlist the
support of the 100 sceptics I needed for the study, and thus was left with the
responses from my sample of the SPR membership.
Method
Subjects
The respondents were 58 members of the Society for Psychical Research, part
of an initial random sample of 100 members. Ages ranged from a minimum of
17 years to a maximum of 87 years. Average age was 46.03 years. Of the 57
respondents who gave their sex, 42 were men (74%) and 15 were women
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(26%). The SPR membership is well known for its predominance of male
members in the middle to upper classes, and the list of sample occupations
reflects this (e.g. a random selection of occupations taken from the sample are
labourer, university lecturer, animal carer, part time nurse/tutor, and teacher).
As for the sample's representativeness of the range of paranormal belief and
experience, its membership may broadly be classed as non-psychic believers in
the paranormal. Therefore the nature of the sample warrants some caution
when it comes to interpretation of results.
Materials
All survey participants received the 225 item survey questionnaire, and a single
copy of the 54 item FIRO-B questionnaire. The nature of these questionnaires
is as follows;
1. Survey questionnaire (see Appendix II) - this is a 225 item questionnaire
using a variety of response formats, comprising the following scales;
a) Paranormal Experiences Scale (PES) (see Appendix I) - this scale
was put together by the author to comprehensively measure a
person's experience of parapsychological phenomena. Telepathy,
clairvoyance, precognition, OBE's, mediumship, and psychokinesis
are all assessed.
b) Modified Australian Sheep-Goat Scale (ASGS-B) - this scale was a
shortened version of Thalbourne and Delin's (1994) ASGS. Only
those items referring to paranormal belief were used (the ASGS also
refers to paranormal experience). Items were drastically abbreviated to
make their meaning clearer on the advice of colleagues whose own
participants voiced some confusion about the nature of the original
wording for items in the ASGS.
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c) Edinburgh Paranormal Belief Scale (EPBS) (see Appendix I) - this
scale was drawn together by the author in order to overcome some of
the problems with other scales for the measurement of paranormal
belief. The intention was not to produce a psychometrically
impeccable instrument, but merely to have a second tool for the
assessment of paranormal belief that might complement the ASGS
(thus cancelling out their specific deficits).
d) Survey of Traumatic Childhood Experiences (STCE) - This scale
remained the same as that described in chapter 6.
e) Childhood fantasy (see Appendix I) - This scale remained the same
as that described in chapter 6.
2. FIRO-B - this 54 item scale was developed by Schultz (1954) to measure the
fundamental determinants of interpersonal behaviour as Schultz saw them;
affect, control, and inclusion. Each of these three aspects of interpersonal
behaviour is measured in terms of both wanted and expressed behaviour. Thus,
the wanted affect scale measures the degree to which a person wants others to
act Svarm and friendly' to them, whereas the expressed affection scale measures
the degree to which the respondent expresses 'warmth and friendliness' in their
own behaviour. For the purposes of this study, the most interesting
component of the scale is the control dimension. This scale measures the
extent to which people seek to control, or wish to be controlled by, others.
Respondents answer each item on a 6 point scale (with varying meaning).
These raw item scores are then filtered through a binary scoring system in
which there are 0-9 points available for each of the six measured constructs
(wanted/expressed affection, wanted/expressed control, and
wanted/expressed inclusion). Schultz has identified 37 characteristic scoring
patterns, which he has wryly named, e.g. Loner, Mission Impossible. Each
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pattern identifies a characteristic way of dealing with that aspect of
interpersonal behaviour. Fumham (1990) describes the scale as having, 'limited,
but satisfactory psychometric properties in terms of validity and reliability.'
(pp.712). The primary area of use for the FIRO has been in the area of
occupational selection.
Procedure
A random sample of 100 members of the SPR was drawn up from a list of
over 700 British members in the 1994 membership lists (kindly provided by
Eleanor O'Keeffe, secretary at the SPR). Copies of the survey questionnaire
were then posted to the sample over the period 8 August 1994 until 22
September 1994. The retrieval procedure was to allow one month for
completion and return of the questionnaire before a follow up phone call was
made. 43 responses were received in the first posting, and 15 other responses
were received after the follow up phone call. Of the original 100 people
sampled, four were physically unable to respond (due to death, not living at the
listed address, or some other similarly irretrievable circumstance). The final
plausible response rate was therefore 60.4%. In addition to assuring participant
anonymity, the author gave all potential respondents the opportunity to
contact him directly by phone if they had any problems with the content of the
childhood trauma scale. No phone call or complaint about the content of the
scale was ever received, although several respondents expressed bewilderment
at the association of trauma with paranormal experience and belief (all such
queries were personally answered by letter).
StatisticalMethods
The statistical analysis adopted for this study was much the same as that for the
pilot study. Two differences are worth noting. Firstly, in this study two
measures of paranormal belief are used, the ASGS and the EPBS. The variable
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of paranormal belief in this study is therefore analysed as a latent variable
defined by factor scores based on the systematic covariation in the two
manifest variables. Secondly, given that non-normality is more likely in smaller
samples, I chose to employ the maximum likelihood estimation technique (as
before), but with robust statistical estimators selected. These estimators are
adjusted to protect against the problems of non-normality that may befall
studies with small sample sizes.
Results
Prior to analysis data were inspected for missing values both by eye and by
graphical techniques provided by EQS. Values that appeared to be missing at
random were replaced by mean substitution. The only data which appeared to
be missing non-randomly were the FIRO-B data; due to its particularly
repetitive response format some individuals simply stopped filling it in, or
didn't bother. In analyses with the FIRO: B only complete cases have been
analysed. However, with a small amount ofmean substitution it was possible to
recover complete data for all the main variables of interest in this study.
Firstly, examining table 1 we can see how well the basic relationships
uncovered in the last study have been reproduced in this study. Of course, we
can also see how well this study replicates the work of Irwin (1992). Firstly, the
correlation between the two belief measures and fantasy (average Pearson r =
0.225) accords very well with the results found in the previous study based on a
student population (r = 0.27). Both these correlations and those of the
previous study are much lower than those found by some others using the
ICMI:C; Rao (1992) found a correlation of 0.46 between the ICMI:C and
paranormal experience. As argued before (Lawrence et al., 1995) one can
expect the present correlations with fantasy to be below those found in other
studies simply because the measure of fantasy used here addresses only
childhood fantasy, and not child and adult fantasy (as does the full scale
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Figure 2. Lawrence et al. (1995) model of paranormal belief
development.
ICMI:C). Thus, the results for the relationship between fantasy and belief show
the kind of chronological attenuation that one would expect for temporally
distant influences. As before, and in a similar vein, the correlation between
fantasy and experience accords well with that of the previous study (r — 0.315).
The consistency in these correlations between two quite distinct populations is
heartening, and tends to suggest that the differences that do exist between the
Edinburgh student study and the SPR study have no systematic influence upon
the relationships between the variables of concern to me in this thesis.
Turning to childhood trauma and belief the degree of consistency with
previous studies is lower. Whilst the EPBS does show a similar strength of
relationship with trauma with Irwin's study and the previous study (r = 0.215
for both those studies), the ASGS-B shows almost no correlation with trauma.
This is perhaps not so troublesome though, given that previous modelling
attempts suggested that there was no significant direct effect of trauma on
paranormal belief, and what is more important for modelling is that experience
shows a stronger relation to trauma than does belief. This latter correlation is
clearly consistent with previous results, the figure of 0.440 being somewhat
larger than that found in the previous study (r = 0.343). Summarising the
conclusions that can be drawn from the basic correlation matrix we can say
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Table 1. Correlations between the variables of interest.
Variable Experience EPBS ASGS-B Trauma
EPBS 0.551 — — —
ASGS-B 0.316 0.373 — —
Trauma 0.440 0.168 -0.051 —
Fantasy 0.272 0.271 0.180 0.131
that a fair degree of consistency has been evinced, a few errant correlations
notwithstanding. This is encouraging given the nature of the sample, and
perhaps warrants a little more confidence in subsequent interpretation of the
data.
In the previous study a detailed tabulation of the specific traumatic correlates
of belief and experience provided clear evidence of a stronger link between
trauma and experience than was evident for trauma and belief; a result which
was also suggested by the causal modelling results in that study. In table 2 I
present similar results for the present study. Naturally this table differs in its
inclusion of correlations for both belief measures. It also differs in two other
respects. Firstly, in the published data for the previous study the means were
composed of averages averaged by subject and by the number of items
contributing to that subject average (e.g. there are three items for familial sexual
abuse but only two for robbery/mugging). This item averaging is not present in
the present table, accounting for the difference in means and standard
deviations between the studies. If one includes the item averaging for the
present data then there is a fair agreement between the means and standard
deviation for these two studies, save for the isolation mean, which brings us to
the second difference. After the previous study was published I noticed an
error, committed by both Irwin and myself, in the calculation of the isolation
sub-score. Whereas Irwin and I had both added the two items comprising the
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Table 2. Spearman rho Spearman rho Spearman rho
Source of Childhood Trauma Mean S.D. (EPBS) (ASGS-B) (Experience)
Intrafamilial sexual abuse 3.034 0.263 0.210 -0.072 0.178
Intrafamilial physical abuse 11.190 5.886 0.171 -0.033 0.255
Loss (friend) 3.603 1.611 0.030 -0.033 0.046
Extrafamilial sexual abuse 3.552 1.062 -0.004 0.007 0.242
Loss (family) 4.414 1.487 0.066 -0.193 0.056
Isolation 3.138 3.663 0.222 0.027 0.439
Personal Illness 2.741 1.085 -0.180 -0.085 0.138
Parental divorce/miscarriage 2.241 0.506 0.177 0.011 0.344
Assault 3.034 1.426 0.179 -0.022 0.142
Loss of property (home moving) 4.759 1.302 -0.091 -0.177 -0.112
Robbery/mugging 1.138 0.437 0.166 0.054 0.097
isolation sub-score, the scoring system for the sub-scores indicates that the two
items should be multiplied together. Thus if someone indicates three separate
episodes of isolation of at least 1 months duration each on the isolation items
this would score 3+3 on the incorrect scoring system and 3*3 on the new. The
actual score would be 3 points lower than the correct score. This error would
clearly influence both the mean and the standard deviation of the scores, and
this is what is found in table 2. Because of the expansion in variability that
would result from the correct scoring one would expect an increase in the
strength of any real correlation that exists between isolation trauma and related
variables due to the expansion of range.
Turning to table 2 then we can see that a similar pattern emerges as was found
in the previous study. Spearman correlations between experience and the
specific traumatic sources are significant for three variables, and near-significant
for a further three variables. For the EPBS three variables show near-
significant correlations, whilst only one variable shows any kind of near
significant correlation with the ASGS-B. Once again then, we see that the
correlations for the specific types of traumatic event are more salient and
numerous when experience is the correlate than when either kind of belief
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measure is the correlate, fully confirming the general findings of the previous
study in this respect. Particularly noteworthy is the anticipated expansion of the
correlation of isolation with experience. This is also felt somewhat for the
EPBS, whilst the ASGS-B shows almost exactly the same degree of non-
correlation as was found in the previous study. This result is very encouraging,
as are the basic results from table 2 in general, providing once again subtle
allusions to the model to come.
Results ofCausal Modelling
Both models taken from the last study were separately analysed for their
goodness of fit in this study on an a priori basis (i.e. no modification was made
to the models prior to the analysis that might influence their degree of fit).
Running EQS on the model given in Figure 1, the simplified version of Irwin's
model, gave fit statistics as indicated in table 3, column 2. The fit statistics for
Irwin's model indicate an inadequate degree of fit in all respects. The Satorra-
Bentler chi-square is significant, indicating that the model leaves a significant
amount of covariance left unexplained. The Bentler-Bonnett non-normed fit
index is particularly poor, and this is problematic given its sensitivity to fit in
small samples. The situation is somewhat improved for the confirmatory test
of the Lawrence et al. (1995) model. Although on average that model leaves a
slightly higher residue of covariation to be explained, this is due to just one or
two marginally discrepant residuals1. Generally, the fit statistics for the
Lawrence model are far improved, and this is reflected in the Satorra-Bentler
scaled chi-square which is non-significant (indeed it is almost at its optimum
value, equal to the degrees of freedom). Finally, the Bentler-Bonnett non-
normed fit index is well within the acceptable 0.90 boundary for a well fitting
1 Indeed, three residuals are above ±0.10; one of these being the, this time, non-significant relationship
between trauma and fantasy. Two other relationships also contribute to the residuals; a negative one
between truama and the ASGS-B, and a positive one between fantasy and the EPBS. Neither are










Average off-diagonal absolute standardised residuals 0.0639 0.0739
Independence Model Chi-Square (dj) 51.67 (10)
Independence AIC 31.67 31.67
Model AIC 6.46 -4.33
Satorra-Bentler Scaled Chi-Square (df) 15.65 (4) 6.86 (5)
Chi-SquareRvalue 0.0035 0.2309
Normal theory RLS Chi-Square 12.883 5.067
Bender-Bonett Non-Normed Fit Index 0.372 0.968
AChi-square (d.f) (p-value) 8.79 (1) (p<0.005)
model. Despite the irritating failure to confirm a significant relationship
between trauma and fantasy (generally not disputed in the psychological
literature) it is clear that generally the Lawrence et al. (1995) model is confirmed
in this small study. Thus, the relationship between trauma and fantasy
notwithstanding, the results of the previous study were not merely the result of
capitalisation on chance.
Whilst the Lawrence model reproduces the original correlations in the basic
data very well, it might not necessarily do this with similar structural
coefficients. Figure 2 shows the full path diagram for the model with the
relevant components of the standardised measurement and structural models
represented. From this model it is clear that the essential pattern of the
structural coefficients is replicated, save for the effect of trauma upon fantasy.
In particular the coefficient for the effect of fantasy on belief is exacdy
reproduced. The coefficient for the novel direct effect from trauma to
experience is not only well confirmed, but is somewhat stronger in the latest




Expressed Control 0.241 0.035 0.197
Wanted Control 0.028 -0.158 -0.059
Expressed Inclusion 0.036 -0.088 0.151
Wanted Inclusion 0.084 -0.165 0.109
Expressed Affect 0.130 -0.077 0.041
Wanted Affect 0.002 -0.069 0.007
appropriately high. The appropriateness of this particular relationship is
manifested in two respects. Firstly, one has come to anticipate high correlations
between experience and belief, but secondly higher path strengths are a
common feature of models using latent variables. Thus, with the diluting
effects of systematic unique variance factored out of the experience-belief
relationship one naturally obtains a more accurate estimate of the genuine
relationship between the two. Paradoxically, some researchers regard this kind
of effect enhancement with the suspicion that it is some kind of mathematical
sleight of hand. Quite the opposite, assuming both factored variables do share
a common core then the latent variable will be composed of this core, whilst
unique but systematic variability specific to each measure is left out - this must
surely be a valuable feature of the latent variable model! On the integrity of the
measurement model of the belief latent variable we see that both belief
measures adequately load the factor of paranormal belief.
Thus, despite the small size of the sample, and despite its apparent particularity,
the results of this study fairly support those of the previous study.
Results for the FIRO-B scale
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In table 4 we can see how the relationship between the six subscales and the
three paranormally relevant scales breaks down. The relationship between the
EPBS and expressed control (rho = 0.197) most clearly supports Irwin's earlier
findings, where Tobacyk's PBS gave a similar moderate correlation with
expressed control (rho = 0.32) when assessed by the survey respondents
assistant, or a non-significant correlation (rho = 0.10) when the survey
respondents themselves filled out the FIRO-B. Strangely, the ASGS-B shows
no relationship with expressed control, and a non-significant but nevertheless
weakly negative relationship with wanted control. Meanwhile, once again, the
PES shows the strongest correlation with expressed control, and almost no
relation to any other variable save for a small correlation with expressed affect.
Clearly the data at hand tend to support the notion that expressed control
alone has some part to play in future modelling attempts. I now turn to a
discussion of these results.
Discussion
Rather than being the result of capitalisation on chance, the model suggested in
the last chapter's specification search would appear to depict a fairly robust and
consistent representation of the development of paranormal belief and
experience, at least so far as the pattern of results for childhood fantasy and
childhood trauma is concerned. The rather restricted nature of the sample, and
its small size, has not prevented a similar pattern of results from presenting in
this study. Despite this success, the SPR study proved too small to allow
anything other than this most basic confirmation of the Lawrence et al. (1995)
model. The larger model outlined earlier in this thesis could not be analysed
due to empirical underidentification (the variablersample size ratio was too
low). Further still, the simplification inherent in the present and previous
modelling attempts means that strictly speaking those previous models have
been misspecified. With the inclusion of all, or most, of the relevant variables
in Irwin's model, one may yet find significant changes to the parameters that
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have been specified. Lastly, the analysis of the FIRO-B measure, though basic,
has lent some more support to the notion that a need for control is manifest in
the character of the paranormal believer and experiencer. The final study




We have now seen two successive attempts to confirm and extend Irwin's
childhood factors model of paranormal belief and experience. Some interesting
modifications were suggested in the first modelling attempt, and when the model
based on these modifications was cross-validated on the SPR data the results
provided a reasonably good degree of corroboration for the first study's
respecification. However, more interesting issues came out of the first study that
could not realistically be dealt with in the SPR study, primarily because the sample
size for that study was too low. It remained then for me to attempt a full blown
cross-validation of the previous study results on a larger, more representative
sample. Likewise, my predictions about the meaning of the direct route from
trauma to experience would need to be put to specific test. These are the key
features I wish to develop in this chapter. If the model developed in previous
chapters is seen to cross over to the wider population of people living in
Edinburgh then we may feel fairly confident that a stable set of relationships is
being addressed, something that is worthy of concerted theoretical analysis in the
concluding parts of this thesis. Of course I cannot be sure that my model includes
all the relevant factors, but in the absence of any compelling reason to believe the
model omits key variables I would feel confident, if the previous model was
confirmed, in offering up these results for serious consideration as a fundamental
component in the understanding of paranormal belief and experience.
There are basically two planned analyses in this chapter. The first is the basic
confirmation of the model developed in the previous two chapters, and as we are
now familiar with that model I shall not dwell on it here. However, a larger study
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should afford us the possibility of exploring in more detail some aspects of Irwin's
more complex specification of the development of paranormal belief and
experience. Secondly, in Lawrence et al. (1995) I proposed a two route model of
the relationship between trauma and paranormal experience, in which trauma has
both direct and indirect influences on paranormal experience. The indirect route is
moderated by childhood fantasy, and represents the widely accepted view that
childhood fantasy, in the form of fantasy proneness, has a prominent role in the
development of paranormal experience. The direct route is a novel addition to the
model proposed by Irwin, and seems warranted from the results of the second
study. In brief, I argued earlier that the two routes may well stem from two kinds
of trauma; control related and bereavement related. It seems the best way to test
this hypothesis is to model the factors relevant to it on their own, divorced from
complication with other factors. This then is what I shall aim to complete in this
chapter. For clarity of exposition this chapter will be split in to two parts; one
which provides the confirmation of the previous two chapters' findings, and the
second, which tests what I shall call the 'specified trauma model' of traumatic
influences on paranormal experience.
Methods
Subjects
The respondents were 129 citizens living within the city of Edinburgh, from an
initial survey acceptance quota of 300. The volunteer response rate is therefore
43.66%, by no means a poor response rate for this kind of survey. However, 134
people simply refused outright to participate in the survey. A large majority (64%)
of these were judged to be over 50, and as so many of these refused to participate
before the survey could be explained to them, there is a somewhat lessened chance
that strong content related selection biases apply. Of the 116 people who gave
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their sex, 45 were male and 71 female. One hundred and fifteen people gave their
age, and for this sample the mean and median age were 40 years.
Materials
A 225 item survey questionnaire was constructed using items from a variety of
scales. Only the following are relevant to this study;
(1) Survey of Traumatic Childhood Experiences (STCE) — This scale,
developed by Council and Edwards (1987), comprises 30 items dealing with
events that may cause trauma in a child's life. The full 30 item scale was
used in this study. The scale has items relating to intrafamilial sexual and
physical abuse, loss related to friends and family, extrafamilial sexual abuse,
assault, loss of home and property, isolation and personal malady,
adolescent abortion/miscarriage, and parental divorce/separation.
Responses are scored on a 5 point scale of frequency, with (A) none, (B)
one, (C) two to five, (D) six to ten, and (E) more than ten traumatic
experiences.
(2) Modified Australian Sheep-Goat Scale (ASGS) — this scale was a shortened
version of Thalbourne and Delin's (1993) ASGS. Only those items referring
to paranormal belief were used (the ASGS also refers to paranormal
experience). Items were drastically abbreviated to make their meaning
clearer on the advice of colleagues whose own participants voiced some
confusion about the nature of the original wording for items in the ASGS.
(3) Edinburgh Paranormal Belief Scale (EPBS) — this scale was drawn together
by the author in order to overcome some of the other problems with other
scales for the measurement of paranormal belief. The intention was not to
produce a psychometrically impeccable instrument, but merely to have a
second tool for the assessment of paranormal belief that might complement
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the ASGS (thus cancelling out their individual deficits as measures of that
construct).
(4) Childhood fantasy — This construct was measured using only those items
from Myers' (1983) ICMI:C that refer explicitly to childhood fantasy. Items
are scaled dichotomously, in the true/false format. High scores indicate
high fantasy.
(5) Paranormal Experiences Scale — This scale measures the extent to which a
person has experienced events of an ostensibly paranormal nature.
Comprising 14 items, the scale measures the following kinds of paranormal
experience; general psi ability, telepathy, precognition, visions (general and
of spirits), psychokinesis, out-of-the-body experiences, and anomalous
object movement.
Survey Procedure
The random function of a Casio calculator was used to select one page from the
Edinburgh residential telephone book. The first thirty street names in the left most
column of this page were selected at random from the telephone book for the
Edinburgh district. The author then visited each street, and exhaustively sampled at
least 10 houses until the survey questionnaire had been accepted by ten individuals,
whereupon a new street was sampled (on occasions a street was exhausted before
ten questionnaires had been administered, in which case the author moved in to an
adjacent street). Overall the author visited 434 houses until all 300 questionnaires
had been accepted for completion. People answering the door were (if over 18)
invited to participate in a study to examine the causes and consequences of
paranormal belief and experience. Attention was drawn at this stage to the
sensitive nature of some of the scale items, and participants were informed that
should they not wish to complete part or all of the questionnaire they were
perfectly within their rights to do so. Any questions about the nature of the
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questions were answered to the satisfaction of the respondent, and if a potential
respondent declined to take part a brief apology for calling on them was offered
and the researcher departed. Participants were given the survey questionnaire to fill
in. Participants were asked to fill in the questionnaire as honestly as possible, and
the questionnaire introduction also included an honesty statement to dissuade
participants from giving only socially desirable responses (Eysenck, Eysenck and
Shaw, 1974). Despite the intimate nature of some of the questionnaire items, no
respondent reported having any particular problem with the content of the scales.
Participants were given one week to complete the questionnaire before the author
personally returned to collect the questionnaire. If people requested more time to
complete the scale a further week was given.
Part I - Results
Preliminary analysis
Examination of univariate and multivariate kurtosis estimates revealed no
substantial departure from univariate or multivariate normality (Mardia's1
coefficient = 0.8801, z = 0.5974, p=NS). Examination of case numbers with the
largest contribution to the normalised multivariate kurtosis revealed only one
strongly discrepant case, case 78. Examination of raw data for case 78 revealed that
this correspondent reported a higher than average amount of loss related to
friends and family. However, this case did not contribute to overall significant
kurtosis, and so was not removed from the analysis.
An intercorrelation matrix was analysed using maximum likelihood covariance
structure analysis. The determinant of the input matrix was suitably non-zero, and
the necessary program statement, 'PARAMETER ESTIMATES APPEAR IN
ORDER, NO SPECIAL PROBLEMS WERE ENCOURNTERED DURING
i See Mardia (1970) or (1974).
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OPTIMIZATION.' given. This being the case, we shall turn to a consideration of
the modelling results.
Modelling results
Table 1. gives the modelling results for the covariance structure analysis of the
Irwin and Lawrence et al. (1995) models of paranormal belief development. It is
manifestly apparent that the twice suggested superiority of Lawrence's model is
confirmed in this analysis on a larger, more general sample. The off diagonal
residuals for both models are good. The model Aikaike Information Criterion chi-
square indicates that Lawrence's model is again the more parsimonious of the two.
Interestingly, chi-square goodness of fit tests for both models are non-significant
indicating that both models reproduce the covariation amongst the manifest
variables very well. The normal theory RLS chi-square supports this conclusion
also. Finally, the Bentler-Bonett non-normed fit index gives a very acceptable
degree of model fit for both models, favouring Lawrence et al. model. Despite the
improved quality of fit for Irwin's model on this sample of data, it is now
abundantly clear that the Lawrence et al. model represents a genuinely and
consistently better fit to data collected using the variables of trauma, fantasy,
paranormal belief and experience. Cautious use of the specification search facility
of EQS by Lawrence et al. (1995) has resulted in a model which cross-validates
reasonably well in widely differing samples. However, only examination of the
largest standardised residuals, standardised solution results, and Lagrange and Wald
tests, will indicate whether the model's quality of fit is precisely the same as for
previous analyses.
For Irwin's model the three largest residuals were for the correlations between
trauma and the EPBS (0.176), trauma and paranormal experience (0.119), and
trauma and the ASGS-B (0.107). All other residuals were within ±0.004 points of
zero error. Once again, for Irwin's model the relationship between trauma and
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TABLE 1. Irwin's Model New Model




Average off-diagonal absolute standardised residuals 0.0406 0.0422
Independence Model Chi-Square (df) 221.064 (10)
Independence AIC 201.0639
Model AIC -2.97 -4.93
Chi-Square (df) 5.028 (4) 5.069 (5)
Chi-Square p-value 0.28443 0.40750
Normal theory RLS Chi-Square 4.928 4.927
Bender-Bonett Non-Normed Fit Index 0.988 0.999
paranormal experience is found to be poorly explained. All measurement and
construct equations had highly significant coefficients in the model, except for the
path coefficient representing the influence of fantasy upon paranormal belief
(coefficient = 0.041, z=0.203, p=NS). This of course hints at the likely removal of
that link from the model in the forthcoming Wald test, a result in keeping with the
two previous studies results. True to form, the very first parameter considered for
removal in the Wald test is the link from fantasy to belief. For the Lagrange
multiplier results, which suggest possible additions to the model, only one
suggestion gives a significant chi-square reduction; the addition of a link from
belief back to fantasy. I find it difficult to make this link theoretically meaningful,
especially as the path coefficient for this link would be negative (-0.264)! I shall
therefore blatantly ignore this modification, passing it off as a candidate for
capitalisation on chance if seriously implemented in the model. The very next
suggested addition, which is not quite significant, is the familiar addition of a direct
link from trauma to paranormal experience (chi-square = 2.55, p=0.110). Although
not significant, the estimated parameter change resulting from adding this link is
the largest of all those suggested (the fact that it is insignificant would suggest that
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the standard error of the estimate is quite large). Nevertheless, it is clear that the
direct link from trauma to experience is here to stay.
Turning to the largest standardised residuals for Lawrence et al. model, the largest
three are, in order, the residual for the relationship between trauma and the EPBS
(0.179), trauma and paranormal experience (0.119), and trauma and the ASGS-B
(0.109). The remaining residuals are all within ±0.004 of zero error. The residuals
are all too small to worry over, and indeed the Lagrange multiplier test for adding
parameters found no unspecified parameters which if added would significantly
enhance model fit. The Wald test did suggest that the direct link between trauma
and experience be dropped (univariate X, (i) = 3.097, p<0.078, and so this path was
removed and the Lawrence model reanalysed. The resulting model, with
standardised path coefficients, is depicted in Figure 1.
Part 1 Discussion
The results of this confirmatory analysis are reasonably clear. The new model of
paranormal belief development resulting from Lawrence et al. (1995) specification
search is generally a better fit than Irwin's original model. There has been some
difficulty with replicating the links between trauma and fantasy (in the last chapter),
and trauma and paranormal experience (this chapter). However, even paths which
have failed to be significant in confirmatory tests have only just failed to be
significant. To be fair, we are still dealing with smallish sample sizes in this chapter,
with all that implies for replication of weaker links. However, Lawrence et al.
suggested that the two routes to experience from trauma might have different
traumatic causes. I shall not herein go over the details, suffice to say that the next
part of this chapter aims to resolve the status of this conjecture, which at present




Figure 1. The full path diagram for Lawrence's model of the childhood factors
minus non-significant paths.
Part 2 - Examining the Specified Trauma Model
In chapter 6 I attempted to explain the evidence for a direct link from trauma to
experience by proposing that the direct route is caused by a specific type of
trauma, bereavement related trauma. In contrast, the indirect effect of trauma on
paranormal experience is supposed to be the product of control related trauma,
the kind of trauma explicitly theorised in Irwin's (1992) paper on the origins of
paranormal belief. In this section of the chapter I shall directly test this hypothesis.
The first consideration is just how to operationalise the two traumatic latent
variables of control and loss related trauma. In the one instance we want a loss
factor indicated, at a minimum, by variables relating to loss of friends and family
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Figure 2. A scree plot of eigenvalues for the factor analysis of the STCE.
on the STCE, whilst the control factor should relate together traumatic variables
like family physical abuse, parental divorce, and loss of home at the least. One
possible solution would be to perform an exploratory factor analysis on the STCE
main variables to see a) what the dimensionality of the STCE is, and b) whether
within the factors selected there is clear evidence of control and loss factors. It just
so happens that the results of a principal factor analysis of the 11 main variables of
the STCE do indeed support the notion that there are two factors of trauma, one
relating to loss traumas, and one relating to control traumas. The results of this
analysis are given in table 2 and Figure 2.
Initially a principal components analysis was performed on the STCE, giving the
scree plot in Figure 2. From this we see clear evidence for two genuine factors of
the STCE. This is indicated by the marked increase in variance accounted for after
factors 3-11. From factors 3-11 there is a very constant and tiny increase in
variability accounted for by each factor - as one would find with a factor analysis
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Table 2. Factor Loadings for the Principal Factor
Analysis of the STCE (Orthosim Solution)
Variable Factor 1 Factor 2
Intra-familial Sexual Abuse -0.0742 0.0267
Intra-familial Physical Abuse 0.0572 03845
Loss of friends 0.5255 0.1406
Extra-familial sexual abuse 0.2577 0.2651
Loss of family 0.5196 0.0780
Isolation 0.5052 0.0104
Illness 03420 -0.0779
Parental Divorce 0.0548 0.4348
Assault -0.0378 0.2791
Loss of home 0.0931 03635
Robbery -0.0557 03287
on random variables. But the 'mountain' of genuine factors rises above this
general trend only with factor 2, the rest being mere scree. So two factors were
selected for analysis and rotation using principal factor analysis. Both orthosim
(orthogonal) and direct oblimin (oblique) rotations were performed, but as the
correlation between factors in the oblimin solution was a mere 0.074 the
orthogonal solution was interpreted. The factor loadings for the orthosim solution
are given in table 2. Taking as a minimum loadings greater than 0.30, we see that
factor one is loaded on by loss related to friends, loss related to family, isolation,
and illness. Here then is our loss factor. Likewise, factor 2 is loaded on by family
physical abuse, parental divorce, loss of home, and robbery. The two most strongly
loading variables for this factor are clearly of control-theoretic relevance, and a
similar though less strong case can be made for the loss of home and robbery
variables. In addition simple structure appears to have been achieved, excepting
the loading for extra-familial sexual abuse. The almost zero loadings for intra-
familial sexual abuse merely reflect the fact that there practically is no variability to
be explained here.
From this factor analysis we have come away with no little support for the two
kinds of trauma envisaged by Lawrence et al. (1995). Eight of the eleven variables
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Figure 3. The Specified Trauma Model
will go on to play a part in the test of the specified trauma model, and it would
seem appropriate to use the factor loadings from this exploratory analysis as the
start values for the latent constructs of loss and control related trauma in the
subsequent analysis.
We now must consider the initial path diagram to test the specific trauma model of
Lawrence et al. (1995). Figure 3 provides a path diagram that precisely depicts
Lawrence et al. hypotheses about the two routes from trauma to paranormal
experience. As we can see the two factors of trauma, control and bereavement
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related, are indicated by the variables based on the principal factor analysis of the
STCE reported earlier. They are both permitted to correlate in the initial test. With
both factors initially 'causing' both fantasy and experience we have our best chance
of determining if Lawrence et al. are right. If with this model we find the route
from control related trauma to fantasy to be stronger than that from loss related
trauma to fantasy then we have evidence that control related trauma is the main
cause of fantasy. Likewise if the direct route from loss related trauma to experience
is greater than that from control related trauma then we have support for the
notion that loss related trauma is responsible for the direct route to paranormal
experience. Furthermore, my conjecture would have its strongest confirmation if
the path coefficients for the direct route from control trauma to experience and
the direct route from bereavement trauma to fantasy are estimated at or near zero.
Such a result would indicate the absolute separation of these factors effects.
Lastly, for this modelling attempt I should note that, apart from those items used
to fix the scale for each factor, the start values for the items loading on to control
and bereavement related trauma are all set at the level of their exploratory factor
analytic loadings.
Part 2 - Results
Preliminary analyses
Examination of univariate and multivariate kurtosis estimates revealed substantial
departures from both univariate normality and multivariate normality (Mardia's
coefficient = 36.99, z = 11.46, p<0.01). Univariate estimates of kurtosis and skew
were outside acceptable ranges for loss of friends, loss of family, isolation, parental
divorce, and robbery. Examination of the largest contributors to multivariate
kurtosis revealed that, once again, case 78 was causing the severe departure from
non-normality, aided by a less discrepant contribution from case 70. In order to
combat any problems in statistical inference that may result from this non-
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TABLE 3. Specified Trauma Model
MODEL FIT STATISTICS (Fig. 4)
Average off-diagonal absolute standardised residuals 0.0518
Independence Model Chi-Square (df) 309.838 (45)
Independence AIC 219.838
Model AIC -34.046
Chi-Square (df) 32.953 (32)
Chi-Square p-value 0.42026
Normal theory RLS Chi-Square 32.697
Satorra-Bentler Scaled Chi-Square 33.4489
Bender-Bonett Non-Normed Fit Index 0.995
normality, the subsequent analysis will be run with robust statistical estimators (see
Satorra and Bender, 1988a, 1988b, and Hu, Bender and Kano, 1992).
Thus, an intercorrelation matrix was analysed using maximum likelihood
covariance structure analysis with robust statistical estimators. The determinant of
the input matrix was non-zero , and the necessary program statement indicating no
special problems in optimisation was issued.
Modelling Results
The model as specified in figure 3 provided a very good fit to the data, but
contained a number of clearly non-significant parameters. In particular, the paths
representing the effect of loss of control trauma on paranormal experience, and of
beareavement related trauma on childhood fantasy were non-significant as I had
predicted. In addition, the loading of robbery on loss of control trauma was non¬
significant, as was the loading of illness on bereavement related trauma. Finally, the
effect of bereavement related trauma on paranormal experience was, although
strictly non-significant, so very close to significance that it was retained in the
respecified analysis below. With all but one non-significant parameter removed
2 A non-zero determinant is needed to calculate the inverse of a matrix, which is needed to perform the
matrix equivalent of division. When the determinant is zero the matrix is said to be singular and division by
zero occurs, bringing all computation to a halt.
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from figure 3, the respecified model was analysed (minus non-significant
parameters). Table 3 gives the modelling results for the respecified trauma model
as specified in Figure 4. We can see that with average off-diagonal residuals of
0.0518 the model as finally specified turns in a good degree of fit between sample
and estimated correlation matrices. The likelihood ratio chi-square of 32.953
indicates a non-significant degree of discrepancy between model estimate and
sample data; indeed, chi is almost at its asymptotic optimal value, equivalent to the
degrees of freedom. The normal theory RLS chi-square also supports the standard
chi-square test result. Most importantly, the scaled chi-square test statistic, which is
robust to violations of multivariate normality, is well within the bounds of non-
significance. This suggests that the results can meaningfully be interpreted as
representing a well fitting model. Lastly, the Bentler-Bonett non-normed fit index
is very close to optimal at 0.995, and well within the bounds of acceptability. In
short all results indicate that the respecified trauma model provides an excellent fit
to the sample data.
Examination of the largest standardised residuals shows that the respecified model
fails to account adequately for the relationship between variables isolation and
fantasy (residual = 0.185), and family physical abuse and the EPBS (residual =
0.180), these being the two largest residuals. All other residuals are of marginal size,
within ±0.01 of zero error.
With these caveats in mind the standardised solution path diagram, with error
coefficients for dependent variables, is given in Figure 4. Despite the poor quality
of the traumatic factors the structural component of the model bears a close
resemblance to Lawrence et al. (1995) hypothesis. Control related trauma, insofar
as it is identified with family physical abuse and parental divorce, is emphatically
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Figure 4. Final Specified trauma model with results,
minus non-signficant parameters.
related to fantasy proneness, but not to paranormal experience. Likewise, the only
evidence, albeit of marginal significance, for an effect of bereavement related
trauma within the model, shows that its primary influence is a weak direct effect
upon paranormal experience, with no effect upon fantasy proneness. Thus, though
the overall result is not emphatic, Lawrence et al. (1995) conjecture about the
direct route from trauma to experience seems to be supported.
Discussion
The analyses conducted in this chapter broadly lend further weight to my own
model of paranormal belief development. This model continues to better Irwin's
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(1992) original model of the childhood causes of paranormal belief and experience,
suggesting that it genuinely captures some true feature of paranormal experience
development. Further still, and perhaps more impressive, I proposed a specific
cause for the two routes to paranormal experience in their new model, and the
attempt to confirm my hypotheses about these two routes met with considerable
success, despite some inadequacies in the measurement of the constructs of
control and bereavement related trauma. Nevertheless, this chapter has taken the
original models proposed by Irwin (1992) and myself a step further. The final
chapter on the theme of modelling attempts to address the wider model proposed
by Irwin. In particular I shall attempt to address the question of whether
paranormal belief once developed actually has consequences for the individual, in
terms ofmeaning in life and well being.
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Chapter 9
PARANORMAL BELIEF, MEANING IN LIFE AND WELL BEING
In this chapter I wish to examine the role that paranormal belief and
experience may play in the maintenance ofmeaning in life and well being. This
can be considered as an examination of the tail end of Irwin's (1993) general
model of paranormal belief development. According to Irwin (1993),
paranormal beliefs and experiences foster an illusion of control, and this in turn
leads to enhanced coping with uncontrollable life events. If this is indeed the
case then we might suppose that people with high paranormal beliefs should
show enhanced levels of meaning in life and psychological well being, in
contrast to those with low levels of paranormal belief. However, this is not
necessarily the case. It could be that those who experience a lot of trauma have
very low meaning in life and well being (initially), but that paranormal beliefs
serve to bring them up to only average levels of coping. Analyses of
correlations, as form the basis of this chapter, will not enable us to decide
between these two possibilities, but merely whether an illusion of control
(somehow defined) covaries with meaning and well being.
The difficulty in testing Irwin's general model is in working out how to
operationalise such constructs as 'illusion of control', or 'coping with
uncontrollable life events'. Illusion of control, as a term, has a definite meaning
in experimental work relating paranormal belief to success in parapsychology
experiments testing for psychokinetic ability (Blackmore and Troscianko,
1985). In those experiments an illusion of control is said to have been
demonstrated when the participants' judgement of success in the task at hand
exceeds their actual level of success. However, in the real world it is nigh on
impossible to determine whether one suffers from an illusion of control,
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excepting cases of known psychopathology. To do so would require that one
knew just how much control a person actually exerted over events in their life,
and how much control was exerted over them by those events. As the real
world is massively multivariate it would be unrealistic to attempt to measure
any illusion of control.
It may however be entirely possible to examine the extent to which people
have an internal or external locus of control. Here we are asking merely
whether the person feels controlled by, or controls, external variables (i.e. a
phenomenological issue not an ontological one). On this front there is a
reasonable body of work which suggests that paranormal belief is associated
with varying levels of internal and external control. However, the picture here
is quite complicated, and deserves extended examination.
Locus of control and paranormal belief
Locus of control (Rotter, 1966), as a construct, refers to the extent to which a
person feels that they are in control of events or events are in control of them,
where 'events' could be manifest at the level ofworld politics, or office politics,
or domestic politics, or even personal behaviour. In contemporary psychology
there is a proliferation of measures of locus of control (Fumham and Steele,
1993), leading some to suppose that locus of control is a barren concept with
no explanatory power (Kline, 1992, is an example). Nevertheless, at a basic
level people do seem to differ in the extent to which they express an internal or
external locus of control, and these differences often covary with a number of
psychological variables. Interest in the relationship between locus of control
and paranormal belief stems from the work of Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswick,
Levinson and Sanford (1950) who suggested that superstitious beliefs were
strongly related to belief in supernatural external influences upon the person.
In keeping with this, Jahoda (1970), Scheidt (1973), and Jones et al. (1977) all
found a significant correlation between belief in the supernatural and external
locus of control. However, these early studies depended upon a somewhat
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restricted conception of paranormal belief (that it was all supernatural or all just
superstition). Fortunately, though it may sound odd coming from me after the
reader has ploughed through chapters four, five and six, more recent studies of
locus of control and paranormal belief have been able to exploit the more
realistic multidimensional conception of belief introduced by Tobacyk and
Milford's (1983) Paranormal Belief Scale. I shall exemplify this with reference
to the most enlightening of all studies on locus of control, that of Davies and
Kirby (1985).
Davies and Kirby sought to examine the relationship between perceived
control and belief in the paranormal insofar as it is measured
multidimensionally by the PBS. To do this they administered Paulhus' (1983)
Spheres of Control Scale (SOC) and Tobacyk and Milford's (1983) Paranormal
Belief Scale to 54 female and 41 male liberal arts students. The SOC is an
interesting scale which measures three distinct types of control; socio-political1,
2 3
interpersonal , and personal control . Likewise, my own critique aside,
nominally the PBS measures seven factors of paranormal belief. Davies and
Kirby were interested to see if the positive relationship between external locus
of control would hold up across different types of paranormal belief, and
different types of control (Rotter's I-E Scale correlates most strongly with the
socio-political control dimension of the SOC - not studied here). In a canonical
correlation analysis they discover two canonical variates. The first loads
negatively upon the personal and socio-political dimensions of the SOC, and
not at all upon the interpersonal dimension, whilst the second loads strongly
and positively on the personal and interpersonal dimensions, and moderately
negatively on the socio-political dimension. More interesting is that these two
canonical variates have quite different loadings on the seven scales of
paranormal belief. Thus, variate 1 had high loadings on religious belief,
1 E g- The average citizen can have an influence on government decisions.
2 E.g. I have no trouble in making and keeping friends.
3 E g- I can usually achieve what I want when I work hard for it
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superstition, and spiritualism, whilst variate 2 had high loadings on psi belief,
witchcraft, and moderately on extra-ordinary lifeforms.
Thus, Davies and Kirby seem to have good evidence for an internal locus of
control, at least in the personal and interpersonal realms, for those who express
a high belief in psi phenomena of the kinds which concern us in this thesis. It
is only more marginal belief factors, like religious belief, superstition, and
spiritualism which are strongly related to external locus of control. This is of no
little relevance for this thesis. If paranormal belief can assist in the
establishment of an internal locus of control in the personal and interpersonal
domains then it can have buffering effects upon any challenge to real control in
those domains. And it is precisely those domains which are challenged when
children or adolescents experience traumatic events of the kind considered
previously in this thesis. Thus we might well expect interpersonal and personal
locus of control to have effects upon purpose in life and directly or indirectly
upon well being.
We should, however, be aware of the results of an attempt to replicate the
Davies and Kirby (1985) study, conducted by Tobacyk, Nagot and Miller
(1988)4. Though not using canonical correlation analysis, they did not find the
same pattern of results at all in their southern US sample. Perhaps there are
cultural differences going on here, with the largely Southern US population in
Tobacyk at al. (1988) study having a genuinely different style of responding to
control issues.
4 Oddly, Tobacyk et al. (1988) make no reference to Davies and Kirby (1985) although the later study
almost exactly addresses the same issue.
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Figure 1. Irwin's (1993) model of the consequences of
paranormal belief and experience.
This discussion now needs to be placed in the context of a preliminary model
of the personal consequences of paranormal belief and experience. The
immediate inspiration for such a model rests with Irwin's (1993) general
conception of the consequences of paranormal belief and experience. In Figure
1 I depict this model as it appears in Irwin's original review of paranormal
belief. I have, however, taken some licence with the model. For example, there
is a causal link from paranormal experience to paranormal belief in the model
as depicted here; Irwin's (1993) original specification was a mere correlation
between the two. Also, Irwin has coping with life events5 feeding back on to
paranormal beliefs, reinforcing the buffering effect that they might have, but
this is not the case for paranormal experience. I do not model this feedback
effect, though it can be done. Such effects work less well in cross-sectional
5 Irwin (1993) does not distinguish between genuine coping and illusory coping (Le. the mere impression
that one is coping). Presumably both kinds of coping may result from an illusion of control.
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designs such as mine, and are best suited to longitudinal designs or three stage
panel designs where the effects of xl on y2 and y2 on x3 can be measured
through time. Instead, we shall leave it to the Lagrange multiplier test to
suggest such subtleties if needed. Using Irwin's model in Figure 1 one can,
using the variables to hand in the Edinburgh survey questionnaire, form the
following Irwin inspired model, which I shall call the personal consequences
model. This is given in Figure 2. Though not immediately familiar, this model
captures the essence of Irwin's specification as best as possible given the
variables at hand. Thus, as both personal control and interpersonal control are
to represent the illusion of control construct, and as the illusion of control
construct is supposed to be caused by paranormal belief and paranormal
experience, I have four causal links representing the effects of paranormal
belief and experience on these variables. As I represent the construct of Coping
with reference to two causally related variables, purpose in life and well being,
the model differs here also. I hypothesise that the effect of a heightened sense
of internal personal and interpersonal control is to enhance directly purpose in
life and only through this improve well being. One could also start with a
model in which the control variables are directly related to well being, but I
think it best to start with a simple model and only build complexity if
necessary. This then is the initial model designed to represent the personal
consequences of paranormal belief and experience. I now turn to its testing.
Methods
Subjects
This study used the survey data taken from the Edinburgh survey, and the
reader is advised to consult chapter eight for details of subjects.
Materials
From the Edinburgh survey questionnaire data, only the following variables
are relevant to this study;
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Figure 2. The Irwin inspired Personal Consequences Model Mk I.
(1) Meaning in Life — This was measured using the 20 item Purpose in Life
(PIL) scale (Crumbaugh, 1968; Crumbaugh and Maholick, 1964). This
test is designed to measure the degree to which a person experiences a
sense of meaning and purpose in their life. Split-half reliabilities for the
test have been reported in the region of 0.90 (Crumbaugh, 1968;
Crumbaugh and Maholick, 1964; Reker, 1977), and test-retest
coefficients in excess of 0.68 (Meier and Edwards, 1974; Reker, 1977).
Zika and Chamberlain (1992) report an alpha coefficient for the scale
of 0.91. Chamberlain and Zika (1988) recommend the use of the PIL as
'.. .a general measure of meaning in life...' (p. 595).
(2) Modified Australian Sheep-Goat Scale (ASGS) — this scale was a
shortened 6 item version of Thalbourne and Delin's (1993) ASGS. Only
those items referring to paranormal belief were used (the ASGS also
unfortunately refers to paranormal experience). Items were drastically
abbreviated to make their meaning clearer on the advice of colleagues
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whose own participants voiced some confusion about the nature of the
original wording for items in the ASGS. Thalboume and Delin (1993)
report reasonable factorial validity for a three factor structure of their
original 18 item visual analogue scale. Internal consistency by
Cronbach's alpha is 0.94, item-total correlations for the 18 items range
from 0.45 to 0.79, whilst 11 month test-retest reliability is 0.66. See
appendix for further details.
(3) Edinburgh Paranormal Belief Scale (EPBS) — this 9 item scale was
drawn together by the author in order to overcome some of the other
problems with other scales for the measurement of paranormal belief.
The intention was not to produce a psychometrically impeccable
instrument, but merely to have a second tool for the assessment of
paranormal belief that might complement the ASGS (thus cancelling out
their individual deficits as measures of that construct).
(4) Well Being — this construct was measured using two published scales,
Life 3 (Andrews and Withey, 1976) and Affectometer 2 (Kammann and
Flett, 1983). Life 3 is reported to have a validity coefficient of 0.8 and a
reliability of 0.7 (Andrews and Withey. 1976). Affectometer 2 is a 40
item scale with items measured on a 5 point proportion-of-time scale. It
has an alpha of 0.95 and a 15 week stability coefficient of 0.72.
Affectometer 2 measures both positive and negative affects (20 items on
each), and in a recent study was found to correlate 0.63 with Life 3 (for
positive affect) and -0.48 with Life 3 (for negative affect) (Zika and
Chamberlain, 1992).
(5) Paranormal Experiences Scale — This scale measures the extent to
which a person has experienced events of an ostensibly paranormal
nature. Comprising 14 items, the scale measures the following kinds of
paranormal experience; general psi ability (including PK ability,
precognition, and telepathy), abnormal visions, OBE's, apparitional
experiences, and anomalous loss/discovery of objects. A factor analysis
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Figure 3. The Personal Consequences ModelMKI with path coefficients.
shows that the scale is unidimensional, and all items have acceptable
item-total correlations. It is scored on a 7 point scale of agreement.
Survey Procedure




Examination of univariate and multivariate kurtosis estimates revealed no large
deviations from normality, multivariate or otherwise. Mardia's coefficient of
multivariate kurtosis = -1.46 (2=-0.66, p=NS). Examination of cases with the
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largest contribution to multivariate kurtosis revealed no substantial outliers.
This being the case the data were analysed using maximum likelihood
covariance structure analysis.
Modelling results
Initial attempts at model analysis were thwarted by convergence problems6. In
the first analysis with the model as specified in Figure 2 matrix estimation
difficulties occurred from iteration 2, 5 and (twice) 7. In addition the parameter
estimates for personal control and belief, and interpersonal control and belief
were linearly dependent. Various attempts at solving the problem were tried,
including fixing certain start values (factor loadings for paranormal belief were
fixed at levels given in chapter eight results, along with the path coefficient
between belief and experience) and increasing the number of iterations (to
100), but to no avail. However, Bentler (1993) suggested that in models where
over-identification had been achieved, and where the program informs the user
that parameters are linearly dependent, then, '...increasing TOL to, say, 0.001,
may create a cleanly converged solution and sometimes also a dramatic
reduction in the chi-square statistic.' (p. 71). As the model was over-identified
with 16 degrees of freedom, the original model was analysed with the
TOLERANCE7 variable set to 0.001 instead of its default value of 0.000001.
This produced a neatly converged solution in only 11 iterations, with no
problems in parameter estimation, or optimisation difficulties.
6 All successful modelling attempts with CSM end when 'convergence' has been achieved. For most
typical applications of CSM convergence occurs when the fit function which EQS tries to minimise
differs only at the 5th decimal place from the last iteration's fit function. EQS will continue to resolve
the model until convergence is achieved, or the pre-set number of iterations is completed (usually 30).
If EQS fails to converge before the pre-set limit is reached it issues a warning in its results output.
7 According to Bentler (1993), Tolerance is a technical concept associated with pivoting operations in
solving linear equations. It determines the point at which one variable can be considered to be linearly











Average off-diagonal absolute standardised residuals 0.0558 0.0615
Independence Model Chi-Square (df) 393.153 (28)
Independence AIC 337.153
Model AIC 2.904 -1.232
Chi-Square (df) 34.904 (16) 36.768 (18)
Chi-Square p-value 0.00410 0.00848
Normal theory RLS Chi-Square 32.694 34.159
Benfler-Bonett Non-Normed Fit Index 0.909 0.928
The results for this test of the Tersonal Consequences Model Mk I' are given
in table 1 and Figure 3 (with path coefficients) . For such a complex model, the
fit statistics are surprisingly close to acceptable. Thus, the residuals are fairly
small at only 0.0558. Chi-square indicates that the estimated correlation matrix
based on this model fails to fit the observed correlation matrix. This is
supported by the RLS chi-square also. Finally, the NNFI indicates only a close
to marginal degree of fit against conventional levels of incremental fit. In short
we might not expect to do too much respecification to find a model that fits
(theoretical caveats excepting).
In assessing model misfit, the largest standardised residuals indicate that the
correlation between variables personal control and interpersonal control, and
interpersonal control and well being were poorly accounted for in the model.
All other residuals were normally distributed around zero. Turning to the Wald
test results only three parameters in the model are multivariately non¬
significant. These represent, in order of decreasing univariate p-value, the error
term for the loading of the EPBS on belief, the influence of paranormal
8 For clarity, error terms have been omitted from this path diagram. However, readers interested in
recreating them can do so using the following formula;
error =
Where r = the rth path coefficient causally effecting the dependent variable of interest
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experience upon personal control, and finally the influence of paranormal
belief upon interpersonal control. What is of immediate interest here is that a)
paranormal belief is slightly negatively related to both personal and
interpersonal control, and b) the effect of paranormal belief on interpersonal
control is small enough to warrant discarding them from the model. Secondly,
paranormal experience is moderately related to interpersonal control, but only
slightly positively to personal control. Indeed the relationship between
experience and personal control is itself not significant on the univariate and
multivariate Wald tests. Thus the only links between the paranormal variables
and control variables are between paranormal experience and interpersonal
control and paranormal belief and personal control, but the former link does at
least fit with the work of Davies and Kirby in demonstrating that such
perceived control tends to be internal control.
Of psychological interest is the discovery that both personal and interpersonal
control are positively and moderately related to purpose in life (indicating that
those who tend towards more internal control show higher purpose in life).
Finally, the characteristically large correlation between purpose in life and well
being (very well measured by its indicator variables) is apparent9.
Turning to possible model additions, the Lagrange multiplier test suggested
only two significant additions to the model, though both of these would greatly
enhance the fit of the model. The first one was to allow for a link from well
being back to interpersonal control, whilst the second was to allow for a link
from well being back to personal control. These links are potentially
theoretically meaningful (at least for psychology) as they imply that well being
reinforces a sense of control over the personal and interpersonal domains.
However, the data to hand are not longitudinal and thus cannot support the
kind of effect suggested by the Lagrange Multiplier test, which would in this
model lead to a backward loop. Thus, though the suggested modifications from
9 Zika and Chamberlain (1992) report that the correlation between the PIL, and Life 3 and the positive
dimension ofAffectometer 2, is 0.71 and 0.78 respectively (based on a sample of 176 mothers).
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Figure 4. The respecified personal consequences model (MK II) with path coefficients.
the Wald test were implementable the same could not be said for the Lagrange
test.
The initial respecified model, with non-significant paths removed (save for the
error term for the EPBS), was calculated but a feature of the respecification
was a non-significant Wald test result for the link between paranormal belief
and personal control. This path was removed from the model, and the model
once again recalculated. The results for this second respecification are depicted
in Figure 4 and the second column of table 1.
As we can see, the respecified model fits somewhat equivocally, with a
significant chi-square goodness of fit statistic, but a reasonable non-normed fit
statistic. Furthermore, looking at Figure 4 we can see that the solution offered
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is far from acceptable in terms of furthering our understanding of the influence
of paranormal belief and experience upon well being and purpose in life. In
short, paranormal experience is the only relevant variable to influence control,
and it only influences interpersonal control. If this model is to be believed then
only paranormal experience has any consequence for purpose in life and well
being. This is, frankly, hard to believe from a theoretical perspective, and I am
sorely inclined just to ignore this whole solution in favour of the original one.
That would mean accepting, at least provisionally, that the influence of
paranormal experience and belief upon well being and purpose in life is weak
and indirect, but this seems to me to be more realistic than the alternative. I
now turn to a discussion of these results.
Discussion
In contrast to previous modelling attempts, the models outlined in this chapter
have met with many problems. Though there seems to be some theoretical
justification for the notion that paranormal beliefs might enhance coping with
uncontrollable life events, the analysis has failed miserably to find confirming
evidence for causal models implementing this hypothesis. A model with
equivocal fit suggested on the basis of a specification search showed absolutely
no role for paranormal belief in influencing purpose in life or well being,
directly or otherwise. I am sufficiently perturbed by this as to wonder whether
some confounding factor, not included in the model, might be preventing a
clearer picture from emerging. One possibility is immediately apparent - that
there might be sex differences in the relationship between paranormal factors
and well being and purpose in life. If this was the case, and if these sex
differences lay in opposite directions, then this may well explain some of the
problem in testing the proposed model. The solution would be to analyse the
personal consequences model separately for males and females. In part 2 of
this chapter I undertake this task, in a purely exploratory way.
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Table 2a. Correlations Overall Correlations Correlation for men Correlation for women
Between PES and Key PES (N=129) PES (N=45) PES (N=71)
Variables
Life 3 0.020 -0.090 0.116
Well Being -0.031 -0.249 0.101
Personal Control 0.005 -0.158 0.165
Interpersonal Control 0.176 -0.009 0.300
Purpose In Life 0.066 -0.015 0.203
Part 2
Without further ado let us move straight to tables 2a and 2b in which we can
see the pearson correlations between paranormal belief, experience, well being
and purpose in life for the whole sample, for men, and for women. It is clear
from these tables that men and women do express different relationships
between paranormal experience, paranormal belief, well being and purpose in
life. For men, the correlation between the paranormal variables and the
consequence variables is weakly negative. For women, the correlation between
the paranormal variables and the consequence variables is weakly positive. The
consistency in these correlation differences is striking, and some of them are
significantly different from each other on a one-tailed Fisher z-test (Fisher,
1921). Specifically, the Fisher z's for the sex difference in correlations between
life 3, well being and paranormal belief scale are significant, as are the Fisher z's
for the differences in correlations for well Being, personal control and
paranormal experience. Also, the correlations, irrespective of sex, tend to be
stronger between the key variables and paranormal experience, than for
paranormal belief. Lastly, the overall correlations, irrespective of sex, artificially
show no correlation between either paranormal experience and the key
variables, or paranormal belief (except for the correlation between paranormal
experience and interpersonal control which came through as the only link in
the personal consequences model MK II). Clearly, one would do well to
analyse the original personal consequences model separately for both sexes.
This having been done the results are depicted in table 3 and Figures 5 and 6.
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Firstly, no special problems were encountered in testing either the males or
females PCM Mk I models (with TOLERANCE set to 0.001). For the test of
the male data five parameters were found to be non-significant in the initial
analysis; the parameters from belief to personal and interpersonal control,
experience to personal and interpersonal control, and interpersonal control to
purpose in life. No parameters were suggested for addition according to a
Lagrange Multiplier test. In the initial analysis for the female data three
parameters were found to be non-significant; the parameters from experience
to personal control, and belief to personal and interpersonal control. Table 3
shows the respecified models' fit statistics for the male and female data with
these non-significant parameters removed. From table 3 we can see that
neither the male or female PCM models give a significant degree of misfit.
Given that the PCM seems to fit adequately for both sexes, we need to turn to
Figures 5 and 6 to see whether this fit is achieved with different path
coefficients.
Table 2b. Correlations








life 3 0.034 -0.157 0.169
Well Being -0.000 -0.301 0.198
Personal Control -0.061 -0.126 0.058
Interpersonal Control 0.076 -0.048 0.178
Purpose In Life -0.017 -0.115 0.111
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TABLE 3. Final Personal Final Personal
MODEL FIT STATISTICS Consequences Model Consequences Model
Males Females
(N=45) (N=71)
(Fift 5) (Fig. 6)
Average off-diagonal absolute standardised residuals 0.0994 0.0914
Independence Model Chi-Square (df) 136.139 (28) 240.487 (28)
Independence AIC 80.139 184.487
Model AIC -20.984 -9.62603
Chi-Square (df) 21.016 (21) 28.374 (19)
Chi-Square p-value 0.45797 0.07649
Normal theory RLS Chi-Square 17.885 25.340
Bentler-Bonett Non-Notmed Fit Index 1.000 0.935
Comparing the two Figures one can see that radical differences in the path
coefficients occur in a number of paths. Thus, the path coefficient from
experience to interpersonal control is moderately positive for females (0.300)
but non-existent for the males. For the effects of the control variables upon
purpose in life some particularly interesting differences emerge across sexes.
For females and males, personal control is moderately positively related to
purpose in life (0.282 and 0.345 respectively). For females, interpersonal
control is positively and (moderately) strongly linked with purpose in life
(0.529), whilst in males this path is non-existent again. All other aspects of the
structural model for males and females have very similar path coefficients.
These results are of some significance, and so I shall turn to their discussion.
Part 2 - Discussion
What can we make of the results of this analysis? It seems to me that the
results, though exploratory, raise some interesting possibilities. So, for the men
we seem to have found something rather drastic - neither paranormal belief or
experience are significantly related to issues of personal or interpersonal
control, or purpose in life. Some findings of psychological interest may result
from the finding that only personal control issues relate to purpose in life for
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Figure 5. Personal Consequences Model for Males (N=45) with path coefficients.
men, with interpersonal control having no bearing upon purpose in life. For
men it seems as though being the master of one's own fate is what influences
the sense of purpose in life, whilst having control of one's relations to others is
just not relevant. I do not know if this result is present in the literature on
purpose in life, but if genuine then I think it should be. As for women, they
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Figure 6. Personal Consequences Model for Females (N=71) with path coefficients.
do display a reasonable relationship between paranormal experience and a
sense of interpersonal control. This may perhaps be related to a use of
Vomen's intuition' in the intuiting of problems or prospects in interpersonal
relationships. This is of course pure speculation, but interesting nonetheless.
On the psychological front women show reasonable positive relationships
between personal and interpersonal control and a sense of purpose in life. For
women, in contrast to men, it is interpersonal control which is moderately
related to enhanced purpose in life, suggesting that for them purpose in life is
partly gained through keeping control over their relationships with others.
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Lastly, as we saw from table 2a and 2b men generally show weak negative
relationships between the paranormal and control/life meaning/well being
variables, whilst women show stronger positive relations. This is an intriguing
result, which is at one time surprising and obvious. We know from surveys that
women and men differ in terms of their strength of paranormal (psi) beliefs,
with women displaying stronger paranormal belief. It is then perhaps only
superficially surprising that men and women should display differing
relationships with paranormal belief and locus of control. Nevertheless, this
discovery considerably modifies, and warrants caution against, the
interpretation of previous findings relating paranormal belief to locus of
control type measures. Whilst women show positive and moderate strength
relationships between paranormal experience and personal and interpersonal
control, mean show either weak (interpersonal) or weakly negative (personal)
strength relationships with paranormal experience. Even more interesting still,
is the discovery that paranormal belief plays a very small role in the
determination of personal control or interpersonal control. Once again we see
that paranormal experience is the more interesting variable, and that previous
studies influenced by a more sceptical orientation to ignore experience have
done so at their cost. Nevertheless, how should we explain these sex
differences? What needs to be explained is how women seem to benefit from
enhanced personal control and interpersonal control when they claim to
experience paranormal phenomena, whilst men barely gain any benefit, and
indeed are more likely to perceive less control over interpersonal matters when
claiming high paranormal experience. In all likelihood a whole Ph.D. could be
devoted to an examination of these sex differences, and so what I offer here
will perhaps only scratch the surface. It seems one possibility can be drawn
from the existing literature. Thus, we know that women claim higher levels of
paranormal belief than men (Emmons and Sobal, 1981; Thalbourne, 1981;
Tobacyk and Milford, 1981; though Thalboume and Delin claim their ASGS is
indifferent to the sex of the participant). Certainly on Tobacyk's Revised
Paranormal Belief Scale there is a tendency for women to score higher than
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men on most of the seven subscales except for extra-ordinary lifeforms. It is
interesting that ELF is the only scale on which men score more than women,
indicating (potentially) that men believe more in the aliens and their spacecraft
than do women.
What is interesting about the ELF scale is that it is starkly materialistic in
comparison to the other scales. Perhaps then men prefer to believe in things
they can see with their real eyes, whereas women gain more from imaginative
type paranormal beliefs (ones that depend upon inner space as opposed to
outer space). Such belief distinctions may stem from subtle contrasts in
cognitive style between men and women in their imaginative capacity. Thus,
when women experience an ostensible paranormal phenomena of the
mentalistic kind they are able to accommodate it within their conceptual and
cognitive system, whilst men are less able to do this, being more driven by
propositionalistic styles of thinking. Incapable of integrating such mental
intrusions as paranormal phenomena consists of the man may choose to
ignore them or may even become concerned at their pathological implications.
A vision of impending mental deterioration, and the self doubt this brings, may
unless resolved have negative consequences for personal and interpersonal
control such as have been seen weakly in our data. The argument offered here
goes well beyond any of the present data, and one need not be bound to its
essentially cognitive or constitutional premises to explain such sex differences.
Social or interpersonal accounts in terms of socially developed coping styles
may work just as well, and may even offer more fertile soil for future
investigation. Needless to say I think the discovery made here points to a
potentially rich avenue for examination.
We have now covered both the head and tail of Irwin's original model of the
development of paranormal belief and experience. Interesting discoveries have
been made, some substantial and some less so, and there is I feel good reason
for thinking that we now have an augmented (I shall leave it to my peers to
judge whether improved) understanding of the potential causes and
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consequences of paranormal belief and experience. However, it has become
clear in the course of this research that paranormal experience is a key variable
in all the models developed, and that paranormal belief appears very much
more consequential than causal. Up to this point I have been implicitly using
the term paranormal experience to mean 'ostensible paranormal experience',
but I wish in the next, penultimate chapter to tackle the prefix 'ostensible' by
examining more generally the question of whether paranormal belief can be
related to laboratory based studies of paranormal experience. A whole host of
studies have been conducted since the early 1940's examining the so-called
sheep-goat effect in force-choice ESP tests. These studies claim to provide
support for the notion that belief may assist in the ability to score well in ESP
tests, which if true would provide an interesting reversal of the causal trend
developed in this thesis (from experience to belief), not only because it would
suggest that belief could sometimes cause paranormal experience, but that it
could sometimes causes real paranormal experience (albeit of the limited and
largely dispositional kind found in forced choice tests). Let us then don our
intellectual Wellingtons and Barbour and step in to the farmyard of the
parapsychologists' laboratory.
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Ch ap ter 10
GATHERING IN THE SHEEP AND GOATS.. .A META-ANALYSIS OF
FORCED CHOICE SHEEP-GOAT ESP EXPERIMENTS, 1947-1993.1
For the most part this thesis has pursued a course of indifference with respect
to the question of whether paranormal phenomena really exist. Indeed, it is
commonly presented as a benefit of research in to paranormal belief that it
does not necessitate any active interest in the psi hypothesis. Because of this
the area of research in to paranormal belief is the most academically correct of
all areas of research in to the paranormal. Despite its pretensions to academic
correctness however, research in to paranormal belief that does not stop to ask
the question of whether or not paranormal phenomena may be implicated in
any way runs the risk of intellectual dishonesty. At this juncture then, just prior
to drawing the curtains on this thesis, I want to stop and permit myself the
freedom to consider the possibility that the people whose opinions and
experiences I have surveyed are not all deluded, stupid, gullible etc. Of course,
we can never go back to the circumstances of their individual experiences and
adjudicate their paranormality. Nevertheless, the broad thrust of their
experiences would suffer somewhat were parapsychologists unable to find any
valid evidence for paranormal phenomena. In this chapter then I take it upon
myself to examine, in depth, one particularly pertinent area of research, namely
research into the so-called sheep-goat effect. In my thesis I have been
principally concerned with the causes and consequences of belief in the
paranormal and paranormal experience, so what better way to fortify this
research than to examine that large(ish) body of experimental studies that have
sought, prima facie, to examine the effect of belief in ESP upon one's success
1 I wish to thank Jessica Utts, Professor of Statistics at UC Davis for statistical help with this meta¬
analysis.
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in experimental tests of ESP. In choosing to examine this area of research I
could fulfil two tasks - to examine an area of pertinence to this thesis, and to
make a genuine summative contribution to parapsychological knowledge. The
technique of meta-analysis has of late become something of a cause celebre of
the parapsychologist (Broughton goes so far as to call it a controversy buster!),
and it has now been employed to positive effect in a number of important
areas of parapsychological research (Utts, 1991). But one area of research that
had not been meta-analysed at the start of my research was the sheep-goat
effect. And so in this chapter I detail my own attempt to meta-analyse this area
of research. As it happens, this enterprise assumes some significance in the
context of our wider model building attempt. As I suspected, and as Peter
Bentler was able to confirm, one can fix any substantively obtained correlation
coefficient in to a path analysis, whether that coefficient comes from data
obtained in that path analysis or not. And so, on the face of it, the effect size
measure we obtain for the sheep-goat effect has the potential to clear up, for
sure, at least one interesting part of the wider model - to what extent can
paranormal belief facilitate paranormal experience.
One of the reasons that people who are sceptical of the paranormal often
give for their scepticism is that they have never experienced anything that they
would deem remotely psychic. Schmeidler (1943) proposed that at least one
reason for the sceptics' lack of apparent psi experiences may be that sceptics
tend to subconsciously avoid them. Moreover, using forced-choice card
guessing designs, Schmeidler (1943; Schmeidler and McConnell, 1958) found
that sceptics of the paranormal consistently scored below the mean chance
expectation for such experiments. Schmeidler termed those who professed
scepticism the goats and those who professed belief in the paranormal- sheep.
Subsequent research into the so-called sheep-goat effect (from now on
abbreviated to SGE) by independent investigators confirmed the finding that
sheep tended to score above chance on ESP tests, whilst goats tended to score
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below. The consistency of this finding lead to a major review of SGE studies
in the early seventies, with Palmer (1971) ending his survey by concluding that:
"...the data presently available support the hypothesis of a genuine SGE,
although the relationship is very slight and difficult to display with small
samples. It also is likely to be quite sensitive to the experimental
situation...The SGE may indeed prove to be considerably stronger once a
more reliable measure ofESP isfound." (p.405)
In this chapter I present the results of a meta-analysis of 73 studies that looked
at the influence of belief in ESP on scoring in ESP tests, published between
1947 and 1993. Five major questions are asked: (1) Is there an overall SGE? (2)
What is the effect size of the overall effect? (3) Is the display of a SGE related
to methodological factors that might suggest a non-paranormal explanation?
(4) Does the SGE vary meaningfully with potential moderating variables (e.g.
experimental setting, sample size, knowledge of results)? (5) Does the SGE
depend upon the type of beliefmeasure used?
The last question is of particular importance given the wide variety ofmeasures
of belief in ESP (and also the paranormal in general). Furthermore, at least one
study (Palmer, 1972b) has shown that a consistent SGE is likely only when a
particular type of question is used, namely Schmeidler's (1943) original
question- 'Do you believe it is possible that ESP can be shown under the
conditions of this experiment?' (This type of question will be referred to as the
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Criterion 1 question, after Palmer, 1971). If we can't separate out the laml?
from the mutton how are we going to separate out the sheep from the goats?
Study Search Methods
Source ofStudies
Studies were taken from any English language source that addressed the
relation of subjects attitude to the paranormal and its influence on ESP scoring.
This represents an 'all in' selection policy to try and get as many studies in the
analysis as possible. In matter of feet, most studies were from the standard
parapsychological journals; Journal ofParapsychology, Journal (and Proceedings) of the
American Society for Psychical Research, European Journal of Parapsychology and
abstracts of peer reviewed papers presented at the Parapsychological
Association meetings published in Research in Parapsychology.
Outcome Measures
The first thing that must be noted is that some authors looked at more than
one definition of sheep-goat. Palmer (1971; 1972a) identified at least four
classes of sheep/goat and some authors employ more than one of them in
their analyses. There is therefore a problem of multiple dependent variables, all
potentially correlated. The approach adopted here is that favoured by
Rosenthal (1984) and simply consists of taking a single measure of the
dependent variable wherever possible. In keeping with this approach, I have
specifically employed the method of mean result (discussed in Rosenthal, 1984).
Using this method all measures of outcome (^s and effect sizes) are totalled and
divided by the number of such outcome measures to give a mean £ and effect
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si2e. However, at the request of Schmeidler (personal communication, 1993) if
a study used Schmeidler's original Criterion 1 question amongst other criteria
then ONLY Schmeidler's criterion was used in the analysis. Thus this meta¬
analysis will directly assess the utility of Schmeidler's criterion for separating
sheep and goats. Furthermore, it has been common for some researchers to
use a three way split of belief into sheep-undecideds -goats. In the Palmer
(1971; 1972a) review these agnostic subjects scores were split evenly between
sheep and goats. Thus half the hits of undecideds went to sheep and half to
goats. This seems a half-baked technique to use to get round the problem of a
three way split of belief. The present author feels that, given the fact that we
are looking for a sheep-goat effect, it is better just to ignore the data from
undecided subjects. What is more, there is evidence that undecideds score
higher than sheep on the average (Bevan, 1947; Casper, 1957; Nash and Nash,
1967). At least with the approach adopted by this author we can be sure that
we are looking at the scoring differences between those who believe and
disbelieve in ESP.
Significance levels. Three basic procedures were employed to assess study
significance;
1. Full data given- where the study gave full data for trials, hits, and
probability of a hit for sheep and goats then significance level was
determined by calculating the ^score ofthe difference in twoproportions using
a formula (number 10) given in Edge et al (1986, pp. 154). These
calculations were done on a computer.
2. Other stats given- where trials, hits and probability of a hit were not
given, but some other statistic was used instead (e.g. Pearson's r) then if
2Also known as 'conflicts'.
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possible a transform to £ was calculated and used. In most cases this
consisted of a transform of rto fusing;
z = r*J~N
3. No data given- where no data were given by the author the outcome
of the study was always described by that author as 'not significant'.
Quite simply, these were given z = 0. Eight such studies were found.
Effect si%e. Once a single significance level had been determined, the effect sizes
were calculated. As in Honorton and Ferrari's (1989) meta-analysis of
precognition studies a trial based estimate of effect size was used. However, as
sheep-goat studies look at mean differences between two groups a modified
effect size estimate was calculated as;
where Ns and Ng are the number of trials for sheep and goats respectively. This
was the procedure used when a study gave full data (trials, hits, probability of a
hit). Calculations of effect size on full data were done on computer. Two other
procedures were also used to estimate effect size;
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1. Other statistics given- where some other statistic was given, then that
statistic was transformed to a £ (using the procedure described for
assessing significance given above) and then that £ was used to
calculate an effect size as for full data. This of course presumed that
one could infer accurately the number of trials given to sheep and
goats. If this could not be done then the second procedure was used.
2. No data given- in all cases where no data were given the author merely
describes the SGE as 'non-significant'. The effect size given for such
studies is zero.
Overview ofMeta-analysed Studies
The author found 73 studies published over a 46 year period from 1947 to
1993. The database consists of over 685,000 forced choice ESP trials with
more than 4500 subjects. Study sample sizes range from 140 to 50000 trials
(mean = 10539.8; median = 5750). The total number of subjects per study
ranges from 9 to 399. Most studies used students. Methods of assessing sheep-
goat status varied widely, and the following common measurement
questionnaires were included separately for analysis; Schmeidler's Criterion 1
(Schmeidler, 1943), Thalboume's Australian Sheep-Goat Scale (Thalboume and
Haraldsson, 1980), Van de Castle's Incompleted Sentence's Questionnaire (ISQ) (Van
de Castle and White, 1955) and Bhadra's Sheep-Goat Questionnaire (BSGQ),




Overall Evidence for the SGE
Mean S.D.
z-score (N=73) 0.956 1.365
Effect Size r (N=73) 0.029 0.045
Combined z - 8.17, p = 1.33*10"16
"Fail-safe N"= 1726
t(ES) = 5.54, 72 df, p = .0000002
95% Lower confidence estimate = .019
Combined Evidence for the SGE.
Quite simply, there is a significant overall SGE. From Table 1 (above) it is clear
3
that the overall results are highly significant .
Eighteen studies (24%) show significant sheep-goat effects at the 5% level. Z
scores correlate positively and almost significantly with the square root of the
sample size r(65) = .218, r2 = .048, p(1 -tailed) — .081. Indeed, the mean sample
size for significant studies (mean = 13742.5) is 47% larger than the mean
sample size for non-significant studies (mean = 9313.34). This difference is
almost significant; t^(63) = 1.379,p(1-tailed) — .0864.
Statistical analyses were performed cm Statview on an Apple Mac. All Rvalues are two-tailed unless
otherwise stated. Combined are based on Stouffer's method (Rosenthal, 1984).
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Effect Si%e By Principal Investigator
When the first author of a study is used to assess effect size instead of the
study itself a similar result emerges. There are 37 such first authors. The mean
effect size for investigators is .026 (S.D. = .043). Even when investigators
contributing more than three studies are left out (leaving 35 investigators) then,
mean effect size is still .026 (S.D. = .045). Along with previous meta-analytic
demonstrations of cross-investigator replicability (e.g. Honorton and Ferrari
,1989) these data provide strong evidence against the view that the results of
parapsychological experiments are attributable to a few 'lucky' major
contributors (Akers, 1987).
The Filedrawer Problem
The practical, intellectual and even emotional investment in a piece of research
is often very great. The need to get results is therefore considerable, and the
disappointment that null or opposite results give rise to is understandable.
However, there may well be a temptation under such circumstances to pass off
the results obtained as just 'bad luck' or seek ad hoc methodological errors to
justify ignoring the outcome. In such cases the researcher may, so it is
supposed, throw their paper into the bottom of their filedrawers along with all
the other studies that didn't 'get results'. Hence, the failure to publish null
results is potentially very important when summarising the outcomes of
published studies in any area of behavioural research. This so called 'Filedrawer
problem' (Rosenthal, 1984) is very pertinent for parapsychological research.
Indeed, in 1975 the Parapsychological Association adopted an official policy
urging researchers to publish null results as well as positive.
Table 1 gives Rosenthal's (1984) "fail-safe N" statistic in an attempt to estimate
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the number of unreported studies with null results (i.e. average %s of zero) that
would have to be sitting in researcher's filedrawers for the reported database
effect to be reduced to nonsignificance. In terms of the SGE database, 23
unreported studies averaging null results need to be 'out there' for every
reported study. Furthermore, using Dawes et al. (1984) truncated normal curve
analysis it is possible to provide a complementary measure of the filedrawer
severity. Essentially, the assumption is that due to publication and reporting
bias the reported studies are only those which have been randomly sampled
(assuming a normal distribution with mean = 0 and standard deviation = 1)
from a critical level of significance greater than £ = 1.65. On this assumption
the mean expected £ is 2.06, and the variance above the truncated normal of £
= 1.65 is .14. For the sheep-goat database there are 18 studies with %s >1.65.
The average £ of these eighteen studies is 2.68, not 2.06. A test ^ comparing
the actual mean of 2.68 with the expected mean of 2.06 gives a ^ of 7.03 (.62
divided by (.14/18)1/2)./) for this ^is .00000110 based on a /(17) distribution.
Given that the actual mean £ of significant SGE studies is significantly larger
than that expected if such studies were randomly sampled above £ = 1.65 on
'no effect' distributions then we can safely assume the existence of some real
SGE independent of publication or reporting biases. What is more the "fail¬
safe N" for the combined SGE is sufficiently large to support the conclusion
that even if every professional parapsychologist reported one null SGE study
every year for the next seven years the result obtained in this analysis would
only then become 'just significant'. Whatever explains the SGE, it is not to be
found in the contents of parapsychologists' filedrawers.
Outlier Reduction
The database under scrutiny does not show the serious problem of outlier
studies that previous databases have (e.g. Honorton and Ferrari, 1989). There is
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however, still over a 9 sigma spread between lowest and highest ^-scores.
Performing a 10% trim on the data (Bamett and Lewis, 1978) gives 59
remaining studies. The combined stouffer Z for the trimmed sample is 6.55, p
= 4.73* 10~12. The trimmed mean effect size is .025, S.D. = .003. The lower
95% confidence estimate for this sample is still .019. Kurtosis (g2) is reduced
from over three to -1.31. The filedrawer estimate for this trimmed sample is
872 studies (14 null for every known one). Where there is a serious problem
with outliers it is sensible to perform subsequent analysis on the trimmed
sample. In the case of the sheep-goat database there does not seem to be a
severe problem with outlying studies. It therefore seems appropriate to
perform study quality analyses upon the original sample of studies.
Study Quality
One of the main criticisms offered by critics of parapsychology is that the
significant effects depend upon the worst controlled studies. If studies are
protected against sensory leakage, given adequate randomisation and have
duplicate or automatic recording and checking of guesses then no psi will
occur. Subject fraud and experimenter error will have been minimised.
In all types of meta-analysis the studies under scrutiny will vary widely in
quality- along a number of dimensions. How to deal with this variation is a
point of some argument amongst meta-analysts. In this meta-analysis the
author has chosen to look at all studies on the SGE (in the forced choice
domain). Whilst discarding studies that are not up to scratch is the crude
equivalent of assigning them a quality weighting of zero it should be
remembered that if a study is physically thrown out of the analysis all of its
other potentially useful information is gone. This author has chosen to analyse
studies with weights of zero all the same, should they arise.
177
StudyQuality Criteria
As for Honorton and Ferrari's (1989) meta-analysis, research quality was
assessed in terms of a number of procedural descriptions, giving details on
methodology and statistics. Essentially, one point is given for each of the
following criteria:
Specification of sample sfe. If the investigator explicitly pre-specifies the sample
size then credit is given. If the study uses group testing- where it is not possible
to pre-specify the sample size precisely, then credit is also given. Credit is
withheld for studies in which the sample size is not planned or not mentioned.
Preplanned analysis. If the method of statistical analysis, including the outcome
(dependent) variable is preplanned then credit is given. If neither the
experimental design or analysis are mentioned in respect of the dependent
variable of concern then no credit is given.
Randomisation method. Credit is given if the study was adequately randomised.
Adequate randomisation techniques are; random number generators, random
number tables, and mechanical shufflers. Hand-shuffling, drawing lots and die
casting do NOT constitute adequate randomisation and are not given credit.
Controls. If studies report randomness control checks (or control series) or
empirical cross-check controls then credit is given.
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Recording. If target sequences and subject responses are automatically recorded,
or recorded in duplicate (e.g. via carbon copy) a point is awarded.
Checking. If checking of target-response matches is done automatically or in
duplicate (e.g. by two independent checkers) then credit is given.
Controls against sensory leakage. Where studies have no sender (i.e. clairvoyance
studies) then one point (and only one) is given if any or all of the following are
evident; 1) Opaque container for targets/RAM memory stored targets. 2)
Subject screened and blind to experimenter. 3) Subject is physically remote. In
the case ofprecognition apoint is always awarded as no sensory leakage is possible. In the
case of studies with a sender then one point (and only one) is awarded if any or
all of the following are evident; 1) Different rooms separate sender/receiver. 2)
Room shielding documented. 3) 1-way communications from receiver
documented. 4) Sender/Receiver monitored vigilantly.
StudyQuality Analysis
A total of seven quality points are available. The range of points awarded was
1-6 (mean = 3.164, S.D. = 1.247). There is no significant relationship between
study quality and effect size. The quality weighted stouffer ^ = 7.97, p =
5.07* 10"16. The weighted effect size is 0.022.
Quality Extremes
When studies are split into quality extremes is there a tendency for very poor
studies to get larger effect sizes than extremely good studies? 10 good studies
(quality ratings of 5-6) had a mean effect size of .018 (S.D. = .063) and 23 poor
studies (quality ratings of 1-2) had a mean effect size of .032 (S.D. = .055);
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tdijjy31) = -.631 ,p = .5325. Thus, whilst the tendency for poorer studies to get
larger effects is shown, the difference is not significant.
Quality Variation in Publication Sources
Quality of studies does vary depending upon the journal the study was
published in; a Kruskall-Wallis One-Way ANOVA corrected for ties gives H(6)
= 23.27, p = .0007. This is due largely to the poorer quality of studies published
in Research in Parapsychology. However, this result will depend to some extent on
the fact that RIP articles tend to be abstracted and don't give as much
information as fuller journal articles. Despite this, there is no significant
difference between effect size and publication source on a One-Way ANOVA;
F(6, 72) = .255,p = .9554.
StudyQuality in Relation to Year ofPublication
Study quality has not increased over the years; tfl2) = .017,p = .8889. Effect




The Effect of Belief Scale on Sheep-Goat Effect Sizes
Belief Measure N(Studies) Mean(ES) S.D.
Bhadra (BSGQ) 5 .027 .043
Australian 6 .032 .063
ISQ 5 .011 .079
Criterion 1 30 .032 .036
Others 27 .029 .046
Overall main effect; F(4, 72) = 0.239, p = .925
The results of the study quality analysis are clear and confirm the meta-analyses
of previous authors. The sheep-goat effect is not related to the quality of the
study. Yet again the view that only the worst controlled studies would display
ESP effects is shown to be wrong.
Moderating Variables
Comparisons ofBeliefAssessment Efficag
The question addressed here is one of considerable importance for future
research in this area. Does the size of the SGE depend upon how one
measures subjects' belief in the paranormal? Palmer (1972b) suggested that
only Schmeidler's (1943) Criterion 1 question would give consistent results.
Furthermore, Broughton (1991) has shown that the number of subjects
classified as sheep and goats depends upon the type of question they are asked,
and varies widely within subjects and across questions. From my own
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experience, it is clear that a sheep on one scale may be a goat on another.
Despite this potential source of confusion, the results are surprisingly coherent
and consistent.
It is clear from Table 2 that there is no overall relationship between type of
belief measure on effect size. Only the ISQ shows any likelihood of being a
poor measure of the SGE, yet it is not significantly smaller than any other
measure on a Scheffe F-test. More importantly, there is no apparent superiority
for Criterion 1 over other sheep-goat scales, although it does give the joint
highest mean effect size, with the Australian Sheep-goat scale (Thalbourne and
Haraldsson, 1980). Some measures of belief in the paranormal are to be noted
for their absence. The Paranormal Belief Scale (Tobacyk and Milford, 1983)
and the Belief in the Paranormal Scale (Jones et aL 1977) are both potentially
useful measures of sheep-goat belief, and they have been profitably used in
psychologically oriented studies of belief in the paranormal (see Irwin, 1993, for
a review). It appears that these measures have failed to cross over to
parapsychology. Whether this is a good or bad thing is something for later
discussion.
The results of this section are clear. There is no single best way of separating
sheep from goats. All measures used to date give approximately the same
answer. In many respects this is good news- the SGE seems quite robust.
Other Moderating Variables
In their meta-analysis of the forced-choice precognition literature, Honorton
and Ferrari (1989) found two variables that systematically covaried with effect
size that are also of potential importance to the SGE database; 1) Individual
vs. Group testing, 2) Feedback of Results.
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Table 3.
Feedback Received By Subjects In Sheep-Goat Studies
Feedback Type
None Session Trial Run-Score
N(Studies) 1 6 2 22
Mean (ES) -0.02 0.033 -0.035 0.029
SD (ES) 0.044 0.124 0.032
Overall main effect; F(2, 27) = 2.268, p = 0.123
(Data for no feedback not included in ANOVA)
Furthermore, insofar as SGE studies are addressing personality factors we
might reasonably expect variables that influence these personality factors to
also affect the SGE. Most pertinent is a finding by Honorton and Bern (1991)
that an extrovert-introvert correlation with ESP scoring was only
demonstrated in forced-choice data when the subjects were given the
personality measures after they were tested for ESP. This suggests that the
subjects' knowledge of their ESP score may influence their level of reported
extroversion post-experimentally, and also raises the possibility that the
experimenter may influence the subject after finding out their ESP score-
eliciting certain personality type responses over others. Therefore, I look at
whether the sheep-goat scale was given before or after the ESP test, with the
prediction that the SGE will be significantly higher in the 'after' condition than
the 'before' condition.
It is predicted that feedback will result in enhanced ESP performance, and that
trial by trial feedback will be better than other types of feedback, as per
Honorton and Ferrari (1989). As with Honorton and Ferrari it is also predicted
that individually tested studies will give larger effect sizes than group studies.
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Feedback
Firstly, it should be said that no firm conclusions are possible from the data
presented in Table 3. The number of studies explicitly stating that they looked
at 'no feedback' and 'trial-by-trial feedback' is insufficient. Therefore, the
crucial confirmation of Honorton and Ferrari's previous data (showing
superior effect size for trial feedback over run over none) is not feasible.
Individual Versus Group Testing
Honorton and Ferrari (1989) found that only studies testing subjects
individually gave significant non-zero effect sizes. They argued that group
studies were often conducted 'off the cuff and with little preparation and
presented evidence to suggest that such studies were of significantly lower
quality than their individually tested counterparts. The likelihood is that group
studies don't invest the time and personal care that individual studies do.
However, from Table 4 we can see that in the SGE database neither of these
results is found.
The results clearly show no major difference between group and individual
studies in terms of effect size and a superiority for group studies in terms of
quality (p = 0.1301). But perhaps this makes some sense- sheep-goat
distinctions characterise to some extent group differences. Points of
disagreement come to the fore when one is matched against a group of direct
opponents and given a chance to prove one's viewpoint. Perhaps the group
setting is more conducive to the sheep-goat effect, overriding the lack of
personal attention given in group studies.
Before VersusAfter (BeliefMeasurement)
Honorton, Ferrari and Bern (1991) only found a significant association between
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extroversion and psi scoring for forced-choice data when the subjects'
personality traits were assessed after the ESP test. Sixty-five studies gave
information as to whether the S-G scale was given before or after the ESP test,
and the results loosely support the conclusion that psi effects are larger when
the S-G scale is given after (N = 15, mean ES = .044, SD = .071) than when
subjects are assessed before (N= 50, mean = .028, SD = .037) testing for psi.
Although a t test does not give a significant result (p - -248), the degree of the
difference is nevertheless cause for concern. Perhaps it would be best if all
future research into the SGE administered the S-G scales before any ESP tests.
If the results of this section on moderating variables say anything it is that the
SGE is surprisingly consistent across a wide range of situations and
experimental variations.
Predictive Consistency in the SGE Database
In his major 1971 review of the sheep-goat effect, Palmer concluded his
discussion of the magnitude of the sheep-goat effect by predicting the
percentage outcome of future studies (on the assumption that the average
difference between sheep and goats in terms of run score was 5.10 to 4.95 (or
.15). In these terms he concluded that;
1. About 84% of studies would yield SGE's in the predicted direction
(S>G).
2. About 16% of studies would yield SGE's that were significant in the
right direction.
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3. About 1 % of studies would yield SGE's that were significantly
reversed.
Therefore...
4. About 15% of studies would yield SGE's that are reversed but not
significantly so.
From Figure 1 we can see that Palmer's (1971) predictions were fairly accurate.
A further 25 studies looking at the SGE appeared after Palmer's review. Only
studies giving full or translatable statistics are included, unless a study gave the
direction of non-significant results. The reduced sample comprises 60 studies.
Palmer's predictions are probably a bit out because of his use of the score
splitting method for studies using 'undecideds', which tends to underestimate
the number of significant SGE's. Nevertheless this meta-analysis provides
considerable consistency with an updated database to predictions made from a









■ Non Sig. SGE
□ Non Sig. Rev.
ElSig. Rev. SGE
What is reported here provides some considerable agreement with previous
meta-analyses. And like those previous meta-analyses the findings indicate the
existence of a small, but highly significant effect. The degree of replicability
found here both in studies and across investigators is again something that is
not new amongst meta-analyses of psi phenomena. No longer can the critic
claim that replicability is not to be found in parapsychology- although they may
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still staunchly defend the primacy of thep<.05.
More specifically, the results of this meta-analysis are quite clear- if you believe
in the paranormalyou will score higher on average inforced choice ESP tests than someone
who does not. That the SGE does not depend upon the quality of the research is
not surprising in light of the number of previous meta-analyses of psi
phenomena that have shown just the same independence from these sources
of artefact (see Utts, 1991, for a good review of meta-analyses in this field).
Nevertheless the critic might argue that despite all the significance the actual
effect itself (0.029) is too small to be of any real world importance. One would
be wrong to suppose that such small effects are of no consequence however.
For example, in a report published by the Steering Committee of the
Physicians' Health Study Research Group (1988) an experiment looking at the
effects of aspirin in preventing heart attacks was terminated after the beneficial
effect of aspirin became obvious- aspirin patients clearly had fewer heart
attacks than non-aspirin patients (placebo control group). The effect size was
0.03. Another statistic to answer just this type of criticism was devised by
Rosenthal and Rubin (1982) and is known as the Binomial Effect Si%e Display
(BESD). In the case of a SGE size of 0.029 the BESD shows that 51.5% of
sheep would benefit from a gain in score simply as a result of their positive
attitude to the paranormal, whereas only 48.5% of goats would show a gain in
ESP score in spite of their scepticism. Seen in these terms the weak sheep-goat
effect looks far more impressive.
The finding that the SGE is relatively robust across different measures is also
cause for some relief. However, this does not mean that researchers should
continue with their 'pet' SG scales. What is needed is a good, reliable,
accurately validated measure of general belief in the paranormal (with sub-
scales for a psi component). Questions should most certainly include the
Schmeidler question seen to be joint most successful measure of belief in terms
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of getting results. The need for such a universally accepted scale is more
important now that psychologists and parapsychologists are looking in to the
wider consequences of belief in the paranormal (Irwin, 1993). It is sadly the
case that no current measure of belief (either in parapsychology or
psychology) is good enough to encompass the requirements for universal
acceptance. What is more, there are at least two schools of research on belief in
the paranormal. The first school is represented by the research reported here.
Researchers in this mould are broadly open to the possibility of genuine
paranormal phenomena and report their results in parapsychological journals.
On the other hand are those researchers who can broadly be characterised by
their interest in what Irwin (1993) titles - cognitive deficits research. Such research is
carried out by sceptics of paranormal claims, mostly psychologists, and is
reported in psychological journals. The essential question for these researchers
is 'How can people come to believe in the paranormal in spite of its existence?'.
Whilst these two schools of thought often seem incommensurable, in fact a
pragmatically minded approach to belief in the paranormal must find both of
them of equal utility in guiding our research. It is a shame therefore that there
is such little cross-talk between these two schools. There are some instances of
research that are clearly guided by ideas from both these schools (e.g. Irwin,
1992; Lawrence, 1991) but for the most part a conceptual chasm exists between
the psychology and parapsychology of belief in the paranormal. Whatever one
may personally think regarding the existence of psi, there are clearly
opportunities being missed here.
At this point I feel it is necessary to issue some caution over the accepted
interpretation of the SGE. Typically the SGE is interpreted as an effect of
belief upon scoring in ESP tests. However, such confidence in the causal
process can only be claimed if the experimenter has control over the
independent variable in the experiment and is able to randomly allocate
participants to the various levels of the manipulated IV. These conditions do
not pertain in the standard SGE study. In the standard study, which accounts
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for most of the studies reported in this area, the researcher takes a sample of
people, administers some measure of paranormal belief to them, and then splits
the sample in to two groups sheep or goat on the basis of a mean or median
split. What one has in this kind of study is an ersatz IV 'fixed' at two levels with
no random assignment of participants to these levels. If the participants were
selected for the study as a whole at random then in reality we have an arbitrary
dichotomisation of randomly distributed belief scores being associated with a
random distribution of ESP test scores. But it is a simple matter of fact that the
dichotomisation of a sample of random scores reduces information in the data
drastically and thus reduces sensitivity of parametric statistical tests calculated
on these data. With two sets of randomly sampled scores where a natural
variation is present over a reasonable range the optimal analysis is a
correlational one (i.e. a Pearson product-moment correlation coefficient). Any
other analysis (an independent t-test or z-score of the difference in two
proportions) is inevitably less powerful. However, this methodological point
aside, our discussion reveals a deeper problem with attributing causal priority to
belief in such 'experiments'. If all that can be demonstrated is a correlation we
have no basis, within the context of the particular SGE study, to suppose that
it is belief that is causing ESP test score differences. An alternative conjecture,
and one that fits with the broad thrust of this thesis, would have it that ESP
test score is an indicator of the latent variable 'general psychic ability' or
'paranormal experience', and as we know psychic ability does very much have a
causal role to play in the development of paranormal belief. Thus we have a
situation where general paranormal experience is the co-cause of both
paranormal belief and ESP test score. Of course, this implies that there may be
no actual direct relationship between belief in the paranormal and ESP test
score.
However, there are a few studies which do meet requirements for a genuine
attempt to examine the influence of belief on ESP test score. Thus, Lovitts
(1983) used an experimental design in which a group of believers and
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disbelievers were lead to believe either that they were taking part in a test if
ESP (the truth) or an examination of the claim that ESP might result from
subliminal sensory cues (a plausible decoy condition - in fact the only way
success could occur at guessing targets is if ESP existed). Thus, in one
condition success would be interpreted by the participant as evidence for ESP,
whilst in the other it could be passed off (in the participant's mind) as merely a
subliminal cueing effect. Lovitts supposed that sheep and goats in the ESP
condition would show the standard SGE, whilst those in the subliminal cueing
condition would show a reversed SGE. Goats in the latter condition would be
inclined to score well to vindicate their view that ESP was just subliminal
cueing (as a result of sensory leakage) whilst sheep would score badly in an
attempt to thwart this hypothesis (presumably by showing a defensive reaction
to the subliminal cues). Lovitts did indeed find just such a reversed SGE in the
subliminal cueing condition, as revealed by a significant cross-over interaction
in a 2-way factorial ANOVA. These results, though interesting, must be treated
with caution. There have, surprisingly, been few attempts to replicate Lovitts'
work. Thus, Lawrence (1992) failed outright to find a reversed sheep-goat
effect in a fairly exact replication. More recently Lawrence and Norman (1997)
have utilised a less cumbersome auditory cueing decoy ( as opposed to Lovitts'
tachistoscopic visual cueing decoy) and did find a near-significant cross-over
interaction of just the kind found by Lovitts. Clearly more studies need to be
conducted with larger samples, but it seems that belief might have
motivationally moderated effects upon ESP scoring after all.
So, cautions aside, what about the prospects for future SGE research? In
recent years there has been little research looking directly at the SGE. Is it old
hat now? I think not. What the research summarised here has done is establish
a small effect in a contrived setting- the forced choice paradigm was never
known for its ability to induce excitement. More recently developed free-
response techniques have been relatively unused as means to examine the SGE
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(Stanford, 1984). One reason why people steer clear of the SGE is that they
prefer not to have subjects that deflate their psi scores. But such an approach is
clearly short sighted. As much useful information can be gained by planned
analysis of data from subjects with opposing views on the paranormal as can be
gained from looking at the scores of those who fully accept psi in their lives.
In fact, if no one bothers to look at the SGE in free response settings then a
whole area of important research, adding useful insights into our understanding
of psi missing, is missed. Thus at least one area for future SGE research is to
look at it in free response settings. And a specific goal of this research might be
to analyse goats' mentations to get a grasp of what psi missing in more
ecologically valid circumstances actually looks like.
The odd thing is if the results of meta-analyses like this bear fruit and lead to
future research that continues to support the psi hypothesis then public and
academic acceptance of the idea of psi would result in the extinction of the
sheep-goat distinction- everyone would become some sort of sheep. The SGE
may yet become another one of the behavioural sciences' celebrated socio-
historical phenomena; a quirky aspect of an era in which science was unable to
capture adequately the elusive quarry of psi. Belief in the paranormal may well
help you score better...




His utter dependence on circumstances and environment, the manifold
distresses and tribulations of his life, surrounded by hostile neighbours,
dangerous beasts ofprey, and often exposed to the pitilessforces of nature;
his keen senses, his cupidity, his uncontrolled emotions - all these things
bind him to the physical realities, so that he is in constant danger of
adopting apurely materialistic attitude and becoming degenerate. His belief
in spirits, or rather, his awareness of the spiritual world, pulls him again
and again out of that bondage in which his senses would hold him; itforces
on him the certainty of a spiritual reality whose laws he must observe as
carefully and asguardedly as the laws ofhisphysical environment.' - Jung
In this concluding chapter my discussion will fall in to three parts. Firstly, I
wish to consider the empirical data accrued in support of the childhood factors
model of paranormal belief development. Secondly, I wish to consider the
critique of the paranormal belief scale offered in this thesis, and its
consequences for future research in this area. Thirdly, I wish to consider the
evidence for genuine paranormal experience as taken from my sheep-goat
meta-analysis, and from parapsychology in general. Lastly, I want to explore
some possibilities for future research before offering my own view of where
research in to paranormal belief stands as a result ofmy work.
Causes and consequences of paranormal belief and experience
The prescience of Jung appears to have been vindicated in this thesis.
Paranormal beliefs and experiences do appear to have a functional role to play
in human development, and Jung, with his emphasis on spiritual awareness
rather than belief, seems to usher in my own finding that it is paranormal
experience which 'does the driving' as it were. The essential findings from the
modelling research seem to be thus ;
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1) Trauma has a role to play in the development of paranormal belief and
experience. Not a new finding, but we have extended the result thus;
i) it would appear that control related trauma is responsible for
heightened paranormal experience via fantasy. This discovery is also
of potential relevance for psychologists interested in the traumatic
causes of fantasy ability (e.g. Lynn and Rhue, 1988; Bryant, 1995). I
do not know of any studies in psychology that have looked for or
found this relationship.
ii) bereavement/loss related trauma is directly related to paranormal
experience - this route echoes the findings of psychological studies
of the liallucinations ofwidowhood' (Rees, 1971).
2) Fantasy clearly and intuitively has a direct influence upon reported level
of subjective paranormal experience. This fits with previous studies, and
is the key piece of evidence in support of a psychodynamic theory of
paranormal belief development. Thus, it suggests that people
traumatised may resort to fantasy as an escape from a harsh reality (in
keeping with Freud, 1959/1908; and Lynn and Rhue, 1988), and in so
doing develop a capacity for absorbed imaginal states of the kind
conducive to paranormal experience (in keeping with recent findings by
Ellason and Ross, 1997). In psychology, the traumatic causes of fantasy
can be seen in an interesting little study of paracosms, the fantasy
universes of children, by Cohen and MacKeith (1991). Thus, one
woman describing her childhood paracosm 'Branmail' says that
constructing a fantasy world enabled her to 'avoid noticing' her
problems and to Svithdraw from the real world where I felt I could not
influence events'. However, trauma does not always have to be dramatic
to cause fantasy. One child in Cohen and MacKeith (1991) developed a
toy world because 'It gives me something to think and dream about
when I'm bored.' I suspect that isolation plays its direct role on fantasy
(as seen in chapter 8) through 'trauma' of this kind.
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3) Paranormal belief is mostly consequential. Paranormal belief has played
a small role in the models we have developed. In the trauma models
paranormal belief has been the end product of a chain of events in
which fantasy and paranormal experience have been central. In the
personal consequences model where paranormal belief was, a priori,
expected to be a cause of heightened interpersonal and personal control
we once again found that beliefs played almost no role. The lack of
influence for paranormal belief rather stands in stark contrast to the
amount of academic work looking solely at paranormal belief.
Psychologists in particular, it would appear, have overestimated its
importance. Or perhaps I have failed to include variables with which
beliefmight have more influence.
4) Women seem to benefit from paranormal experience, but men don't.
This conclusion comes from an examination of the personal
consequences model in chapter 9. There we found;
a) men and women respond differently to paranormal experience in
terms of their level of interpersonal and personal control, thus;
b) women show moderate positive path coefficients for the effects of
paranormal experience upon interpersonal control.
c) men show a non-significant weakly negative effect of paranormal
experience on personal control, and a near-zero positive effect of
paranormal experience upon interpersonal control.
d) both sexes show no significant effects of paranormal belief upon
both interpersonal and personal control, those weak effects that are
present are all negative.
e) interpersonal and personal control are both positively related to
purpose in life, reinforcing the view that those with higher internal
locus of control in those spheres will feel a greater sense of life
meaning.
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There are some genuinely interesting and original contributions within the
empirical modelling work reported within the thesis, specifically with respect to
the specified trauma model, and the personal consequences model. For the
latter, I have uncovered a sex difference which had previously gone unnoticed,
and which may have influenced the strength of relationships found between
belief in the paranormal and locus of control in earlier studies. However, the
discussion of the results so far has presumed their validity. There may well be
problems with the studies reported herein that would invalidate or moderate
these conclusions. I outline the main problems, as far as I can see them, below;
1) The samples usedfor the studies are too small. There are two ways in which
sample size might influence the covariance structure models reported in
this thesis;
i) The studies reported in this thesis depend upon samples of size 80,
58, and 129 respectively. The studies samples sizes are on the small
side, but we should remember that large sample studies in
covariance structure modelling, by which I mean studies which give
results exceptionally close to the asymptotic properties of the typical
fit statistics, are around the 5000 mark. With response rates for the
third study as they were, plus time constraints, and costs, the
samples obtained probably were the best one could practically
obtain. Furthermore, the effect of sample size is felt most directly
upon the standard errors of statistics, and small standard errors
typically effect such things as cross-validation of models, so one
more pertinent question would be how consistent the models were.
To the extent that the repeated modelling attempts reported here
show the same overall pattern then we may feel confident that small
to medium sample sizes have not been a problem. I think we have
had a reasonable degree of confirmation for the results where
replication in other samples has been attempted. However, for the




Sample Size Number of freely estimated parameters N/p ratio
Edinburgh student 80
SPR 58
Edinburgh Basic Model 129
Spec. Trauma 129






might be best to exercise more inferential caution, though both
those models were tested on general population data and with the
largest sample size.
ii) Sample size is critical in the sense that there should at least be more
people in the study than parameters to be estimated (the so called
sample size: parameter ratio). As Bender (1989) notes, 'An over
simplified guideline regarding the trustworthiness of solutions and
parameter estimates might be the following. The ratio of sample size
to number of free parameters to be estimated may be able to go as
low as 5:1 under normal and elliptical theory. Although there is little
experience on which to base a recommendation, a ratio of at least
10:1 may be more appropriate for arbitrary distributions. These
ratios need to be larger to obtain trustworthy ^-tests on the
significance of parameters, and still larger to yield correct model
evaluation chi-square probabilities.' (p.6).
It might be instructive to examine a table (Table 1.) of the sample
size:parameter ratio for each study. At the worst then one should
approach the results of the specified trauma model with caution, whilst
the tests of the basic Irwin inspired model of childhood factors
developed in chapter 6 and replicated in chapter 7 and 8 can be
regarded with most confidence. In any case, whilst no self-respecting
person would turn away a large N, the sample sizes don't seem so small
for the task set. As Kline (1993) notes with respect to sample size in
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exploratory factor analyses, 'Below 100 any factors require replication.'
(p. 121). We have seen three replications, with reasonably consistent
results for the original childhood factors model based on sample size
less than 100.
2) The samples used are unrepresentative. I shall examine each sample separately
for this problem;
i) The Edinburgh student sample - this sample is certainly not
representative of the general population. It is restricted in age, IQ,
and socio-economic background for certain, and could well be
unrepresentative in other respects undetermined. However, for me
the real issue is whether the unrepresentativeness of the sample is in
any way relevant to the study hypothesis. I don't actually think,
though I grant it is somewhat presumptive, that restrictions of the
kind we see in the Edinburgh student sample are likely to influence
my data in a way which could negate my conclusions. Thus, let us
suppose that this sample is unrepresentative in such a way that it
tends to have a restriction in range on some variable that correlates
in a straightforward linear way with paranormal belief and
experience (childhood trauma might be a highly plausible example).
The effect of this kind of restriction in range is usually to reduce the
estimated strength of the correlation coefficient. Thus, if anything
relationships found between trauma and fantasy and trauma and
experience in the Edinburgh student sample should be larger in other
more representative samples. The model developed herein would
only be supported more strongly. The only way in which the
correlations in the Edinburgh student study could overestimate the
effects modelled is if the real world correlations were quadratic or of
similarly non-linear disposition and our sample were restricted in
range to one pseudo-linear component of the quadratic curve. But
then again we would only be learning one interesting thing in lieu of
one even more interesting thing. That would not be tantamount to
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finding no correlation, which would only happen by type II error or
a true null. Thus, whilst the Edinburgh student sample may be
unrepresentative, I don't think it is so in a way which would
seriously challenge the results.
ii) The SPR sample - on first appearances this sample is dangerous. It
has both a low N and a highly restrictive range in terms of IQ and
socio-economic status. Once again the same types of counter-
response apply to this criticism as did for the Edinburgh student
sample. Thus, the main problem is restriction of range and unless
there really is no effect between the variables modelled the SPR
study is unlikely to lead to highly inaccurate inferences about the
nature of the effects modelled. Indeed, as we saw, the SPR study
broadly replicated the Edinburgh student study. However, the
Edinburgh citizen study is not so wildly restricted and shares the
same questionnaire as the SPR study, so we can compare the
descriptive statistics for these two, to look for a restriction of range;
Table. 2 SPR Study (N=58) Edinburgh Survey (N=129)
Statistics
PES EPBS STCE CF PES EPBS STCE CF
Mean 48.0 37.0 41.3 6.9 32.6 26.0 40.2 6.5
Variance (n-1) 325 56 104 10 272 87 53 11
pooled t-test 5.65* 8.18* 0.86 0.72 ** ** ** **
Starred data are p<0.05
F-test (variances) 1.19 1.55 1.96 1.10 ** ** ** **
i) The data in Table 2. suggest that the only respect in which the SPR
study differs from the Edinburgh survey is in the rather
uninteresting fact that the SPR members show a higher level of
paranormal experience and belief! Certainly Fisher ratios do not lend
support to the view that the SPR sample has a restriction of range
on any of these key variables. Unfortunately we cannot compare
these data with the original Edinburgh student study as that study
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used slightly different questions for paranormal experience.
However, I am satisfied that, insofar as restrictions in range can be
assessed empirically, there are no serious differences in the two
studies that might confound the interpretation of models. However,
this analysis depends upon the assumption that the Edinburgh
survey provides the most representative survey.
ii) The Edinburgh survey's representativeness - the Edinburgh survey
was an attempt to survey a fairly representative cross-section of the
British population. Certainly Edinburghers may have their own
distinct characteristics, but I am not aware of any evidence to
suggest the people of Edinburgh are any more likely to be
unrepresentative where paranormal issues are concerned than other
group of people in Britain (though logically absence of evidence is
not evidence for absence). However, the Edinburgh survey sample is
unlikely to be fully representative for a number of reasons. Firstly, it
isn't so large that all society's extreme cases could be represented.
Secondly, I consciously avoided certain selected streets if they were
in areas that looked dangerous (e.g. Niddrie). A strange, young, male,
English academic may not be every disenfranchised Scot's cup of
tea. So certain of the poorest members of society are not in the
sample, but plenty of areas were sampled that were still relatively
impoverished (e.g. Pilton, of Trainspotting fame, where I myself
lived). Furthermore, I have already noted the existence of an age
bias in the sample, with very many of the outright non-participants
being over 60. However, it is difficult to see how a group of people
who refused to even find out what the study was about could impart
a bias to the data1. Selection biases usually apply when participants
select themselves out for data relevant reasons. Perhaps it would be
1 At a stretch one could argue that 'outright refusers' respond that way as a general defence against
potentially traumatic situations, a defence which might have grown out of genuine trauma in earlier or
later years. However, I don't count this likely - senior citizens just seem to be scared of young men at
the door.
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safer to say that a test of the models developed herein would be
particularly useful amongst the over 60's. The survey data could be
biased in other ways. For example, surveying tended to be done
between 7 and 10pm on weekdays, and would thus exclude those
who are not available at these times (though these times are least
likely to suffer this kind of problem). Alternatively, 7-10pm might be
a time when certain classes of people are more likely to come to the
door. I think in particular this might be true of housewives. There is
a slight female bias in the sample (71) to male (45), and it could well
be that housewives answer the door because their husband is eating
dinner, putting his feet up, or watching the footie. In addition, there
were some occasions when a man answered the door and accepted
the questionnaire, but the wife completed on the grounds that she
was more interested in the survey than the man. Fortunately this did
not occur frequently, but it did occur only in the male to female
direction. However, as far as representativeness is concerned,
whatever small or large discrepancies exist, they have not prevented
us from testing and confirming essentially the same basic model of
paranormal belief development across three highly diverse samples.
Thus, to cut a long story short, I don't think representativeness need
worry us unduly, though I would wish to see these models
(especially the later more complex ones) tested on larger samples
from a general population.
3) Fantasy proneness is implicated in accounts of 'false-memory' syndrome,
so perhaps the correlation of trauma with fantasy is a result of false
memory ( Briere and Conte, 1993; Zelig and Beidleman, 1981). When
false memory caused cases are removed, the correlations with trauma
would deteriorate, and the model would look far less impressive. There
are a number of strong responses to this criticism (which has actually
been expressed to me before);
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False memory accounts are associated primarily with particular
methods for eliciting childhood memories (especially hypnosis, see
Zelig and Beidleman, 1981)- though false memories may arise
spontaneously, they are most likely to occur when psychotherapists
use memory retrieval methods like hypnosis. The questionnaire
method of assessing childhood trauma is not implicated amongst
these techniques because it does not readily pnme or suggest to
respondents that they should recover memories. Its response format
is more akin to recognition memory than recall memory. However,
the apparent paucity of false memories occurring using non-
hypnotic observation techniques may be illusory. It may be that we
are more attuned to false memories occurring in the use of hypnosis
because as professionals we have been concerned with the
possibility of therapist induced memories. False memories may
simply go undetected using other types of observation. I submit that
it certainly could be that my questionnaire responses have been
distorted by false memories. However, when I think of the variables
in this study that have played the more prominent role in
determining childhood fantasy and paranormal experience, like
parental divorce, isolation, loss of friends and family I just can't
believe ordinary people could be mistaken so greatly about their
conscious recall of these events. Nevertheless, I accept that by
themselves the results supporting a link between trauma and fantasy
in this thesis do not guarantee that cause runs from trauma to
fantasy - the path could go the other way. Inevitably, results from
studies using other methodologies are needed to clarify the direction
of influence.
False memories are primarily about sexual or extreme physical
trauma. Practically no sexual abuse trauma has been reported by
respondents in this thesis. Therefore, the correlates established
between trauma and fantasy, and trauma and experience do not
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appear to depend crucially upon those types of trauma most
susceptible to a false memory critique. Indeed, the lack of sexual
abuse trauma reported would tend to favour an interpretation of
response censorship, rather than confabulation. Interestingly, as a
direct result of work by Irwin (1992) and myself (Lawrence et al.,
1995) French and Kerman (1996) have compared levels of
paranormal belief for a group of people with known childhood
trauma histories, with a matched group of people with no known
childhood trauma history. They found a significant difference in
reported level of paranormal belief, with higher scores in the
trauma group. As we have seen, false memory or fantastic
confabulation does not seem to be critical to our results given the
nature of the trauma reported, but in any case French and
Kerman's (1996) study shows that a relationship exists between real
trauma and paranormal belief. Nevertheless, false memories may not
just pertain to sexual and physical abuse trauma but also to false
memories of a quite mundane nature, involving say false memories
of having been shopping last week in Safeways. Certainly I have
been aware of believing I have done something just because at
some time in the past I thought strongly about doing it - but these
occasions are rare in the extreme, and so lest I become a wholesale
memory nihilist I will suppose that generally people do faithfully
report their memories accurately.
4) Response censorship might have prevented people with low paranormal belieffrom
expressing high levels of trauma, due to the socially undesirable nature of sexual and
physical abuse trauma. I take this criticism seriously because from point 3
above we noted a paucity of sexual abuse trauma in our data, and I
suggested that this could be due to response censorship (people might
be worried that acknowledging the existence of a sexual trauma would
lead to further deeper inquiries from the researcher, and so not bother
to acknowledge trauma ofwhich they are otherwise quite aware). I think
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the key thing here is that it is social desirability which leads to response
censorship. Response censorship, if it occurs, would lead to potentially
different correlations between experience, trauma and fantasy.
Fortunately, I included a 13 item measure of social desirability (a reduced
version of the Marlowe-Crowne social desirability scale) in the survey
questionnaire for the SPR and Edinburgh surveys. Using 9 as a clinical
cut-off point for the existence of a social desirability response set, we
can compare the correlations for the full sample scores with correlations
for the reduced (non-social desirability response set) scores;
Table 3. Edinburgh Survey Edinburgh Survey Reduced
Correlations Full Sample (N=129) Sample (N=105)
PES EPBS CF PES EPBS CF
EPBS 0.71 0.71
CF 0.48 0.37 0.49 0.38
STCE 0.24 0.26 0.27 0.25 0.25 0.28
Table 4. SPR Survey Full SPR Survey Reduced Sample
Correlations Sample (N=58) (N=47)
PES EPBS CF PES EPBS CF
EPBS 0.51 0.55
CF 0.25 0.21 0.27 0.27
STCE 0.46 0.18 0.19 0.44 0.17 0.13
In Tables 3 and 4 we can directly compare the correlations between the
variables for paranormal experience (PES), paranormal belief
(Edinburgh scale), childhood fantasy and overall trauma (STCE). It is
manifestly apparent that the removal of cases likely to suffer from high
socially desirability does not affect the overall correlation found at all.
Thus, modelling attempts based upon the reduced correlation matrices
would show little change from their full sample counterparts. Response
censorship due to social desirability does not seem to have affected the
data. Lastly, the questionnaire included an explicit honesty statement
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designed to reduce the level of dishonest response (Eysenck, Eysenck
and Shaw, 1974).
5) The large survey questionnaire has a set order of questions, with no attempt to
counterbalance question orders. Fatigue and boredom effects may affect the results,
especially for items that come later in the questionnaire. Alas, the survey
questionnaire does contain this flaw, and there is potentially a problem
of boredom or fatigue effects setting in as the respondent tries to
plough through the questions. However, the questionnaire was explicitly
constructed in five sections, each of which was designed to take no
more than 9 minutes to complete, and participants were instructed on
the questionnaire cover to '.. .do one section each evening, at a time that
suits you...'. If they followed these instructions (annoyingly no check
was made for this) then fatigue and boredom effects would be
minimised. Perhaps then we should be more cautious about models
based on data which appears substantially later in the questionnaire (the
purpose in life test, and Affectometer 2). This would apply most
strongly to the personal consequences model, which I have identified as
needing replication anyway.
6) the problem of \alternative models' - a persistent problem with structural
equation models is that equally acceptable models may exist (from a
statistical perspective) for a given covariance structure which differ
radically in the kind of interpretation to which they give rise. For
example, it could be argued that latent trait models implying no
particular causal structure more satisfactorily explain the data, especially
given the potential problems with cross-sectional data and items with
content overlap addressed below. The trouble with many alternative
models is that they fit the data just as well but are theoretically
meaningless. However, some models may exist which represent the data
in this thesis just as well, if not better, than the reported models, but
which imply radically different causal or non-causal structures. I can not
claim to have tackled all possible models
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7) the problem of cross sectional data - cross sectional designs like the ones
presented in this thesis involve the collection of data from one moment
in time. Though often convenient for the researcher, they do not
represent the optimum way of assessing causal influences of the kind
being investigated in this thesis. A better way of investigating causal
processes is by conducting a longitudinal study in which the same
participants are measured on at least three separate occasions over a
number of years. In such circumstances the causal ordering of variables
in a model is not in dispute, and researchers may also assess the
reliability of their measures over this time period. In contrast in my own
analyses I am assuming that people's present day memories of childhood
trauma and fantasy are accurately caused by the actual childhood events.
This assumption may be appropriate to a greater or lesser extent, and in
all likelihood it is appropriate although we may reasonably expect some
distortion to have crept in to recollections of long past childhood over
the years. Whether the causal sequences remain valid when tested using
other methodologies only time, and more research can tell. However, I
present evidence later in the discussion which draws upon alternative
sources of evidence in establishing a likely causal role for childhood
trauma and fantasy in the establishment of paranormal belief and
experience.
8) the problem of self-report data - questionnaires are a quintessential form of
self-report data. The researcher relies totally upon the participants' good
memory, degree of self-insight, and honesty in order to establish a valid
set of data. If any one of these three things falters then the validity of
the report is thrown in to question. On memory, we have already spent
much discussion. As far as insight is concerned we can only hope that
participants had insight enough in to their own mentality to answer the
questions set them. Fortunately few of the questionnaires used in this
thesis demand great insight. However, the items assessing purpose in life
and well being do demand of people that they reflect accurately upon
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their recent or long term outlook on life. In addition, where purpose in
life is concerned some individuals simply may not spend much time
wondering about their role or purpose, or life's meaning. To the extent
that anyone lacks insight those scales may be effected. A potential
solution to peoples lack of insight about themselves, is to have other
people comment upon the target person's character. Thus, a researcher
might survey not just my opinion about my purpose in life, but that of
my wife's and my father's. I think both of them would provide support
for the notion that I have a sense of purpose and meaning in my life, or
at the very least that I know what I want to do with it. Data of this kind
could easily be 'factored' in to future analyses of the purpose in life
construct, and might help to overcome problems of low insight, or at
least raise new problems of whose insight to trust! As far as participant
honesty is concerned I think we have covered that in its most relevant
sense already in the discussion of social desirability. However, one could
raise the question of outright, pernicious lying. I think the greatest
problem with this is that it is almost certain to be rare, and likely to be
motivated by some strong reaction to the questionnaire. I don't believe
that such a reaction is likely to have occurred with my own research.
9) the problem of content overlap - where scales contain items which overlap
considerably in content high correlations are an unsurprising result.
Moreover, the best statistical approach to scales that have such overlap
may be to factor them together in any structural equation modelling
attempt, for parsimony's sake if nothing else. Clearly the paranormal
belief scale and paranormal experience scale have content overlap in this
sense, so might we want to factor these together in to one variable? This
may be especially indicated where the correlation between the two
unfactored variables is particularly high, and when attenuation for
unreliability is accounted for then the urge to factor highly correlating
scales may be irresistible. Thus, paranormal experiences regularly
correlate about 0.70 with the latent variable of paranormal belief in the
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structural equation models I have presented. Could we not just suppose
that paranormal experience items are another facet of a wider
'paranormal issues' factor, rather than a separate and independent
variable in their own right? I actually think that in this instance we
should resist the temptation to factor together the paranormal variables.
Firstly, I think the Edinburgh Paranormal Belief Scale is not typical of
most paranormal belief scales in that it asks about one's friends psychic
experiences, reading about psychic powers in newspapers, and psychic
ability within the family. Other scales ask more straight-laced questions
about ones belief in ESP per se, or PK per se, or life after death per se.
For me the EPBS relates consistently more strongly to paranormal
experience (than the ASGS-B) because it taps in to behaviours
characteristic of the psychic experient (namely, that they have a circle of
friends who accept their ability because of the friends' own psychic
experience, or that the experient tends to be interested in reading about
other psychic experiences, or that their family may also have individuals
who have psychic ability). The EPBS draws perhaps too strongly on
these items in its relation to paranormal experience, whereas the ASGS-
B weighs in with a more typical 0.58 correlation with paranormal
experience on its own. As I have noted in a previous chapter, there are
many kinds of paranormal believer and not all of them will be psychic.
The EPBS probably is biased towards those believers who are psychic.
Secondly, from a conceptual perspective it is quite easy to conceive of
individuals who hold high levels of paranormal belief but who have had
little or no paranormal experience. Such individuals may be swayed by
scientific evidence, or popular journalism, or occult literature, or the X-
files(!), or the experience of friends and family. A 'paranormal views'
factor which conglomerates paranormal belief and experience together
as though one must necessarily give rise to the other does not do justice
to the diversity of paranormal believers. Paranormal experience,
whatever its ontological basis, undoubtedly gives rise to paranormal
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belief, but paranormal belief by no means gives rise to paranormal
experience. To factor variables like these together just because their
content overlaps would prejudge issues of causal priority which are
intuitively appealing and theoretically relevant. Lastly, if we feel justified
in factoring together because the paranormal experience relates highly
to a paranormal belief factor we should remember that this is a situation
in which correction of correlations upwards for attenuation due to
unreliability has already occurred for one half of the correlational
relationship, namely the belief factor. The factor draws out the reliable
systematic variance between the two belief variables, thus removing the
unreliability that attenuates measured variables under normal
circumstances. Thus, we might expect the correlation of 0.7 between
experience and a belief factor to be pretty much at its peak - correction
for attenuation would achieve little. However, I submit that there might
be other areas of content overlap within the survey questionnaire, in
particular between childhood fantasy and paranormal experience where
questions about fairies and elves might sit thematically alongside
concerns about psychic powers. Questions about content overlap
accounting for these correlations can be easily answered by correlating
non-overlapped versions of the paranormal experience and fantasy
scales. I took all of the direct paranormally relevant items out of the
childhood fantasy scale (items 4, 5, 6, 8 and 14) and recalculated the
correlation with paranormal experience - it was 0.48, which is no less
than the original correlation. Thus, content overlap, thougjh it might be
a problem in principle, seems not to be a problem in practice.
I have now outlined what I think are the most serious objections to the models
presented in this thesis. None of them are fatal, as I see it, though some of
them might yet have influenced the data in subtle ways which only further
replication will reveal. But then, further replication would be needed whether
there were flaws or not.
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I think the models presented do portray a valid graphical narrative, caveats
excepting, but for the models to be truly causal we need to make some appeal
either to strong theoretical grounds for imputing causality, or to other
evidence. In the remainder of this section on the causal models of paranormal
belief and experience I want to briefly look over the autobiographies and
biographies of some psychics, to see whether the themes coming through from
the modelling research are echoed in psychics' developmental histories.
The Early Lives of the Psychics
In this thesis I have primarily been concerned with survey-based data
pertaining to the prevalence of childhood trauma and fantasy in the
development of paranormal experience and belief. As good as such techniques
are for the demonstration of the strength of relationship between the modelled
variables, we need to look elsewhere to provide wider validity to the model
being built up. In short, if the model of paranormal belief development I am
building has any real-world validity then this should be apparent in the lives of
people who would call themselves psychic.
Fortunately there is no shortage of biographical material relating to the lives of
psychics. In this section then I look over a selection of biographies of psychics,
picked for no other reason than that those biographies were readily available
(either in my own library or at the Koestler Chair library). I make no claim that
the survey is representative, beyond saying that no obvious bias went in to the
choice of biography. At the very least this chapter will help to enrich our
understanding of the problem at hand. For some psychics I had to hand a
reasonable amount of material, whilst for others I had only a little amount of
biographical material. Just because I write a paragraph about one psychic, and
many paragraphs about another, one shouldn't suppose there is any special
relevance. I begin with an examination of the childhood of Eileen Garrett. Of
all modem day psychics she is the one with whom I am most impressed.
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The Childhood ofEileen Garrett
Eileen Garrett was a born in the first decade of this century in County Meath,
Ireland. Whilst still a baby she was adopted by her Aunt and Uncle, and spent
most of her childhood living with them. She seems to have had psychic ability
from a very early age, and in her autobiography squarely places the cause, or
part cause, of her talents down to the conducive folk legends of fairy kingdoms
that were still commonplace amongst Irish folk at the turn of the century.
However Garrett's abilities may have started she went on to become one of the
most, if not the most, respected mental mediums of the twentieth century.
Perhaps the single most striking thing about her mediumship is that she always
maintained a critical distance from the phenomena she produced. Though
spiritualistic beliefs provided a ready-made medium for her abilities, she never
actually pronounced a strong belief in spiritualism. She readily submitted herself
to scientific scrutiny on numerous occasions, and partly with money from her
business career as the owner of a publishing company she founded the
Parapsychological Foundation to support scientific research in to paranormal
phenomena. Thus, many of the sceptics' arguments in favour of charlatanry in
mediums simply fall flat in the face of Mrs. Garrett's life. There could be no
monetary motive for her actions, for she made her money quite readily through
her business. Fame was certainly not an interest of hers, for she already had the
acquaintance of the good and great in the publishing world. It seems then that
Mrs. Garrett provides a most interesting case - a medium whose integrity, at
the least, is beyond question. All being equal, the details drawn from her
childhood may provide revealing and valuable insights.
In her own autobiography, Many Voices, Garrett (1968) outlines in some detail
her childhood in the 'magical realms' of Meath County, Ireland. Here she
notes, the cultural context was steeped in old Irish legends of the fairy kings.
One forms the distinct impression that persistent reference must have been
made to tales of fairy and ghost for a child in the Ireland of the 1900's. Garrett
recalls in particular being taken to Tara Hill by her Uncle Brownell, who
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convinced her that the lands around the hill harboured 'mysterious sun
temples' from the 'lost tribes' of the past days. A noted cousin also spoke of an
ancient priest he had seen walking on Michaelmas Eve, this same cousin
introduced the young Eileen to dowsing with a forked willow branch. As she
wrote herself, 'Who knows how much the awed mind of a child, filled with
wonder, absorbed from men such as these...' (pp. 18).
The above may suggest that Garrett's childhood was idyllic, a tale of those
halcyon days in the emerald isle. The full story is somewhat less convivial
though. Bom to parents whose own personal strife ('confused with life and
religion' in Garrett's own words) led to their committing suicide just after her
birth, Eileen lived out the greater part of her childhood with her maternal Aunt
and Uncle. Though she expressed much love for her Uncle, whose death
during her childhood hurt her very much, she expresses only a grudging respect
for her aunt. It seems that for most of her youth she simply clashed with her
aunt. She describes going to bed early as a means of escape from her aunt (who
would often send her there anyway) but beyond this punishment she seems to
have found in her bedroom her own private world of imaginary friends and
places. It is clear from Garrett's childhood that many of our childhood causes
are not only evident, but explicitly acknowledged. Let us turn now to that most
enigmatic of physical mediums, Daniel Dunglas Home.
DanielDunglas Home
It is interesting to note of Home, one of most famous mediums of the
nineteenth century, that he suffered terribly from consumption as a child, and
was sent to live with an aunt in Edinburgh (from the United States) on the
advice of a doctor. Thus we have a loss of affectional bonds and isolation due
to illness, as well as the fact of the illness itself (Braude, 1986).
Doris Stokes
The late Doris Stoke's autobiographies (Voices in My Ear, More Voices in My Ear,
Innocent Voices in My Ear, A Host of Voices, and Whispering Voices), sold in the
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hundreds of thousands during the early eighties. I bought all of them as a lad.
Unfortunately Doris did not have a particularly traumatic childhood, though of
course living in Grantham, and during a war, life must have been hard.
Ann Walker
Author of the exotic , book Uttle One: Messagefrom Planet Heaven, Walker (1994)
says little explicitly about her childhood, but what she does say is highly
revealing. Walker does not appear to have been psychic from an early age, like
many mediums. Instead, 'During her darkest hour, at the age of thirty-seven,
when she had believed she could no longer carry the burden of emotional pain
that was a legacy from her brutal and traumatic childhood, White Arrow had
appeared to her. With his help and guidance she was slowly able to rebuild her
life and now, in turn, works full-time to help others overcome pain and
confusion of their own.' (Inside back cover). I shall not elaborate.
Jenny Cockell
Cockell could not be regarded as a psychic as such. Certainly she would not
define her life in that way. But nevertheless her book, Yesterday's Children, clearly
marks her out as a woman of considerable sensitivity, as well as a person of
high intelligence and integrity. In that book she provides details of her past life
memory of 'Mary', an Irish woman who she felt she had been in the early part
of this century. Having experienced dreams and images of life as Mary since
she was small, Cockell ultimately embarks on a search for Mary and the
children that Cockell felt sure Mary had left behind after her death. This search
inevitably brings her to Malahide, a small village north of Dublin, where a Mary
Sutton lived with her five children in the 1920's. Having identified her Mary as
Mrs. Sutton, Jenny then goes in search of Mary's children, who are now in
their fifties and sixties. Her search ultimately proves successful, and she is
reunited with her past life family. Cockell's case has attracted some interest
from parapsychologists. In a recent oral presentation of Cockell's case Mary
2 Even by paranormal standards.
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Rose Barrington reported her own investigation of the Cockell case. Having
interviewed Cockell in depth, and those closely connected with Cockell's story,
Rose Barrington then went on to interview more distant relatives in the family,
on the reasonable assumption that they would be unlikely to be party to any
deception. In addition. If Cockell's story is a conscious adult fabrication, then
distant relatives would report no particular knowledge of her past life memories
of Mary that Cockell claims occurred in childhood. Having interviewed an
elderly aunt and uncle, Barrington found that their memory of Jenny's youth
included events consistent with the notion that Mary was being spoken of in
Jenny's childhood. This in itself only establishes that Cockell's story is not an
adult fabrication; she could have course plotted the whole story from an early
age for some unfathomably obscure reason. Nevertheless, Cockell's books do
not convey the typical air of the psychic or medium. There is something about
them which suggests their authenticity implicitly.
As for Cockell's autobiographical details, it would appear that she was a bright,
intelligent child, growing up in a relatively normal household save for a rather
doctrinaire and stem father. Her relationship with her father does seem to have
been strained at times, but generally I can see no evidence for any clear pattern
of trauma in her childhood.
Miscellaneous mediums
I have more recently become acquainted with the autobiographies of the late
Tom Pilgrim, a spiritualist healer, and the late Leslie Flint, a more interesting
exemplar of the mediumistic art of direct voice . Pilgrim did not appear to have
a particularly traumatic childhood, but Flint's autobiography begins thus, 'In
spite of a childhood which would give any modem child psychiatrist
nightmares, or perhaps because of it, I have reached the age of fifty-nine
without falling prey to neurosis, psychosis or even the screaming meemies.' (p.
9). Interestingly, Flint notes that his mother gave birth to him out of wedlock,
a real social scandal in those days, and Flint was bom in a Salvation Army
3 Hie production of audible voices in thin air, or from a seance trumpet.
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Home in Hackney. However, Flint's father turns up, marries his mother, and
that's when the trouble starts,
Theirmarriage was doomedfrom the beginning. They werepitifullyyoungs
desperately poor, and thy had been coerced in to maturity by their elders
long before thy were ready for it. [SJomehow thy survived threeyears of
discord, fighting each other eveiy inch of the way until the 1914-18 war
broke out when I was threeyears old Myfather was one ofthefirst men in
St. Albans to volunteer for the army... simply to get away from the
domestic hell he lived in.' (pp. 10).
After the father left for the war, Flint's mother got a job in a munitions factory,
and with the money she would make from it would often spend her nights out
on the town with local men, even leaving young Flint on his own in the house
(aged only three or four) late at night, as Flint recalls, 'One of my earliest
memories, vivid to this day, is of waking up in the dark to find I was alone in
the room which was our home and of feeling scared and lonely and desperately
frightened that my mother had gone away like my father had gone and neither
of them would ever come back.' (pp. 11). Eventually, Flint's mother eloped
with another man and 'disappeared from my life'. He went to live with his
grandmother where she inculcated strong principles in to the young Flint with
a 'leathery hand', but nevertheless Flint respected his grandmother and it was at
the age of seven whilst still living with her that he had his first psychic
experience (seeing two soldiers come in to their kitchen following his Aunt
Nell, who had just lost her husband in France). And so he went on to become
a medium. Short of illness and long-term isolation, Flint's childhood seems to
show many of the kinds of traumas that have been appearing in our survey data
as significantly related to paranormal experience.
So much for the lives of the psychics about whom I have read. I don't claim
my reading is representative, but I wonder how many other 'professions' would
provide a similar showing for trauma in their list of autobiographies. It seems
to me that, thought not every psychic has a traumatic past, these
autobiographies are interesting. Of additional interest, the one psychic that I
personally know very well has a traumatic childhood past to match the very
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worst of childhoods, and that person certainly does think that the trauma they
experienced had a part to play in their development of psychic ability. Then
again I might yet make the acquaintance of ten more psychics for whom
childhood was all Ribena and Sticklebricks.
I now wish to move on and consider briefly the findings from the two other
areas of the thesis, my critique of the PBS, and the meta-analysis of the sheep-
goat effect. I won't dwell to long on either of these areas because I think that
the issues are fairly straightforward.
The measurement of paranormal belief
I think my critique of the PBS strongly suggested the existence of problems
with that scale, sufficient to warrant construction of a new scale. However, that
critique, in itself, could be passed off as mere armchair criticism, perhaps
accurate in principle but perhaps also inaccurate in reality. Tobacyk (1995b)
suggested that someone conduct a confirmatory factor analysis to test his view
of the PBS and mine. I did this, and I think it's fair to say that Tobacyk's
position is now also empirically bankrupt. My own initial five factor solution
isn't perfect, but it is a lot less imperfect than Tobacyk's, and the claim that the
PBS was oblique and not orthogonal was clearly demonstrated. Short of saying
that the British samples used were not representative of American samples (in
which case perhaps we should call the PBS the American PBS), I can not see
any way of escaping the conclusion that a new measure of paranormal belief is
needed. Although other measures do exist (e.g. Jones et al., 1977) I think they
are actually uniformly worse than the PBS. For me, at the present time only
Thalboume and Delin's (1993) Australian Sheep-Goat Scale has any merit, and
even there I am growing increasingly doubtful about its future.
The solution, that I expressed at length in chapter four, is to develop a new
scale. I won't labour the points raised in that chapter again, but I can see a
useful Ph.D. of the future centred around the attempt to build a paranormal
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beliefs and influences scale. I should add that I think in many ways the critique of
the PBS has been as important as the main empirical component of this thesis,
and I have rarely seen a paper by a researcher within the field now who does
not stop to qualify their use of the PBS with reference to Lawrence (1995a).
The Meta-analysis of the Sheep-Goat Effect
I cut my teeth on this paper, though it comes at the end ofmy thesis, and so it
has now been in the public domain for four years. It seems to have been a
useful paper, as it has citations numbering in excess of twenty at the last count.
My thoughts on the import of the data differ now from my originally published
thoughts. I once thought, as I think many parapsychologists do still, that the
sheep-goat effect tells us something genuinely causal about belief and its effect
upon scoring in ESP tests. For the most part I now think the sheep-goat effect
tells us merely that there is an association between belief and scoring in ESP
tests. This is ironic, as I did the meta-analysis so I could 'fix' at least one
genuinely causal path in to the model of paranormal belief being developed. I
discussed my reasons for thinking this at length in chapter 10, and I also
discussed the kinds of studies that I think do get us closer to seeing the effect
of belief upon ESP scoring, the Lovitts' (1981) design. What I would like to see
in future work with the sheep-goat effect is a) some new work! (the field seems
to have died a death), b) work using the Lovitts' design (or Lawrence and
Norman's (1997) modification of it), c) more work on the sheep-goat effect in
free-response settings. If researchers switch to examining the sheep-goat effect
using Lovitts' design then they will have to treat the sheep-goat effect as an
interesting effect in its own right, which is proper, rather than tacking it on as
an opportunistic analysis in some other study as has tended to happen. I very
much hope they do, because I think the meta-analysis at least shows that there
is something going on.
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Suggestions for future research
I'd like to think that my Ph.D. research hasn't just made a few hours work for
the print office. The critique of the PBS, and soon the factor analysis of the
PBS (Lawrence, Roe, and Williams, 1997), have and will change many
researchers' opinions of that scale. Until a new scale is devised I suspect
Thalboume and Delin's (1993) scale will form the stop-gap for many, but in
the long run a new scale is essential, if for no other reason than researchers will
need it to replicate my other work!
As for the modelling research reported here. I know for sure that two
researchers are following up my work already as reported in Lawrence et al.
(1995). Harvey Irwin, whose work formed the basis for my thesis, is one of
those attempting to follow up my work, and he has purchased a copy of EQS
version 5.0 to do it! When I heard that I felt that I must have done something
worthwhile! Simon Sherwood, a post-graduate at the Koestler Chair of
Parapsychology, gained an Economic and Social Research Council grant on the
basis of a proposal to follow up my work, once again using covariance structure
modelling. Clearly other people think that work of this general kind is useful
also.
The models I have examined here at the very least deserve further analysis.
They seem to me to have a great deal of potential for further research. One
thing that I would like to see done is a study to look at critical stages for the
development of paranormal experience as a result of trauma. Bryant (1995) has
shown that people who were sexually abused as children below the age of
seven report significantly more fantasy proneness than those traumatised
between seven and 14, who in turn report more fantasy proneness than those
never having reported sexual abuse. One can explain Bryant's findings in a
number of ways (e.g. false memory resulting from fantasy proneness), but it
seems to me that the results can be explained in terms of trauma causing
fantasy proneness with differential effect across the span of childhood
development. That the age of below seven coincides with certain broadly
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accepted cognitive developmental stages is interesting (Piaget's preoperational
period from 2-7, when representational, i.e. imaginally derived, thought takes
root). In any case, it seems to me that one might go on to ask whether the link
between trauma and fantasy and therefore paranormal experience is one which
derives only from a particularly sensitive stage in childhood like the period
from 2-7. I think future research may profitably explore this possibility.
Furthermore, I have thought throughout my modelling research that the
paranormal experience - trauma link is similar to the
dissociative/psychopathology - trauma link (e.g. Putnam, Guroff, Silberman,
Barban and Post, 1986). Of course we know that magical ideation is related to
paranormal belief (e.g. Thalboume, 1985). I wonder whether the dissociative
coping mechanisms used to deal with trauma reside along a continuum of
severity. Thus, mild trauma requires almost no coping, medium level trauma
perhaps elicits fantasy-based modes of coping (and thus paranormal
experience), and severe trauma elicits more psychopathological modes of
coping (e.g. multiple personality disorder). Researchers might want to look for
weak quadratic curves in the relation between paranormal experience, fantasy
and trauma as a way of shedding light on this possibility. To explore the
paranormal experience/trauma link in a different context one might conduct a
series of interviews with psychics. Likewise, if one had access to a substantial
amount of cash one could conduct a longitudinal study of trauma and
paranormal experience throughout childhood. This study would bring with it
its own difficulties, but it might just resolve the question of whether trauma
causes experience or fantasy 'causes' trauma and experience, at least for those
kinds of trauma susceptible to a false memory analysis.
For my own part I think that future research in to the link between trauma and
experience will need to be conducted by people working within the clinical
realm (counsellors, clinical psychologists), especially if sexual abuse and physical
abuse trauma are probed in to more deeply. Deeper probing increases the risk
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of abreactive responses, and these are things that only trained personnel should
deal with.
However, the personal consequences model offers much ground for further
work for anyone who may be interested. In particular the apparent sex
difference would seem to offer a fruitful starting place for future research. Why
is it that men respond so differently, or weakly, to paranormal experience?
Interviews with men and women who have experienced causal psychic events
for short episodes in their lives may be instructive here. A content or discourse
analysis on such material may help us see whether men characterise such
experiences as threatening, whilst women see them as integrative episodes that
enrich experience. These are interesting possibilities that extend beyond the
modelling framework developed in this thesis. And what of that framework?
I very much hope my use of covariance structure modelling has been viewed as
an advantage rather than a disadvantage in this thesis. I deliberately set out to
show the methodological utility of this technique in the analysis of correlational
data. At the very least no one can accuse me of having analysed my data in a
piecemeal or unorganised manner, and that advantage alone suggests to me that
covariance structure modelling has been worthwhile. Moreover, the analyses
have always been couched within an explicit theoretical framework, and no one
could now say they don't know what my perspective on paranormal belief is. I
think the clarity of theoretical exposition that comes from covariance structure
analysis will enable others to replicate my work, and extend it in to new areas,
with relative ease.
At the very least that is my belief.
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Relevant Survey Questionnaire Items
In this appendix I provide basic details for those scales which have been
constructed specially for this thesis. Though many other scales were included in
the large survey questionnaire (see Appendix II) I have not used them in the
thesis research, and thus do not dwell upon them.
Paranormal Experiences Scale
A principle factor analysis of this scale shows that it is unidimensional, with the
single factor accounting for around 40% of the variance in items (construct
reliability1 is 0.90). Corrected Item-total correlations are given in brackets,
showing that almost all items correlate highly with the unbiased total score.
Items are scored on a seven point scale from strongly disagree (1) to strongly
agree (7).
1. I have psi ability. (0.63)
2. At least once, I have been psychically aware of another's thoughts.
(0.68)
3. I am often able to find people's lost objects very easily. (0.51)
4. At least once I have successfully seen the future. (0.73)
5. At least once, I have been able to move objects with my mind alone.
(0.35)
6. I have experienced visions for which there were no normal causes.
(0.78)
7. At least once, I have experienced my 'self being separate from my
body. (0.55)
8. I have experienced telepathy with another person. (0.54)
1 Coefficient Alpha, calculated according to Kline (1993) formula 3.8.
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9. I have experienced a future event before it happened. (0.72)
10. I have 'seen' or dieard' the spirits of deceased people, friends and
relatives. (0.53)
11. At times objects that I knew could only be in one location, went
missing and were unaccountably found in another location. (0.52)
12. I am sometimes able to influence people, and objects just by thinking
about them. (0.61)
13. I am psychic. (0.62)
14. I possess marked psychokinetic ability. (0.49)
Edinburgh Paranormal Belief Scale
This 9 item scale was thought up by the author as a complement to the ASGS
scale. Principal factor analysis shows that a unidimensional solution is
appropriate, although perhaps lacking in explanatory power (variance extracted
= 31%, construct reliability = 0.8). Item-total correlations are acceptable for all
but the last item. Items are scored on a seven point scale from strongly
disagree (1) to strongly agree (7).
1. ESP is a real human ability. (0.53)
2. Friends of mine often tell me about their own psychic experiences.
(0.57)
3. I often read about psychic phenomena in the newspapers. (0.48)
4. I often read about other people's ability to 'see' in to the future. (0.54)
5. Psychics can often move objects with the power of the mind alone.
(0.56)
6. I often hear about psychokinetic events from friends and relatives.
(0.50)
7. Certain members ofmy family have strong psychic ability. (0.51)
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8. I could demonstrate ESP under controlled conditions. (0.43)
9. I could demonstrate PK under controlled conditions. (0.30)
Childhood Fantasy Scale
This 17 item scale is an adaptation of Myers' (1983) ICMI:C, and takes only
those questions which refer to childhood fantasy, or the ability to recollect
childhood memories. It is completed using the true/false response format. A
principle factor analysis with direct oblimin rotation of the scale as used here
shows that it is composed of two factors accounting for about 30% of the
... 2 j a
variability (construct reliability = 0.74). The first factor loads strongly on items
referring to pretence or make-believe, whilst the second loads on childhood
reminiscence and belief in fantasy creatures and realms. However, these two
factors are best represented as oblique and the correlation between them is
reasonably high at 0.38. Future research should be done to examine the
differential correlative power of these two subscales.
1. I can remember clearly one or more things that happened to me when
I was three years of age or younger. (0.43)
2. When I remember back to when I was six or seven years of age, I can
'see' and fiear' again what I saw and heard then, and can feel again the
feelings (happy, sad, afraid, etc.) I felt then. (0.60)
3. Although I have grown, I still feel almost the same as I did when I was
younger. (0.39)
4. When I was younger, I believed in such things as elves, witches,
leprechauns, fairies, etc. (0.55)
5. When I was younger, I would dream or make believe I was flying so
clearly that Ifelt as ifI really didfly. (0.38)
6. When I was younger, I enjoyed fairy tales. (0.35)
2 Calculated using the Kuder-Richardson 20 formula (3.9) given in Kline (1993), p. 40.
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7. When I was younger, I was very good at make believe and imagining.
(0.52)
8. When I was younger, I spent time thinking about such things as the
meaning of life and death. (0.50)
9. When I was a young child (below age 8) I liked playing make-believe
games such as cowboys, school teacher, husband/wife, etc. I like them
better than games without make-believe such as draughts, building
things, ball games, hopscotch, etc. (0.42)
10. When I was playing make-believe games as a young child, I would
make-believe so well thatwhat I pretended seemed real to me. (0.45)
11. When I was younger, I lived in a make-believe world much or most of the
time. (0.47)
12. When I was muchyounger, I believed that my doll(s) or stuffed animal(s)
were alive and had feelings (that is, they could feel pain, lonely, happy,
etc.). (0.54)
13. When I was younger, I had a pretend friend or companion (such as a
make-believe person, animal, or object) which I talked to, or took along
with me. (0.29)
14. When I was younger, I would at times pretend and in some ways
believe I was someone else such as a prince, princess, Snow White,
Peter Pan, etc. (0.43)
15. When I was younger, I would have liked to take ballet lessons or I do
or did enjoy taking ballet lessons. (0.20)
16. When I was younger, I would spend at least half of the time I was
awake pretending or imagining. (0.59)
17. At times, when I was younger, it was hard for me to tell if something
had actually happened or if I had imagined it happened. (0.21)
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Belief in the Paranormal
Survey Questionnaire
Dear Participant
The results of this survey will make a significant contribution to the study of belief in
the paranormal, and paranormal experiences. If you are very sceptical, and are
inclined to view this questionnaire as a waste of time, please do not. We need to
know as much about people's reasons for scepticism as we do for those who
believe.
The questionnaire takes about 45 minutes to complete- but I have split it in to five
convenient sections for you to fill in, that will not take more than 9 minutes
each. This way you could do one section every evening, at a time that suits you,
and have it all finished in a week. Enclosed with this questionnaire is a separate
test booklet, the FIRO:B, which I would also like you to fill in and return with this
questionnaire. Psychologists are very aware that when people fill in questionnaires
such as this, they sometimes give answers which they feel present them in a better
light. For example, one of the questions might be: "Have you ever told a lie?"- the
obvious answer to this is "Yes", but we still find that there are a number of people
who say "No". Therefore the questionnaire includes some items to check those
people on this. Remember that there are no right or wrong answers- this is not a
test of ability- so please fill in the questionnaire as honestly as possible.
Thank you for your assistance.
Section 1. (Takes approx. 9 minutes)
I.D.:
Date of Birth:
Sex: M / F
Age:
Marital Status: Widower(ee) / Single / Married / Divorced
Listed below are a number of statements. Each statement is accompanied by a seven point
scale. You must indicate to what extent you agree, or disagree, with each statement, in so far
as it applies to you. Please circle a number for each statement, according to the following
scale;
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Strongly Moderately Slightly Uncertain Slightly Moderately Strongly
Disagree Disagree Disagree Agree Agree Agree
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1. Some of my most vivid memories are called up by scents and smells.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
2. Sometimes thoughts and images come to me without the slightest effort.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
3. My thoughts often don't occur as words but as visual images.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
4. If I wish I can imagine that my body is so heavy that I could not move it if I wanted to.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
5. I am able to wander off into my thoughts while doing a routine task and actually forget that I am
doing the task, and find a few minutes later that I've completed it.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
6. If I wish I can imagine (or daydream) some things so vividly that they hold my attention as a good
movie or story does.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
7.1 can sometimes recollect certain past experiences in my life with such clarity and vividness that it
is like living them again or almost so.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
8. If I stare at a picture and then look away from it, I can sometimes see an image of the picture
almost as if I were still looking at it.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Please bear in mind the following basic definitions when completing this section;
Psi- general psychic ability, split into;
ESP- psychic reception of information without the use of known senses or reasoned guesses.
PK (Psychokinesis)- psychic influence on physical objects by force of mental will power
alone.
9. I have Psi ability.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
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10. ESP is a real human ability.
1 2 3 4 5 6
11. At least once, I have been psychically aware of another's thoughts.
1 2 3 4 5 6
12. Friends of mine often tell me about their own psychic experiences.
1 2 3 4 5 6
13.1 am often able to find other peoples lost objects very easily.
1 2 3 4 5 6
14.1 often read about psychic phenomena in the papers.
1 2 3 4 5 6
15. At least once, I have successfully 'seen' the future..
1 2 3 4 5 6
16. I often read about other people's ability to 'see' the future.
1 2 3 4 5 6
17. Psychics can often move objects with the power of the mind alone.
1 2 3 4 5 6
18. At least once, I have been able to move an object with my mind alone.
1 2 3 4 5 6
19. I often hear about psychokinetic events from friends and relatives.
1 2 3 4 5 6
20. Certain members of my family have strong psi ability.
1 2 3 4 5 6
21.1 have experienced visions for which there were no normal causes.
1 2 3 4 5 6
22. At least once, I have experienced my 'self being separate from my body.
1 2 3 4 5 6
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23.1 could demonstrate ESP under controlled conditions.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
24.1 could demonstrate PK under controlled conditions.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
25. I have experienced telepathy with another person.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
26.1 have experienced a future event before it happened.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
27.1 have 'seen' or 'heard' the spirits of deceased people, friends and relatives.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
28. At times, objects that I knew could only have been in one location, went missing and were
unaccountably found in another location.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
29.1 am sometimes able to influence people, and objects just by thinking about them.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
30. ESP is a fact.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
31. Life after death is a fact.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
32. Telepathy is possible.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
33. Precognition is possible.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
34. Contact with spirits is possible.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
35. Psychokinesis is a fact.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
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36.1 am psychic.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
37.1 possess marked psychokinetic ability.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
N.B. If you have had paranormal experiences that you feel you need to go into further details
about, please feel free to describe your experiences in more detail on separate sheets of
paper. Also, in some cases I may be interested in following up on your accounts of
paranormal experiences (perhaps in a personal interview at your home).
Tick this box if you would welcome further inquiries into your experiences □.
Section 2. (Takes approximately 9 minutes)
In the following section you are requested to indicate whether a statement is true or false
with respect to you. Do this by placing a TICK in the box (e.g. □) at the end of each
statement if that statement was true of you as a child. If the statement does not apply to you
as a child then leave the box blank.
38. I can remember clearly one or more things that happened to me when I was
three years of age or younger. □
39. When I remember back to when I was six or seven years of age, I can "see"
and "hear" again what I saw and heard then, and can feel again the
feelings (happy, sad, afraid, etc.) I felt then. □
40. Although I have grown, I still feel almost the same as I did when I was younger. □
41. When I was younger, I believed in such things as elves, witches, leprechauns,
fairies, etc. □
42. When I was younger, I would dream or make believe I was flying so clearly that
I felt as if I really did fly. □
43. When I was younger, I enjoyed fairy tales. □
44. When I was younger, I was very good at make-believe and imagining. □
45. When I was younger, I spent time thinking about such things as the
meaning of life and death. □
46. When I was a young child (below age 8) I liked playing make-believe games
such as cowboys, school teacher, husband/wife, etc. I liked them better
than games without make-believe such as draughts, building things,
ball games, hopscotch, etc. □
47. When I was playing make-believe games as a young child, I would
make-believe so well that what I pretended seemed real to me. □
48. When I was younger, I lived in a make-believe world much ormost of the time. □
49. When I was much younger, I believed that my doll(s) or stuffed animal(s)
were alive and had feelings (that is, they could feel pain, lonely, happy, etc.). □
50. When I was younger, I had a pretend friend or companion (such as a make-believe
person, animal, or object) which I talked to, or took along with me. □
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51. When I was younger, I would at times pretend and in some ways believe I was
someone else such as a prince, princess, Snow White, Peter Pan, etc. □
52. When I was younger, I would have liked to take ballet lessons or I do or did
enjoy taking ballet lessons. □
53. When I was younger, I would spend at least half of the time I was awake
pretending or imagining. □
54. At times, when I was younger, it was hard for me to tell if something had actually
happened or if I had imagined it happened. □
N.B. The remaining statements in this section require responses to be given in the format
found in section 1. i.e. please circle the number on the scale that best represents your degree
of agreement with that statement. The full scale is given again below as a reminder.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Strongly Moderately Slightly Uncertain Slightly Moderately Strongly
Disagree Disagree Disagree Agree Agree Agree
55. I am a logical person.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
56. I rarely use harsh language.
1 2 3 ..4 5 6
57.1 can make decisions easily.
1 2 3 ..4 5 6
58. I am generally aware of others feelings.
1 2 3 ..4 5 6
59. I am never conceited about my appearance.
1 2 3 ..4 5 6
60. I have a strong need for security.
1 2 3 ..4 5 6
61. I can be quite aggressive at times.
1 2 3 ..4 5 6
62.1 can easily express tender feelings.
1 2 3 ..4 5 6
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63. My feelings are not easily hurt.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
64. I am very neat and tidy.
1 2 3 4 5 6
65.1 am easily flattered.
1 2 3 4 5 6.
66. I am a forceful person.
1 2 3 4 5 6.
67. I am very sympathetic to the needs of others.
1 2 3 4 5 6.
68. On most important issues, I am willing to take a stand.
1 2 3 4 5 6.
69. People often say I have a gentle, almost childlike manner.
1 2 3 4 5 6.
70. I can be very affectionate.
1 2 3 4 5 6.
71. In most things I like to take the lead.
1 2 3 4 5 6.
72. I am really quite ambitious.
1 2 3 4 5 6.
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What follows next is a series of things that might happen to you now and again. I want you to
say whether you regard those events as good (you'd like them to happen more often and
would seek to encourage them) or bad ( you'd rather not experience them and would try to
avoid them). Once again, you must indicate your attitude on a seven point scale by circling
the number that best represents your feelings; N.B. the scale has changed and is given below
for your convenience!
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Very Moderately Slightly Indifferent Slightly Moderately Very
Bad Bad Bad Good Good Good
73. A smell or scent makes you vividly recall an old memory.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
74. A thought or image just pops into your head spontaneously.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
75. You are trying to solve a puzzle and find that it can only be solved using visual imagery- simply
thinking analytically or logically about it won't work.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
76. You try to imagine that your body is really heavy so well that you are sure you are paralysed!
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
77. You start to daydream while putting 1000 stamps on 1000 envelopes, and find much later that
you've finished, but you'd forgotten that you were doing such a boring task as your daydream was so
vivid.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
78. You fantasise about something happening so well that it is almost like watching a gripping movie.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
79. You think back to an event in your childhood and the memory is so vivid it is like actually being a
child again.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
80. You stare at a picture and then look away from it, but it still persists in your mind's eye.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
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Section 3. (Takes approx. 9 minutes)
In this section you will be asked questions of a personal nature. Be assured, information you
provide is administered in the strictest confidence by myself alone, and your name and
address will not be identified with this questionnaire (they are held separately and identified
with you only by an arbitrary I.D. number). You may wish to fill this section in privately - to
ensure that you give the most honest response free from the observation of others. If you
have further queries regarding this section please feel free to contact me on 031 650 3063,
and I will return your call at the earliest moment. Thank you.
The items in the following section describe a number of events which may disrupt a child's life and
affect their happiness and functioning. Using the response scale shown below please indicate how
many times ( if at all) each event occurred in your childhood or adolescence. Simply circle the
appropriate response in the response column to the right of each item.
Response scale
Number of occurrences: (A) none
(B) one
(C) two - five
(D) six - ten
(E) more than ten
81. Moved to a new town, started in a new school, had to
make new friends. A B C D E
82. Your parents were divorced or separated. A B C D E
83. A serious illness or operation which required you to be
hospitalised or miss much school. A B C D E
84. Had a major injury or accident. A B C D E
85. Had an abortion or miscarriage. A B C D E
86. A parent, sibling or other close family member was
hospitalised. A B C D E
87. Major injury or accident of parent, sibling or other
close family member. A B C D E
88. The death of a parent, sibling or other close personal friend. A B C D E
89. Major injury or accident of a close personal friend. A B C D E
90. Serious illness or operation of a close personal friend. A B C D E
91. The death of a close personal friend. A B C D E
92. Having your house destroyed or damaged (e.g. by
flood, fire or earthquake). A B C D E
93. Having your home robbed or vandalised. A B C D E
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94. Being confronted by a person and robbed of money
or belongings.
95. Being struck or beaten up by someone other than
a family member (e.g. school bully, stranger).
96. Being spanked by your parents or other caregivers
(e.g. older sibling, baby-sitter, etc.) severely enough
to cause bruises or other injuries.
97. Being struck or hit by your parents, other family
members or caregivers.
98. Being struck or hit by someone who wanted to injure
you and requiring medical attention (broken bone,
stitches, etc.).
99. Being yelled and screamed at by a parent, other
family member or caregiver.
100. Observed or hearing your parents fighting.
101. Seeing one of your parents being physically abused by
the other (struck, shoved, etc.)
102. Seeing one of your siblings being physically abused or
abused by your parent(s).
103. A family member or relative exposed their sex organs
to you when you did not want or expect this to
happen.
104. Another person exposed their sex organs to you when
did not want or expect this to happen.
105. A family member or relative touched you in a sexual way
when you did not want or expect this to happen.
106. Another person touched you in a sexual way when you
did not want or expect this to happen.
107. A family member or relative made you or asked you to
engage in a sexual activity when you did not want to.
108. Another person made you or asked you to engage in a
sexual activity when you did not want to.
109. You were isolated from friends or playmates for a long
period(s) of time (e.g. due to quarantine, chronic illness,
foreign travel, living on an isolated farm, etc.)
A B C D E
A B C D E
A B C D E














110. Continuation of item 109: Average period of time spent in
isolation was;
(A) no isolation; (B) 1 week; (C) 1 month;
(D) 6 months; (E) more than 1 year. A B C D E
N.B. Please complete the following section using the true-false tick method, i.e. leave the box
blank if the statement does not apply to you- tick ONLY if true of you.
111. Before voting I thoroughly investigate the qualifications of all candidates. □
112. It is sometimes hard for me to go on with my work if I am not encouraged. □
113. On occasions I have doubts about my ability to succeed in life. □
114.1 am always careful about my manner of dress. □
115. If I could get into a movie without paying and be sure I was not seen I would do it. □
116.1 like to gossip at times. □
117. No matter who I'm talking to, I'm a good listener. □
118. There have been occasions when I have taken advantage of someone else. □
119.1 always try to practice what I preach. □
120. I sometimes try to get even rather than forgive and forget. □
121.1 am always courteous, even to people who are disagreeable. □
122. There have been occasions when I have felt like smashing things. □
123.1 never resent being asked to return favour. □
To answer the next question you must CIRCLE one of the seven possible responses to
indicate your level of life satisfaction.








Section 4. (Takes approximately 9 minutes)
In the following section you will be given a series of statements that may or not be true of
you. In filling in this section use the standard agree-disagree scale by circling the number
that best represents your degree of agreement with that statement. The scale is given below
for your convenience;
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Strongly Moderately Slightly Uncertain Slightly Moderately Strongly
Disagree Disagree Disagree Agree Agree Agree
125.1 can usually acheive what I want when I work hard for it.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
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126. Once I make plans I am almost certain to make them work.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
127. I prefer games involving some luck over games of pure skill.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
128. I can leam almost anything if I set my mind to it.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
129. My major accomplishments are entirely due to my hard work and ability.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
130. I usually do not set goals because I have a hard time following through on them.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
131. Bad luck has sometimes prevented me from achieving things.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
132. Almost anything is really possible for me if I really want it.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
133. Most of what will happen in my career is beyond my control.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
134. I find it pointless to keep working on something that is too difficult for me.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
135. In my personal relationships, the other person usually has more control over the relationship
than I do.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
136. I have no trouble making and keeping friends.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
137. I'm not good at guiding the course of a conversation with several others.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
138. I can usually develop a close personal relationship with someone I find appealing.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
139. I can usually steer a conversation towards the topics I want to talk about.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
140. When I need assistance in something, I often find it difficult to get others to help.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
141. If there is someone I want to meet I can usually arrange it.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
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142. I often find it hard to get my point of view across to others.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
143. In attempting to smooth over a disagreement I can sometimes make it worse.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
144.1 find it easy to play an important part in most group situations.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
145. By taking an active part in political and social affairs we, the people, can control world events.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
146. The average citizen can have an influence on government decisions.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
147. It is difficult for us to have much control over the things politicians do in office.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
148. Bad economic conditions are caused by world events that are beyond our control.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
149. With enough effort we can wipe out political corruption.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
150. One of the major reasons we have wars is because people don't take enough interest in politics.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
151. There is nothing we, as consumers, can do to keep the cost of living going higher.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
152. It is impossible to have any real influence over what big businesses do.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
153.1 prefer to concentrate my energy on other things rather than on solving the world's problems.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
154. In the long run we, the voters, are responsible for bad government on a national as well as local
level.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
155. I am usually completely bored.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
156. Life seems always exciting to me.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
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157. I have no goals in life at all.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
158. My personal existence is utterly meaningless and without purpose.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
159. Every day is constantly new and different.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
160. If I could choose I would prefer never to have been bom.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
161. After retiring, I would do some of the exciting things I always wanted to do.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
162. In achieving life goals I have made no progress whatsoever.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
163. My life is emtpy, filled only with despair.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
164. If I should die today, I would feel that my life has been very worthwile.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
165. In thinking of my life I often wonder why I exist.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
166. As I view the world in relation to my life, the world completely confuses me.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
167. I am a very responsible person.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
168. Concerning peoples freedom to make their own choices, I believe people have free will.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
169. With regard to death, I am prepared and not afraid to die.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
170. With regard to suicide, I have thought of it seriously as a way out of life's problems.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
171. I have a great ability to find meaning, purpose, or mission in life.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
172. My life is in my hands and I am in control of it.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
173. Facing my daily tasks is a source of pleasure and satisfaction.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
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174.1 have discovered no mission or purpose in my life.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Section 5. (Takes approx. 9 minutes)
In this last section all questions require a response using the familiar 7 point scale. Please
circle a number for each statement, according to the following scale;
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Strongly Moderately Slightly Uncertain Slightly Moderately Strongly
Disagree Disagree Disagree Agree Agree Agree
175. As a child my parents use to 'go along' with my fantasies.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
176. My parents discouraged my attempts at make-believe when I was young.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
177. My parents emphasized concrete, analytically thinking over more creative fantastic 'thought'.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
178.1 can remember my parents showing indifference at my attempts to engage them in my pretend
games.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
179. My parents use to laugh and giggle when I played 'mums and dads', often joining in.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
180. My parents used to play the old trick of food-as-aeroplane 'coming in to land' in my mouth.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
181. If I pretended to shoot my father, playing cowboys and indians, he would usually drop down
'dead'.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
182. If I 'set up shop' as a youngster mum would often come in and buy make-believe 'goods' from
me.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
183. I would often hear my parents telling the neighbours about my imaginary exploits and fantasies.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
184. My parents often read bedtime stories, vividly telling us of all manner of children's heroes and
villains.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
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185.1 think that if I had had an imaginary friend as a child, my parents would have been a little
worried.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
In what follows you will find a series of sentences or words that may describe how you have
felt over the past month. All you have to do is indicate, using the scale provided, how OFTEN
you have felt those things (over the past month). There are five choices for how often you
have felt each feeling or sentiment,-
Not at all □ Occasionally □ Some of the time □ Often □ All of the time □
Over the past MONTH, how OFTEN have you experienced the feeling
186. My life is on the right track.
Not at all □ Occasionally □ Some of the time □ Often □
187.1 seem to be left alone when I don't want to be.
Not at all □ Occasionally □ Some of the time □ Often □
188.1 feel I can do whatever I want to.
Not at all □ Occasionally □ Some of the time □ Often □
189.1 think clearly and creatively.
Not at all □ Occasionally □ Some of the time □ Often □
190. I feel like a failure.
Not at all □ Occasionally □ Some of the time □ Often □
191. Nothing seems very much fun any more.
Not at all □ Occasionally □ Some of the time □ Often □
192. I like myself.
Not at all □ Occasionally □ Some of the time □ Often □
193. I can't be bothered doing anything.
Not at all □ Occasionally □ Some of the time □ Often □
194. I feel close to people around me.
Not at all □ Occasionally □ Some of the time □ Often □
195. I feel as though the best years of my life are over.
Not at all □ Occasionally □ Some of the time □ Often □
196. My future looks good.
Not at all □ Occasionally □ Some of the time □ Often □
197. I have lost interest in other people and don't care about them.
Not at all □ Occasionally □ Some of the time □ Often □
that...
All of the time □
All of the time □
All of the time □
All of the time □
All of the time □
All of the time □
All of the time □
All of the time □
All of the time □
All of the time □
All of the time □
All of the time □
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198.1 have energy to spare.
Not at all □ Occasionally □ Some of the time □ Often □ All of the time □
199. I smile and laugh a lot.
Not at all □ Occasionally □ Some of the time □ Often □ All of the time □
200.1 wish I could change some parts of my life.
Not at all □ Occasionally □ Some of the time □ Often □ All of the time □
201. My thoughts go around in useless circles.
Not at all □ Occasionally □ Some of the time □ Often □ All of the time □
202.1 can handle any problems that come up.
Not at all □ Occasionally □ Some of the time □ Often □ All of the time □
203. My life seems stuck in a rut.
Not at all □ Occasionally □ Some of the time □ Often □ All of the time □
204. I feel loved and trusted.
Not at all □ Occasionally □ Some of the time □ Often □ All of the time □
205.1 feel there must be something wrong with me.
Not at all □ Occasionally □ Some of the time □ Often □ All of the time □
Over the past MONTH how OFTEN have you felt that...
206. satisfied
Not at all □ Occasionally □ Some of the time □ Often □ All of the time □
207. lonely
Not at all □ Occasionally □ Some of the time □ Often □ All of the time □
208. free-and-easy
Not at all □ Occasionally □ Some of the time □ Often □ All of the time □
209. clear-headed
Not at all □ Occasionally □ Some of the time □ Often □ All of the time □
210. helpless
Not at all □ Occasionally □ Some of the time □ Often □ All of the time □
211. impatient
Not at all □ Occasionally □ Some of the time □ Often □ All of the time □
212. useful
Not at all □ Occasionally □ Some of the time □ Often □ All of the time □
213. depressed
Not at all □ Occasionally □ Some of the time □ Often □ All of the time □
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214. loving
Not at all □ Occasionally □ Some of the time □ Often □ All of the time □
215. hopeless
Not at all □ Occasionally □ Some of the time □ Often □ All of the time □
216. optimistic
Not at all □ Occasionally □ Some of the time □ Often □ All of the time □
217. withdrawn
Not at all □ Occasionally □ Some of the time □ Often □ All of the time □
218. enthusiastic
Not at all □ Occasionally □ Some of the time □ Often □ All of the time □
219. good-natured
Not at all □ Occasionally □ Some of the time □ Often □ All of the time □
220. discontented
Not at all □ Occasionally □ Some of the time □ Often □ All of the time □
221. confused
Not at all □ Occasionally □ Some of the time □ Often □ All of the time □
222. confident
Not at all □ Occasionally □ Some of the time □ Often □ All of the time □
223.tense
Not at all □ Occasionally □ Some of the time □ Often □ All of the time □
224. understood
Not at all □ Occasionally □ Some of the time □ Often □ All of the time □
225. insignificant
Not at all □ Occasionally □ Some of the time □ Often □ All of the time □
Thank you for your generous assistance. You have been one of the participants in a study which will
better enable parapsychologists to understand the causes and consequences of belief in the
paranormal.
If you wish to recieve details of the results of this study, including a brief run down of your own
results, please tick □.
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Appendix III
Correlation matrices and standard deviations for the modelling analyses.
Confirmatory Factor Analyses (Chapter 5)
Part I - Correlations and standard deviations for 26 PBS items (five-point scale) N=131
TOB1 TOB2 TOB3 TOB4 TOB5 TOB6
TOB1 1.000
TOB2 0.305 1.000
TOB3 0.417 0.481 1.000
TOB4 0.044 0.297 0.212 1.000
TOB5 0.420 0.564 0.442 0.145 1.000
TOB6 0.093 0.215 0.231 0.122 0.389 1.000
TOB7 0.128 0.256 0.131 0.340 0.183 -0.015
TOB8 0.465 0.154 0.461 0.168 0.158 0.035
TOB9 0.360 0.708 0.519 0.189 0.591 0.323
TOB10 0.367 0.425 0.625 0.103 0.294 0.248
TOB11 0.133 0.264 0.226 0.694 0.235 0.172
TOB12 0.453 0.405 0.382 0.159 0.726 0.318
TOB13 0.080 0.171 0.215 0.158 0.181 0.461
TOB14 0.182 0.304 0.182 0.333 0.307 0.096






























































TOB16 0.216 0.166 0.787 0.428 0.245 0.517
TOB17 0.172 0.279 0.422 0.568 0.256 0.386
TOB18 0.428 0.133 0.122 0.073 0.811 0.193
TOB19 0.177 0.050 0.395 0.218 0.237 0.525
TOB20 -0.006 -0.119 0.202 -0.059 0.035 0.258
TOB21 0.431 0.289 0.500 0.375 0.360 0.599
TOB22 0.136 0.798 0.178 0.206 0.244 0.201
TOB23 0.298 0.232 0.466 0.162 0.202 0.404
TOB24 0.032 0.300 0.458 0.717 0.233 0.363
TOB25 0.346 0.222 0.529 0.320 0.270 0.520
TOB26 0.329 0.175 0.396 0.309 0.348 0.513
TOB13 TOB14 TOB15 TOB16 TOB17 TOB18
TOB13 1.000
TOB14 0.124 1.000
TOB15 0.136 0.079 1.000
TOB16 0.187 0.281 0.174 1.000
TOB17 0.169 0.276 0.150 0.452 1.000
TOB18 0.259 0.416 0.100 0.229 0.253 1.000
TOB19 0.126 0.197 0.108 0.436 0.119 0.188
TOB20 0.239 0.047 -0.090 0.227 -0.042 0.072
TOB21 0.137 0.469 0.292 0.554 0.361 0.364
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TOB22 0.046 0.124 0.659 0.114 0.218 0.167
TOB23 0.053 0.231 0.291 0.490 0.157 0.195
TOB24 0.196 0.150 0.250 0.423 0.596 0.195
TOB25 0.112 0.341 0.146 0.534 0.451 0.257
TOB26 0.163 0.385 0.182 0.454 0.356 0.331
TOB19 TOB20 TOB21 TOB22 TOB23 TOB24
TOB19 1.000
TOB20 0.362 1.000
TOB21 0.446 0.053 1.000
TOB22 0.048 -0.103 0.252 1.000
TOB23 0.267 0.048 0.452 0.201 1.000
TOB24 0.172 0.019 0.423 0.222 0.132 1.000
TOB25 0.413 0.245 0.478 0.117 0.329 0.361





TOB1 = 1.294, TOB2 = 1.097, TOB3 = 1.220, TOB4 = 0.8, TOB5 = 1.188, TOB6 = 0.957, TOB7 =
1.027, TOB8 = 1.424, TOB9 = 1.180, TOBIO = 1.336, TOB11 = 1.020, TOB12 = 1.201, TOB13 =
1.104, TOB 14 = 0.980, TOB15 = 1.432, TOB16 = 1.159, TOB17 = 1.038, TOB18 =1.014, TOB19 =
266
1.199, TOB20 = 1.032, TOB21 = 1.093, TOB22 = 1.406, TOB23 = 1.005, TOB24 = 1.080, TOB25
1.196, TOB26 = 1.010
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Part II - Correlation matrix and standard deviations for 26 item PBS (seven point scale)
N = 225
qi q2 q3 q4 q^ q6
qi 1.000
q2 0.306 1.000
q3 0.445 0.506 1.000
q4 0.134 0.264 0.267 1.000
q5 0.251 0.515 0.333 0.229 1.000
q6 0.153 0.346 0.252 0.337 0.367 1.000
q? 0.201 0.387 0.271 0.372 0.319 0.303
q8 0.330 0.296 0.550 0.134 0.111 0.195
q9 0.220 0.715 0.416 0.248 0.543 0.367
qlO 0.295 0.378 0.571 0.196 0.322 0.297
qll 0.116 0.211 0.145 0.608 0.201 0.327
ql2 0.395 0.452 0.361 0.155 0.578 0.313
ql3 0.020 0.121 0.069 0.173 0.213 0.545
ql4 0.243 0.339 0.205 0.313 0.274 0.289
ql5 0.391 0.095 0.224 0.074 -0.053 -0.049
ql6 0.217 0.687 0.336 0.216 0.623 0.361
qi? 0.274 0.309 0.526 0.229 0.288 0.239
ql8 0.123 0.272 0.226 0.448 0.146 0.245
ql9 0.389 0.300 0.202 0.174 0.330 0.158
q20 0.060 0.237 0.074 -0.070 0.271 0.245
q2i 0.204 0.346 0.277 0.338 0.284 0.229
q22 0.313 0.163 0.329 0.134 0.034 0.050
q23 -0.244 -0.212 -0.188 0.034 -0.143 -0.075
q24 0.287 0.309 0.619 0.223 0.298 0.270
q25 0.346 0.447 0.447 0.183 0.364 0.251
q26 0.332 0.408 0.486 0.235 0.358 0.269
q? q8 q9 qlO qll qi2
q? 1.000
q8 0.161 1.000
q9 0.357 0.209 1.000
qlO 0.238 0.395 0.328 1.000



































































































































































ql9 q20 q21 q22
ql9 1.000
q20 0.195 1.000
q21 0.363 0.212 1.000
q22 0.097 -0.107 0.156 1.000
q23 q24
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q23 -0.107 -0.185 -0.123 -0.009 1.000
q24 0.125 0.085 0.290 0.224 -0.050 1.000
q25 0.454 0.206 0.495 0.089 -0.145 0.362





VI = 1.585, V2 = 1.574, V = 1.410, V5 = 1.575, V6 = 1.624, V7 = 1.609, V8 = 1.880, V9 = 1.523, V10 = 1.847, VI1 = 1.539,
V12 = 1.570, V13 = 1.522, V14 = 1.459, V15 = 1.870, V16 = 1.606, V17 = 1.563, V18 = 1.460, V19 = 1.540, V20 = 1.338, V21
= 1.501, V22 = 1.713, V23 = 1.388, V24 = 1.558, V25 = 1.578, V26 = 1.470
First Edinburgh Student Study (Chapter 6) N= 80
Trauma Fantasy Experience
Fantasy .356 — —
Experience .343 .315 —
Belief .215 .271 .534
Standard Deviations: Trauma = 8.13, Fantasy — 6.46, PB- 5.75, PE= 9.55
Society for Psychical Research Survey (from chapter 7) N=58
Experience EPBS ASGS-B STCE
EPBS 0.551 — — —
ASGS-B 0.316 0.373 — —
STCE 0.440 0.168 -0.051 —
Fantasy 0.272 0.271 0.180 0.131
Standard deviations:
PES = 18.027, EPBS = 7.455, ASGS-B = 7.291, CF = 3.154, STCE = 10.209
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Edinburgh Survey (Chapter 8)
Part 1 - Irwin vs. Lawrence (Basic Models) N=129.
PES EPBS ASGS-B CF STCE
PES 1.000
EPBS 0.723 1.000
ASGS-B 0.508 0.676 1.000
CF 0.476 0.355 0.245 1.000
STCE 0.250 0.273 0.175 0.274 1.000
Standard deviations:
PES = 16.742, EPBS = 9.602, ASGS-B = 8.767, CF = 3.315, STCE = 7.305
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ASGS-B 0.508 0.676 1.000
CF 0.476 0.355 0.245 1.000
FAMPHYS 0.184 0.227 0.161 0.209 1.000
LOSSFRI 0.125 0.099 -0.044 0.018 -0.005 1.000
LOSSFAM 0.019 0.037 0.049
0.074
0.044 0.452 1.000
ISOLAT 0.196 0.170 0.124 0.223 0.100 0.302 0.249 1.000
ILLACC 0.064 0.068 0.051 0.102 0.048 0.051 0.156 0.298 1.000
PARDIV 0.134 0.117 0.101 0.281 0.163 0.181 -0.010 0.039 -0.093 1.000
LOSSHOM 0.143 0.024 -0.014 0.051 0.099 0.138 0.042 0.006 0.040 0.223 1.000
ROBBER 0.114 0.142 0.046 0.083 0.139 -0.049 0.043 0.010 -0.026 0.063 0.145 1.000
Standard deviations:
PES = 16.742, EPBS = 9.602, ASGS-B = 8.767, CF = 3.315, FAMPHYS = 4.401,
LOSSFRI = 1.288, LOSSFAM = 1.656, ISOLAT = 2.469, ILLACC = 0.650, PARDIV
= 0.649, LOSSHOM = 1.121, ROBBER = 0.317.
Chapter 9 Correlations and standard deviations for all analyses
Part I - Whole sample Personal Consequences Model (N=129)
pes epbs asgs-b life 3 soc-p soc
pes 1.000
epbs 0.723 1.000
asgs-b 0.508 0.676 1.000
life 3 0.020 0.034 0.057 1.000
soc-p 0.005 -0.061 -0.006 0.289 1.000
SOC-l 0.176 0.076 0.028 0.301 0.351 1.000
pil 0.066 -0.017 0.032 0.553 0.426 0.483





PES = 16.742, EPBS = 9.602, ASGS-B = 8.767, LIFE3 = 0.906, SOC-P = 7.341, SOC-I
= 8.763, PIL = 14.634, WELLBE = 22.353
Correlations and S.D.'s for PCM Model for Females (N=71)
pes epbs asgs-b life 3 soc-p soc-i
pes 1.000
epbs 0.662 1.000
asgs-b 0.523 0. 663 1.000
life 3 0.116 0.169 0.161 1.000
soc-p 0.165 0.058 0.179 0.307 1. 000
soc-i 0.300 0.178 0.093 0.354 0.357 1.000
pii 0.203 0.111 0.147 0.573 0.447 0.599






PES = 16.806, EPBS = 9.289, ASGS-B = 7.715, LIFE3 = 0.971, PIL = 15.444, WELLBE =
25.966, SOC-P = 6.903, SOC-I = 9.848.
Correlations and S.D.'s for PCM Model for Males (N=45)
pes epbs asgs-b life 3 soc-p soc-i
pes 1.000
epbs 0.791 1.000
asgs-b 0.508 0.714 1.000
life 3 -0.090 -0.157 0.023 1.000
soc-p -0.158 -0.126 -0.113 0.225 1.000
soc-i -0.009 -0.048 0.058 0.102 0.348 1.000
pil -0.015 -0.115 -0.046 0.470 0.345 0.258





PES = 15.441, EPBS = 9.614, ASGS-B = 10.526, LIFE3 = 0.809, PIL = 12.381, WELLBE =
15.248, SOC-P = 7.921, SOC-I = 6.918
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Appendix IV
The Tobacyk (1988) Revised Paranormal Belief Scale:
N.B. The item numbers are exactly the same as the variable numbers
("v's") given in figures 1, 2, and 3.









1. The soul continues to exist though the body may die.
2. Some individuals are able to levitate and travel (lift) objects through mental forces.
3. Black magic really exists.
4. Black cats can bring you bad luck.
5. Your mind or soul can leave your body and travel (astral projection).
6. The abominable snowman of Tibet exists.
7. Astrology is a way to accurately predict the future.
8. There is a devil.
9. Psychokinesis, the movement of objects through psychic powers, does exist.
10. Witches do exist.
11. If you break a mirror, you will have bad luck.
12. During altered states, such as sleep or trances, the spirit can leave the body.
13. The Loch Ness monster of Scotland exists.
14. The horoscope accurately tells a person's future.
15.1 believe in God.
16. A person's thoughts can influence the movement of a physical object.
17. Through the use of formulas and incantations, it is possible to cast spells on persons.
18. The number "13" is unlucky.
19. Reincarnation does occur.
20. There is life on other planets.
21. Some psychics can accurately predict the future.
22. There is a heaven and a hell.
23. Mind reading is not possible.
24. There are actual cases ofwitchcraft.
25. It is possible to communicate with the dead.
26. Some people have an unexplained ability to predict the future.
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MODELLING CHILDHOOD CAUSES OF PARANORMAL
BELIEF AND EXPERIENCE: CHILDHOOD TRAUMA AND
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Summary—Using covariance structure modelling we sought to test the childhood factors model of
paranormal belief development outlined by Irwin (.Journal ofAmerican Society-for Psychical Research, 86,
199-208; 87, 1-39). Eighty-two students at the University of Edinburgh were administered three
questionnaires relating to childhood trauma, childhood fantasy, and paranormal belief and experience.
Eighty suitable questionnaires were completed and analysed using EQS (Bentler, EQS Structural Relations
Program Manual, 1989). The first test of Irwin's model showed that the model did not provide an adequate
fit to our sample data. In particular, EQS suggested dropping a direct causal link from fantasy to belief and
adding a direct link from trauma and paranormal experience. Both modifications were intuitively plausible
and were implemented in a post hoc modified model. This new model gave an excellent fit to the data. In
addition, our study replicated Irwin's (JournaloftheAmerican Societyfor Psychical Research, 86,199-208,
1992) finding of a small but significant correlation between childhood trauma and paranormal belief, and
extends previous findings showing a small correlation between childhood fantasy and paranormal belief (and
experience) to the realm of childhood fantasy, thus addressing the childhood factors model proper. In
conclusion, we offer up our new model for future attempts at replication, and strongly advocate the switch
to a model building approach to better understand paranormal belief and experience.
INTRODUCTION
"When it's grey I know all I want to do—resort to make believe. "
(From the song A Love for all Seasons, by Right Said Fred.)
Any particular person's history of paranormal belief and experience must have some beginning, and
some causative factor responsible for that beginning. Until quite recently researchers on the topic of
paranormal belief (PB) and experience (PE) remained unaware, or uninterested, in the possible early
developmental causes of PB and PE, much of the research in this area reflecting what Irwin (1993)
calls the cognitive deficits hypothesis—the view, influenced by a broadly sceptical research agenda,
that those with high PB or PE are '... illogical, irrational, credulous, uncritical, and foolish' (Irwin,
1993, p. 16). Recently, however, research conducted by Irwin (1992) has shown the potential
importance of childhood factors underlying PB, and so it is to a subset of these potentially causative
correlates ofPB and PE that our paper is addressed—namely, childhood trauma and childhood fantasy.
Research addressing the childhood causes of PB and PE can be traced back to a small study reported
by Wilson and Barber (1983). In their study Wilson and Barber (1983) interviewed 27 women whom
they had rated as excellent hypnotic 5s (with a comparison group of 25 women not so rated). The
interviews centred around childhood and adult memories, fantasies and psychic experiences. As
Wilson and Barber (1983) note, with reference to their excellent hynotic 5s:
"Their extensive and deep involvement in fantasy seems to be their basic characteristic and their
other major talents—their ability to hallucinate voluntarily, their superb hypnotic performances,
their vivid memories of their life experiences, and their talents as psychics or sensitives—seem
to derive from or to grow out of their profound fantasy life." (Wilson & Barber, 1983, p. 340).
One of the most significant factors in differentiating between fantasisers and non-fantasisers in
Wilson's and Barber's group was the incidence of childhood trauma [previously found by Hilgard
* To whom all correspondence should be addressed.
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(1970,1974)]. Of the 27 fantasisers, nine (33%) reported having experienced some difficult or stressful
event in their early life, ranging from physical abuse by parents, or a mother with emotional problems,
to unstable living conditions. No Ss in the comparison group reported having experienced any
childhood trauma [see Lynn and Rhue (1988) for a replication].
Since Wilson and Barber's study, two studies relating fantasy proneness to PB have been conducted
by Irwin (1990, 1991). In the first study, Irwin (1990) administered Myers' (1983) version of the
Inventory of Childhood Memories and Imaginings (ICMI:C) to 92 people, along with Tobacyk and
Milford's (1983) Revised Paranormal Belief Scale (PBS). Irwin found Pearson correlations of 0.48,
0.58, and 0.43 for the Psi Belief, Spiritualism, and Precognition subscales of the PBS respectively
with scores on the ICMI:C (all significant at P < 0.001), suggesting a definite link between imaginal
involvement and the core constructs of PB. In a follow up study, Irwin (1991) administered the ICMI:C
and PBS to a sample of 122 students and found a similar pattern of correlations—the PBS Psi Belief,
Spiritualism, and Precognition subscales correlated 0.40, 0.42 and 0.34 with the ICMI:C (all
P< 0.001). Another study by Rao (1992) looked at the relationship between fantasy proneness and
PE alone as measured by Neppe's (1983) Subjective Paranormal Experiences Questionnaire (SPEQ).
Rao found a correlation of 0.46 (P<0.01) between the SPEQ and the ICMI:C, replicating Wilson
and Barber's finding that fantasy prone participants reported more psychic experiences.
On the topic of childhood trauma and PB Irwin (1992) administered the revised PBS (Tobacyk,
1988), and the Survey of Traumatic Childhood Experiences (STCE) (Council & Edwards, 1987) to
72 students. He found a Pearson correlation of 0.21 (P < 0.05 < 0.08) between the full scale PBS score
(including items of dubious paranormality about the Loch Ness monster and life on other planets) and
the STCE; a non-significant result which is at least suggestive. Those items most strongly correlated
with PB were the STCE items relating to intrafamilial physical abuse (r = 0.31, P < 0.05). Thus there
is evidence to support the view that childhood trauma has an influence on the subsequent development
of PB. In suggesting his own model of these relationships Irwin concludes:
"... Fantasy proneness ... is a central mediating variable in the development of paranormal
beliefs. Fantasy proneness may be kindled in early childhood through parental encouragement
and/or the incidence of traumatic experiences. In particular, the latter will instill a strong need
for interpersonal control. Given a conducive social context, fantasy proneness and the associated
need for control may lead to the formation of paranormal beliefs. Fantasy proneness ... also may
be a factor in the occurrence and/or acknowledgement ofparapsychological experiences." (Irwin,
1992, p. 206).
Figure 1 presents a reduced version of Irwin's childhoodfactors model, showing only those relations
between factors that we have chosen to model in the present study. With respect to his larger model
Irwin notes, "Most of the relationships indicated by the arrows have now been documented in the
empirical literature, but there remains a need for a single study entailing a path analysis of all variables
encompassed by the model." (Irwin, 1992, p. 205).
In this study we attempt a partial confirmation of Irwin's model, using a more advanced technique
than path analysis, namely covariance structure modelling (CSM) using EQS (Bentler, 1989), a
program specifically designed to implement and test structural equation models using covariances.
Using the reduced version of Irwin's model (see Fig. 1) we aim to test the causal structure underlying
the relations between childhood trauma, childhood fantasy, PE and PB. No study has to date looked
specifically and exclusively at the role of childhood fantasy involvement in the development of PB
and PE, but we feel that an emphasis on childhood fantasy, as opposed to the mixed effects of child
and adult fantasy (as measured by the ICMI) is important given the proximity of childhood fantasy,
and its pertinence to traumatic events in childhood.
METHOD
Subjects
The respondents were 82 students and friends of the last four authors, all at the University of
Edinburgh. Unfortunately no information on sex or age was taken, but the sample was broadly similar
to those that one usually gets from university students.
1_77
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Fig. 1. A simplification of Irwin's (1992) model depicting the childhood causes of paranormal belief.
Materials
A 61-item questionnaire was constructed using items from the following three scales:
(1) Survey of Traumatic Childhood Experiences (STCE). This scale, developed by Council and
Edwards (1987), comprises 30 items dealing with events that may cause trauma in a child's
life. The full 30 item scale was used in this study. The scale has items relating to intrafamilial
sexual and physical abuse, loss related to friends and family, extrafamilial sexual abuse,
assault, loss of home and property, isolation and personal malady, adolescent abortion/mis¬
carriage, and parental divorce/separation. Responses are scored on a five point scale of
frequency, with (A) none, (B) one, (C) two to five, (D) six to ten, and (E) more than ten
traumatic experiences.
(2) Australian Sheep-Goat Scale (ASGS). This scale comprises 18 items referring to three
common components of PB; ESP, PK, and Life after Death. Thalboume and Delin (1993)
report reasonable reliability and some evidence showing concurrent validity. Items refer to
PB and PE and were marked by a seven point scale.
(3) Childhood fantasy. This construct was measured using only those items from Myers' (1983)
ICMI:C that refer explicitly to childhood fantasy. Items are scaled dichotomously, in the
true/false format. High scores indicate high fantasy.
Procedure
Participants were given the three-scale questionnaire to fill in, along with a blank envelope for the
completed questionnaire to be placed in to preserve the participant's anonymity. Participants were
asked to fill in the questionnaire as honestly as possible. Once the questionnaire was completed and
sealed in the envelope the participant was briefed about the nature of the study. No participants
reported having any particular problem with the content of the scales, though some pointed out that
the Australian Sheep-Goat Scale was quite contorted in its wording. Once the data had been collected
they were entered in to Statview for calculation of the correlation matrix, before being entered into
EQS for covariance structure modelling. At this stage two participants' questionnaires were excluded
from the analysis, as they constituted extreme outliers on Trauma and one of the Ss had (amongst other
unlikelies) claimed to have had more than ten abortions/miscarriages! Consequently, we suspected
that at least one of the two outliers was not responding honestly. The remaining sample comprises
80 individuals.
Statistical methods
Correlational data from this study were analysed using the technique of covariance structure
analysis using EQS (Bentler, 1989). EQS combines factor analysis, multiple regression, and path
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Table I, Pearson correlations between the four main variables









* P< 0.06 >0.05; ** PC0.05: *** PC0.01; ***** P < 0.0001.
Standard deviations: Trauma = 8.13. Fantasy = 6.46. PB = 5.75.
PE = 9.55.
analysis techniques, providing a powerful system to test and confirm various causal or structural
models. The most important output from a test of any causal model is a list of goodness-of-fit statistics,
indicating how well the hypothesized model accounts for the observed correlational structure of the
data. When assessing the goodness-of-fit of a causal model there are a number of statistics which we
have at our disposal. For the first of these, the y2 goodness-of-fit statistic, we require that the y2 be
non-significant for our model to be considered a good fit. Next we have average standardized residual
statistics, of which the off diagonal residuals are the most important. These may be treated like
residuals in regression analysis, indicating unexplained variance, and are particularly useful in
comparing the differences in fit between two or more alternative models. Aikaike's Information
Criterion (AIC) y2 provides an estimate of goodness-of-fit that takes into account the parsimony of
the underlying model (in terms of the number of parameters that must be estimated to arrive at a
particular solution). Thus the smaller the value the better. Lastly, Bentler and Bonett's non-normed
fit index (NNFI) provides a particularly good estimate of model fit with small sample sizes
(appropriate for this sample size). To even be considered as a reasonable fit, the fit index should show
values of greater than 0.9.
Lastly, a useful feature of causal modelling is the suggestion ofmodel modifications, whereby EQS
suggests changes to the model in order to provide a better fit. Used cautiously, this feature is helpful
in achieving models which fit the data well.
From Tables 1 and 2 we can determine how well our study has replicated previous findings on the
relation between PE and belief, with fantasy and trauma. In Table 1 we may note that the correlation
between fantasy and PB is r = 0.27 (P<0.05). This fits reasonably with the studies of Irwin (1990,
1991) showing average correlations of around 0.44 between the ICMI:C and the PBS. The relationship
between childhood fantasy and PE was slightly stronger, r = 0.31 (P < 0.01). This result offers a fair
degree of agreement with the findings of Rao (1992) with the ICMLC (r = 0.46). Further, our own
reported correlations for childhood fantasy are likely to be smaller simply because we were solely
measuring childhood fantasy (the ICMLC actually has adult fantasy questions too). Obviously we
cannot expect memory based estimates of childhood fantasy to correlate as highly with present day
PB or PE, as would contemporary fantasy estimates.
With respect to childhood trauma and PB our correlation exactly replicates that of Irwin (1992).
This is particularly encouraging, given our use of a much narrower measure of PB. However, we failed
to replicate Irwin's post hoc finding that the strongest specific traumatic correlate of PB was
intrafamilial physical abuse. Our data, presented in Table 2, show that the strongest predictor of PB
were the items relating to Toss of property' (scores for this predictor stemmed mostly from answers
to an item relating to the frequency of moving home as a child).
Table 2 gives the descriptive statistics for childhood trauma, split into its various sources. Whilst
all of the four main variables gave reasonable approximations to a normal distribution, this was not
the case for the specific traumatic variables presented in Table 2. Of these, only intrafamilial physical
abuse data showed evidence of being normally distributed, the other variables being more y2 in their
distribution. Indeed, it is clear that most participants had neither experienced much childhood trauma,
nor collectively displayed much variation in trauma experienced. This is particularly the case for
familial sexual abuse, almost all participants reporting no sexual abuse in their family as children.
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Table 2. Descriptive statistics for specific sources of childhood trauma, with correlations given for paranormal
belief and paranormal experience
Corrected Spearman Corrected Spearman





Intrafamilial sexual abuse 1.04 0.16 -0.008 0.058
intrafamilial physical abuse 2.49 0.92 0.196* 0.194*
Loss (friend I 1.28 0.45 - 0.024 0.23**
Extrafamilial sexual abuse 1.28 0.47 - 0.038 0.086
Loss (family) 1.63 0.56 0.110 0.164
Isolation 1.35 0.67 0.064 0.056
Personal illness 1.40 0.54 - 0.039 0.194*
Parental divorce/miscarriage 1.09 0.19 0.031 0.137
Assault 1.57 0.69 - 0.094 0.18
Loss of properly (home moving) 1.52 0.40 0.379**** 0.239**
Robbery /mugging 1.12 0.37 0.065 0.251**
* P < 0.09 > 0.05; ** P < 0.05; ****P < 0.001.
Consequently, for correlational analyses on the four main variables we used Pearson product moment
correlation coefficients, but for analyses on specific traumatic factors we chose to use Spearman's
p, corrected for ties.
Lastly, our correlations between the various factors of childhood trauma and PB and experience
are interesting in so far as they show that the strength and significance of the correlations reported
is much stronger between trauma and experience than for belief. Here we see the inklings of a model
relating these factors, and it is to the modelling of these factors proper that we now turn.
Results of causal modelling
First we ran EQS on a slightly simplified version of Irwin's (1992) model, given in Fig 1. The results
for this model, in terms of fit statistics, are given in the appropriate column ofTable 3. The y2 of 5.544
on two degrees of freedom indicates a near significant lack of fit between the model and the observed
data. Equally the non-normed fit index is poor; all the worse given that this index is best for reflecting
fit at low sample sizes. In short, Irwin's model is a poor fit.
EQS recommended two changes to Irwin's model. Firstly, the Wald test for dropping parts of the
model suggested the exclusion of the direct causal link from fantasy to belief. Secondly, the Langrange
Multiplier test for adding parts to the model suggested the inclusion of a direct causal link between
trauma and PE. Consequently, we made these changes to the model, arriving at a much more
streamlined model whereby trauma causes fantasy causes experience causes belief, with a direct link
from trauma to experience (we had actually considered modelling this model previously, minus the
trauma-experience link).
The results for the test of this model are given in the last column of Table 3. The new model is
a considerable improvement. Residuals and fit statistics indicate an excellent degree of fit. AIC
statistics, plus residuals, show that this model is considerably better than Irwin's in reproducing the
covariance found in the original data. In Fig. 2 we provide a graphical representation of this new model,
with path coefficients. It is to a discussion of these results that we now turn.
Table 3. Fit statistics for Irwin's (1992) childhood factors model and the new model
Irwin's model New model
Model fit statistics (Fig. 1) (Fig. 2)
Axerage off-diagonal absolute standardized residuals 0.058 0.022
Independence model /' (d.f.) 52.332 (6)
Independence AIC 40.332 40.332
Model AIC 1.544 -2.691
'd.f.) 5.544 (2) 1.309 (2)
/- P-value 0.0625 0.520
Normal theory RLS /' 5.354 1.298
Bentler-Bonett non-normed fit index 0.771 1.045
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Fig. 2. The new model of the childhood causes of paranormal belief and experience.
DISCUSSION
The correlation between childhood trauma and PB, whilst of marginal significance, was exactly
the same as that found by Irwin (1992). Also the previous findings of a relation between fantasy, PB
and PE, were confirmed, whilst also being extended to the influence of childhood fantasy
More importantly, Irwin's proposed model of the causes of PB, as it applies to the variables we
studied, did not provide a good fit to the data. Our data provided insufficient support for the link
between fantasy and PB, and it certainly makes more sense to suppose that any direct effects of
heightened fantasy involvement would be felt upon PE, rather than PB. However, of particular interest
is the finding that a much better fit stems from the inclusion of a direct link between trauma and PE,
not an obvious result by any means. According to the new model trauma has two causal routes in its
influence on PE, one direct, the other indirect.
Our finding that trauma gives rise to PE directly, is something which we may explain only once
we have been able to determine the specific traumatic causes responsible for the direct route to PE.
From a post hoc perusal of our data we would like to suggest a possible cause of the two routes to
paranormal experience (from trauma). It may be that the direct link stems from the victims' response
to bereavement related trauma. A pervasive wish to bring back a loved one may be supposed to increase
the likelihood of hallucinating their presence (indeed, studies of bereavement have shown this to be
the case for some people). The indirect route to PE via childhood fantasy almost certainly stems from
the victims' concerns about the loss of control of social and domestic domains, as Irwin's larger model
suggests. Physical and sexual abuse, frequently moving home, long periods of isolation due to travel
or illness, may all leave a child feeling as though they are powerless to control events in their life.
In the struggle to regain control, some may turn inwards to their own uniquely private inner life of
fantasy friends and make believe realms, and in doing so they may permanently open doors to
heightened visualisation ability.
Also, our new model shows that PB is best modelled as a consequence, rather than a cause, of PE.
This is an important result, if it can be substantiated by further research on larger samples, precisely
because Irwin's original model is equivocal with respect to the effects of fantasy on PB and PE, and
PB and PE themselves are supposed to show reciprocal causation with one another. If, as our model
suggests, PE experience is more the result of fantasy proneness, and PB is more the result of PE, then
this suggests a more phenomenological explanation for PB, over a more attributional one (i.e. that
one has PB and then attributes paranormality to hallucinatory experiences). In short, where PE has
previously been considered the younger brother to PB, our research suggests that it is more the
'paternal cause' of PB.
Research such as we have reported is building up an interesting and, we think, insightful picture
of the causes of PE and PB. The evidence we report adds strong weight in favour of the view that
traumatic events in childhood are a partial cause of heightened fantasy, and that the development of
heightened fantasy has consequences for PE. Researchers in this area are only just beginning to form
a picture of the causes and consequences of PB and PE. We commend the kind of model building
til
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approach that Irwin (1993) has employed. With the modelling techniques we have used to test Irwin's
model, we feel that future research can begin to move away from the rather atheoretic, piecemeal,
and simple correlational approach to PB and PE, towards techniques and ideas that can enable us to
truly come to understand those who experience paranormal phenomena, and those who hold
paranormal beliefs.
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HOW MANY FACTORS OF PARANORMAL
BELIEF ARE THERE? A CRITIQUE OF THE
PARANORMAL BELIEF SCALE
ABSTRACT: The purpose of this investigation was to assess critically the Paranormal
Belief Scale (PBS) developed by Tobacyk and Milford (1983) and revised by Tobacyk
(1988). This scale provides seven factors of paranormal belief: Traditional Religion, Psi
Belief, Precognition, Spiritualism, Witchcraft, Extraordinary Life Forms, and Superstition.
The revised scale consists of 26 items and has been widely used in research into the causes
and consequences of belief in the paranormal. However, in its present form the PBS is
based on less than strong methodology, and even though the factorial structure of paranor¬
mal belief is likely to be multidimensional, it is certainly not accounted for by a seven-fac¬
tor simple structure, nor is it likely to be orthogonal. Reconstruction and reanalysis of the
original 13-factor solution show that there are more likely to be four significant factors in
the PBS. An in-depth review of the PBS subscales shows that subscale items lacked
comprehensive coverage of their constructs and are often wrongly named. It also sheds
light on why the factor structure may have turned out as it did. In concluding, I argue that
a new PBS and a more appropriate definition of paranormal are required. Finally, a new
approach to PBS scale development is argued for, helping the researcher to sift out the
varieties of believer and therefore enhancing the quality of paranormal belief research.
For about the last 20 years, psychologists have been paying ever
greater attention to the possible causes and consequences of belief in
the paranormal (see Irwin, 1993, for a comprehensive and balanced
review of research in this area). One suspects that this interest is due
largely to the persistence of these beliefs despite the great successes of
science over the last 100 years. Parapsychologists have had an interest in
paranormal belief almost since the experimental science of parapsychol¬
ogy began, being most specifically concerned with one particular conse¬
quence of paranormal belief—its effect on one's ostensible psychic
ability (see Palmer 1971, 1972; Schmeidler, 1943; and, most recently,
I would like to acknowledge useful comment and criticism from Michael Thalbourne,
Paul Kline, Chris McManus, Ian Deary, Harvey Irwin, Robert Morris, James Alcock, and
one anonymous reviewer. My thanks are due especially to Dr. Tobacyk for providing addi¬
tional details of analyses.
By Tony R. Lawrence
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Lawrence, 1993). Research into the ostensible paranormal causes and
consequences of belief in the paranormal is in itself important enough
to justify interest in this area of investigation, but there are many other
lines of research available to the behavioral scientist that justify taking
the topic of belief in the paranormal very seriously. Indeed, psychologi¬
cal research on belief in the paranormal has important consequences
for our understanding of these commonly held views and the people
who hold them. But research conducted on belief in the paranormal is
only as good as the devices used to measure it.
There are numerous questionnaires available to assess paranormal
belief (Jones, Russell, & Nickell, 1977; Randall & Desrosiers, 1980;
Scheidt, 1973; Thalbourne & Delin, 1993; Tobacyk, 1988). However, the
most popular measure is Tobacyk and Milford's (1983; Tobacyk, 1988)
Paranormal Belief Scale (PBS). Perhaps the PBS's greatest contribution
to the area of paranormal belief measurement is its emphasis on the
multidimensional nature of paranormal belief. For early researchers,
belief in the paranormal was a unitary phenomenon, a generalized trait
much like intelligence and unlike personality (e.g., Randall and Des¬
rosiers, 1980, found that a single main factor of "supernaturalism" ac¬
counted for 70% of the variance in their factor analysis). But despite
early enthusiasm for a unidimensional construct of belief in the paranor¬
mal, later factor analyses have tended to support the view that belief in
paranormal phenomena is multifaceted (Clarke, 1991; Grimmer &
White, 1990; Sobal & Emmons, 1982; Thalbourne & Delin, 1993).
Indeed, the PBS has seven dimensions of paranormal belief. These
subscales are (in descending order of percentage of variance accounted
for) Traditional Religious Belief, Psi Beliefs (mostly psychokinesis ques¬
tions), Witchcraft, Superstition, Spiritualism, Extraordinary Life Forms,
and Precognition. Since the development of the original scale, a num¬
ber of changes led to a revised scale (Tobacyk, 1988). The revised PBS
incorporates a 26-item, 7-point scale (as opposed to a 25-item, 5-point
scale) and has changes in the Precognition and Witchcraft scales, and
minor changes in the Extraordinary Life Forms scale.
The arguments expressed in this paper stem from the suspicion that
seven dimensions of paranormal belief are simply too many. Although
several researchers (e.g., Irwin, 1993) have raised specific concerns
about the PBS, no one has as yet actually examined in depth its construc¬
tion and content to see if the claims for seven dimensions are accurate.
Consequently, in the remainder of this paper I present an in-depth
critique of the PBS and its revised variant. In the first section I attempt
to determine precisely how the factor analysis of the PBS could have
yielded seven factors. Factor analysis is a complicated statistical
technique, and the technical details presented in my reconstruction of
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the original factor solution of the PBS may be skipped by those who are
of a less technical persuasion. These readers are advised to move on to
the last (summary) paragraph of the next section, and then to read on
from the section "The Revised PBS."
The Development and Factor Analysis of the PBS
In constructing their paranormal belief scale, Tobacyk and Milford
(1983) gave 61 items that in their judgment "would sample as wide a
range of paranormal beliefs as possible" (p. 1030) to 391 students at
Louisiana Tech University. Items were scored on a 5-point scale from 1
(strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). These items were intercorre-
lated and factor analyzed by the principal-axis method. Promax oblique
rotation was performed to assess for dependencies between factors but
"revealed little evidence of dependence between factors, which allowed
for the use of orthogonal rotations." The orthogonal transformation
solution gave 13 factors, accounting for 60.7% of total variance.
Tobacyk and Milford (1983) do not state whether any statistically
based means of factor selecdon were used to arrive at the original 13-fac-
tor solution, except that they go on to select only 7 of the 13 factors on
the basis that these factors "appeared meaningfully interpretable as
common factors." However, Dr. Tobacyk kindly informed me that he
"used several criteria for the selection of factors concurrently: eigen¬
value > 1.0, scree plot of eigenvalues, proportion of total variance ac¬
counted for, [and] conceptual meaningfulness of the factor
dimensions" (personal communication, 1994).
It would be worthwhile to note at this juncture that Tobacyk's set of
four criteria for selecting factors, although reasonable in an early pe¬
rusal of the analysis, falls short of adequacy in the construction of the
final scale. The trouble is that these four criteria, taken together, are
likely to produce far too many factors. Also, although selection of factors
that "appeared meaningfully interpretable" is a valid procedure (provid¬
ing that one is clear about what would constitute a meaningful factor a
priori), in Tobacyk and Milford's case the use of this criterion actually
contradicts their explicit aim to let the factor analysis describe the struc¬
ture of paranormal beliefs, rather than impose any a priori dimensions
upon the data (a la Randall & Desrosiers, 1980). Indeed, it is hard to see
how one can select factors that appear meaningfully interpretable with¬
out having some a priori conception of what should constitute a factor
of paranormal belief. With at least four criteria for selecting factors from
their analyses, Tobacyk and Milford's factor selection procedure may












TRB PB W SU SP ELF P
The PBS Factors
8 9 10 11 12 13
Figure l.The 13 factors ofTobacyk andMilford's (1983) Paranormal BeliefScale.
We can find out just how many factors there would most likely be if
only one, statistically reasoned factor selection procedure had been
used. To start with, we can reject the simple use of the Kaiser-1 criterion
on the grounds that it is too liberal (see Horn, 1965; Zwick & Velicer,
1986), that is, it gives too many factors; and indeed, in Tobacyk and
Milford's analysis, itwould have accounted for 13 factors alone.1 Alterna¬
tively, looking at the proportion of variance accounted for by each vari¬
able is a redundant procedure because an eigenvalue is simply an
indirect measure of proportion of variance accounted for, and thus any
procedure that analyzes eigenvalues to select factors is looking at pro¬
portion ofvariance accounted for. Also, we cannot use the most accurate
selection procedures, such as Minimum Average Partial Technique
(MAP) or Parallel Analysis (PA), because these techniques require ac¬
cess to original data, which Tobacyk no longer has (Tobacyk, personal
communication, 1994).
We are thus left with the use of a scree slope analysis which involves
plotting a visually judged line of best fit through the smallest eigenvalues,
and taking only those that come above the line. To carry out the analysis,
we need to reconstruct the 13 factors of the original factor solution. We
'We can reasonably assume that the first 13 factors stemmed from the default applica¬
tion of Kaiser-1 by Tobacyk and Milford's SAS statistical package.
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know the eigenvalues of the first 7 factors from data presented in To-
bacvk and Milford (1983), and by making certain assumptions we can
piece together the likely distribution of the original 13 factors. The
assumptions that permit us to do this are as follows:
1. Factor 7 (Precognition) is the 7th largest factor. We are given no reason
to believe that Tobacyk and Milford did not select the 7 largest factors
from their 13-factor solution, and it seems unlikely that they did other¬
wise.
2. Factor 13 had an eigenvalue ofexactly 1. If this was the smallest factor
to make the Kaiser-1 cut, then it is most likely that it was on or very near
the criterion division of 1.
3. Factors 8 to 13 were roughly linear in distribution (i.e., triangular). This
assumption is not unreasonable. It is the weakest assumption I make,
however.
We know that Tobacyk and Milford's original 13-factor solution ac¬
counted for 60.7% of the total variance in their analysis. And, by sum¬
ming the percentage variance accounted for by each of their 7 selected
factors, we know that these 7 factors accounted for 48.2% of the total
variance. This means that, of the 13 original factors, the 6 "unknown"
factors that did not make the cut accounted for 12.5% of the total
variance. By invoking Assumption 1, we can deduce that Factor 8 had an
eigenvalue no more than that of Factor 7 (Precognition). In this case,
that is 1.281 (2.1/100 x 61). So Factor 8 must be less than 1.281. From
Assumption 2 we can suppose that the smallest of the 13 factors selected
had an eigenvalue very close to 1. However, I shall suppose that the
eigenvalue for Factor 13 was in fact 1 (in any case these calculations are
unlikely to be far out). Assumption 3 may be invoked to determine the
distribution of the unknown 6 factors. To do this we simply suppose the
distribution of these factors to be linear and work out the gradient of the
slope for these factors using basic mathematics. In this, the distance the
slope must travel is 6 factors, and the height the slope must reach is from
an eigenvalue of 1 to an eigenvalue of 1.281 (or 0.281 units). The gradi¬
ent for this slope is given by 0.281/6 = 0.0468166. This value is then the
average distance between Factors 7 to 13. Using those first three assump¬
tions, we can now get some idea of the distribution of Factors 8 to 13.
The results of this analysis, expressed in eigenvalues, along with the
known eigenvalues of the 7 factors of Tobacyk and Milford's PBS, are
given in Figure 1 (n.b., Factors 8 to 13 are inferred).
Now that we have a rough plot of the eigenvalues in Tobacyk and
Milford's PBS, we may try to use the more accurate and discerning scree




scree slope analysis, they would have selected Traditional Religious Be¬
lief, Psi Belief, Witchcraft, and possibly Superstition (depending on
where exacdy one supposes the line to be a best fit).
On these most basic analyses there are only four factors at most.
The other factors might be meaningfully interpretable and have
eigenvalues above 1, but they do not contribute much understanding
to the concept of paranormal belief over the first three or four fac¬
tors, nor do they express much more summarizing value than any one
of the original 61 items. Indeed, there are conceptual reasons to
suppose that the precognition factor should not be a separate factor
at all, but a part of psi belief, as it surely is (see below). I shall now
move on to the second major area of problems with the development
of the PBS scale, where I discuss in particular concerns about the
smaller factors.
The Revised PBS
In 1988 Tobacyk produced an as-yet-unpublished paper oudining
changes made to the original PBS and on this basis declared a new
revised PBS. In brief, the changes he made were: (a) to increase the
original 25 items to 26; (b) to construct a new 7-point scale; (c) to
replace the original 3-item Precognition scale with a 4-item scale of all
new questions; (d) to replace 2 of 4Witchcraft items; and (e) to replace
1 of 3 Extraordinary Life Forms items.
He argued that the changes resulted in greater reliability and valid¬
ity, less restriction of range, and greater crosscultural validity in West¬
ern cultures. The inclusion of a 7-point rating scale seems fairly
straightforward and makes good sense. In what follows I shall address
problems with the various subscales of the PBS, before going on to
consider whether Tobacyk and Milford's early evidence for construct
validity is acceptable. Some of these problems are minor and can be
easily remedied. Some, however, threaten the very existence of the
PBS. First, I begin with the second most important factor of the PBS,
the Psi subscale.
2Some earlier commentators on this paper have expressed doubts about the accuracy
of the scree test over that of the Kaiser-1 criterion. However, Zwick and Velicer (1986)
found it to be, on average, 35% more accurate than the Kaiser-1 criterion in selection of
predetermined factors (57% vs. 22%, respectively). Earlier reports also attest to the high
degree of accuracy (Cattell & Jaspers, 1967; Cliff, 1970; and Zwick & Velicer, 1982) and
generally good interrater reliability among expert and naive judges (Cattell & Vogelman,
1977; Zwick & Velicer, 1982).
HI
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The Psi Subscale
Parapsychologists define psi as an unexplained human extrasensori-
motor capability comprising extrasensory perception, or ESP (telepathy,
clairvoyance, and precognition), and psychokinesis, or PK (mind over
matter). Thus, as a minimum criterion for that name, any psi factor
should meet the requirement that its items broadly and comprehen¬
sively deal with belief in telepathy, clairvoyance, precognition, and psy¬
chokinesis. Yet the PBS psi belief factor has only four questions, ofwhich
three address PK belief and one refers to telepathy alone. Clairvoyance
is not addressed, and precognition appears on its own as the smallest
factor. Plainly, the so-called Psi Belief scale is poorly named; for all in¬
tents and purposes, it is a PK belief scale. This factor of the PBS is simply
too shallow to warrant either its name or the importance placed on it.
Lest it be renamed the "PK belief factor," a new psi belief scale is needed.
The Precognition Subscale
Precognition is a particular kind of psi phenomenon that involves
psychic percepdon of a future event, and along with clairvoyance and
telepathy it is characterized and commonly understood to be a form of
extrasensory percepuon. Thus, one might expect people who respond
affirmadvely to quesdons about belief in telepathy to respond affirm-
auvely also to quesdons about belief in precognidon, and vice versa. In
short, responses to quesdons on precognidon belief should correlate
posidvely with those on other forms of extrasensory percepdon. Thus,
there are sensible a priori reasons to suppose that belief in telepathy,
clairvoyance, and precognidon should be expressible in terms of a com¬
mon factor of ESP beliefs (and to a lesser extent of PK beliefs). That the
PBS showed precognidon to be a separate factor from psi beliefs is
perhaps the single most puzzling outcome of Tobacyk and Milford's
factor analydc assessment.
It is notable that for the revised PBS (1988) Tobacyk totally replaced
the three quesdons on precognidon with four new ones (hence account¬
ing for the increase of PBS items from 25 to 26). The reasons for doing
this are oudined by Tobacyk as: (a) The original Precognidon subscale
has the lowest test-retest reliability of the original seven subscales (rtt =
.60 over 4 weeks)3; (b) the original quesdons were ambiguous and could
have referred to nonparanormal means of predicting the future.
Tobacyk himself gives good reasons to believe that all three original
'Kline (1986) notes that for a minimum accepable level of reliability one should try to
get at least a retest reliability of .7.
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questions suffer from ambiguities of this sort. Thus, in the original PBS
the ambiguity of the questions would likely have meant that a large
number of respondents were not viewing these questions as being about
"psychic prediction of the future," but merely about the likelihood that
people could predict the future in general (say, perhaps, with meteoro¬
logical techniques). Obviously these responses are not likely to covary
meaningfully with the psi scale items. In fact, they are not likely to covary
meaningfully with any of the subscales in the PBS. These questions are
just going to sit as a separate factor on their own, which is precisely what
they do.
It is clear then from Tobacyk's (1988) own paper that the Precogni¬
tion subscale was far from satisfactory, both in its item content and
reliability. The key issue was that the items that went into the original
factor analysis related to the concept of paranormal belief only ambigu¬
ously. Tobacyk's (1988) solution to this problem was to replace these
ambiguous questions with questions that are obviously related to precog¬
nition. These new questions were taken from a study (Tobacyk, Nagot, &
Mitchell, 1989) that had 349 college students rate 60 beliefs about the
prediction of future events. A factor analysis of these 60 items revealed
seven independent dimensions of belief about the prediction of future
events. According to Tobacyk (1988):
The two clearest marker items were selected from each of the two largest
paranormal precognition dimensions to form a new Precognition subscale.
These dimensions and items were: Paranormal Divinatory Systems (Astrol¬
ogy is a way to accurately predict the future. The horoscope accurately tells
a person's future) and Psychically Gifted Persons (Some psychics can accu¬
rately predict the future. Some people have an unexplained ability to pre¬
dict the future), (p. 6)
Thus, from this study the four questions above were used to form the
new Precognition subscale. The test-retest reliability for this scale is a
reasonable .81 over 4 weeks. However, there are numerous errors and
flaws with the approach to the new Precognition subscale that must
render it invalid as a separate scale altogether. I shall now outline these
problems with the Precognition subscale in the revised PBS.
1. The original evidence for a factor ofprecognition was flawed. As Tobacyk
(1988) agrees, the original items in the PBS Precognition subscale were
ambiguous. Therefore the possibility that the Precognition subscale
does not actually measure belief in paranormal precognitive powers
must be taken seriously. If evidence for a separate dimension of belief in
precognition depends on such ambiguities, then this raises serious ques¬
tions about the validity of the precognition dimension. A separate factor
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of precognition cannot be upheld if the items that contributed best to
that factor do not actually relate in an obvious way to precognition.
Evidence for a separate factor of precognition must be derived anew.
Thus, an error was made in supposing that, although the items com¬
posing the original Precognition subscale were in need of change, the
actual status of the factor of precognition needed no such scrutiny. This
supposes that factors are more than the sum of their parts. In fact, the
existence of factors depends crucially on the quality of their compo¬
nents. The subscale items come first, and the factor is always a latent
variable that is to be inferred.
2. The factorial independence of the new precognition items is not established.
This criticism stems from what has previously been argued. One should
really attempt to determine anew that precognition belief is a separate
aspect of belief in the paranormal. Only then can the claim be made that
a separate factor of belief in precognition exists, and only then can the
new precognition items be placed into such a factor. Instead, in choos¬
ing to develop new PBS Precognition scale items with reference only to
items that have "prediction of future events" content, Tobacyk and his
colleagues lose all possibility of establishing that a factor of belief in
precognition does exist, apart from other kinds of belief in paranormal
phenomena. And this is precisely what is needed to justify the inclusion
of a separate factor for precognition in the first place.
3. The Tobacyk et al. (1989) factor analysis contradicts the notion of a single
factor ofprecognition. Having a single factor ofprecognition in the original
PBS was surely based on the idea that those items that were in the
Precognition subscale correlated highly with one another, but not with
anything much outside that subscale. Tobacyk and Milford's (1983) jus¬
tification and use of orthogonal rotations implies this much. Basically,
the items chosen for the original Precognition subscale represented
different ways of asking: "Do you believe people can predict the future
paranormally?" This is reasonable if there is good reason to suppose that
a single factor exists in the factor analysis.
In their development of the Belief in Prediction of Future Events
scale (BPFE), Tobacyk et al. (1989) found seven independent factors of
belief in the prediction of future events. These factors underwent or¬
thogonal rotation, producing factors that shared the least amount of
variance. Subsequently, Tobacyk et al. took the strongest two marker
questions from the clearest two factors of the BPFE to form their new
Precognition subscale. However, in doing this they destroyed whole¬
heartedly the notion of a single factor of precognition. This is because
the four new questions from the BPFE are taken from two independent
factors (Paranormal Divinatory Systems and Psychically Gifted Persons).
U
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In fact, two of the questions in the new Precognition subscale refer to
belief in astrology and not precognition. Only one of the other two
questions actually refers in a clear and definite way to precognition. In
short, the new "factor" of precognition, despite its improved reliability,
measures two different factors altogether, only one of which assesses
belief in precognition (Psychically Gifted Persons). Changes made to
the Precognition subscale may have improved the scale's reliability, but
only at the expense of a near total lack of validity.
The Precognition Subscale: Conclusions
The conclusion that one must draw from an understanding of this
section is that there is no good evidence for a single factor of belief in
precognitive powers. Had the construction of the original PBS precogni¬
tion items been conducted differently, it is most likely that no separate
factor of precognition would have been found. But there may be an¬
other reason why the Precognition subscale did not form a part of a
wider psi scale. As noted previously, the Psi Belief subscale contained
three questions on psychokinesis and only one on ESP. Although pre¬
cognition belief correlates highly with ESP belief in general, it has per¬
sistently correlated less well with PK belief in previous analyses, for
reasons that should be intuitive. If items relating to Psi Belief had been
truly comprehensive, the precognition items would most likely have
loaded onto the factor of Psi Belief—as they have in almost every other
factor analytic assessment of paranormal belief to date (see Clarke, 1991;
Grimmer & White, 1990; Sobal & Emmons, 1982; Thalbourne, 1981;
and, most recently, Thalbourne & Delin, 1993; but see also Thalbourne
& Haraldsson, 1980).
The Witchcraft Subscale
TheWitchcraft subscale of the revised PBS consists of four statements
obviously relating to witchcraft and blackmagic. The original Witchcraft
subscale had been changed because two of the original items ("Voodoo
is a real method to use paranormal powers"; "There are actual cases of
voodoo death") were often not familiar to foreign respondents (specifi¬
cally, Finnish, German, and Polish). These items were replaced by the
statements (a) "There are actual cases ofwitchcraft," and (b) "Through
the use of formulas and incantations, it is possible to cast spells on
persons."
Of these two replacement items, the first is basically good, even if a
little equivocal (one could support the assertion that there are actual
cases ofwitchcraft and still suppose thatmagic does not really exist). The
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second statement is excellent and taps into the factor of Witchcraft
without actually mentioning it explicitly, which is always a good way of
constructing one's items. However, of the remaining two statements in
the revised Witchcraft subscale ("Black magic really exists"; "Witches do
exist") it seems clear that the statement "Witches do exist" is obviously
true whether or not they really have magical powers, and the statement
is likely to be endorsed as such by skeptic and Wicca worshipper alike.
Perhaps this statement could be changed to something such as "Witches
possess genuine magical powers." For the most part, however, there are
no particular problems of major significance with the Witchcraft
subscale.
The Extraordinary Life Forms Subscale
This subscale consists of three statements: (a) The abominable snow¬
man of Tibet exists; (b) The Loch Ness monster of Scotland exists; and,
(c) There is life on other planets. The items in this scale are simply of
arguable paranormality. The mystery surrounding the existence (or not)
of the Yeti and Nessie stems more from their apparent elusiveness than
it does from any intrinsically inexplicable process of nature. If these
creatures exist, they do so as a matter ofnatural historical fact and are as
unlikely to herald a new principle of science as they are likely to warrant
discarding an old one. However, the third statement in the Extraordi¬
nary Life Forms factor is probably quite useless for another reason alto¬
gether. Anyone—even a Royal Society astronomer—could agree with
the statement that there is life on other planets to some degree. The real
question that taps into the Extraordinary Life Forms dimension should
not have been whether there was life on other planets but whether life
on other planets was regularly making trips to our planet! I suspect that
very few astronomers would agree with that contention. So, at the very
least, the factor of Extraordinary Life Forms, which accounts for the
second least percentage of variance in Tobacyk and Milford's original
factor analysis, rests upon shaky foundations, theoretically and method¬
ologically.
If one wishes to develop a psychometric measure of anything of im¬
port, it is usually true that one needs a large number of items to sample
the particular latent variable of interest, be it belief in the paranormal or
extraversion. One needs an even larger number of items to begin to
narrow down the best items to go into the refined measure. A scale that
The Subscales of the PBS
14 TheJournal ofParapsychology
needs only 26 items to sample no less than seven independent latent
variables is probably not valid.4 Indeed, we have seen that the Psi Belief
subscale suffers from a lack of comprehensive coverage of the core psi
phenomena, showing instead a prevalence of items relating solely to
psychokinesis. If four or five items can get to grips with the complex
attitudes and feelings underlying belief in the paranormal, then either
belief in the paranormal is trivially simple or our approach to item
selection is wrong.
Problems ofSubscale Independence (Orthogonality)
In this section I draw on evidence from the old and new versions of
the PBS. In the original paper on the old PBS, Tobacyk and Milford
(1983) presented a matrix of intercorrelations between the subscales of
the PBS that shed light upon the question of whether the subscales are
truly uncorrelated. Clearly, examination of this matrix reveals some cor¬
relations large enough to warrant concern over subscale orthogonality.
For example, Psi Belief correlates .49 with Spiritualism, .40 with Precog¬
nition (where orthogonality has already been questioned), and .34 with
Witchcraft. Tobacyk and Milford (1983) dismiss these larger correla¬
tions, not by dealing with them directly, but by noting that "because
these correlations are based on a 424-subject sample, statistical signifi¬
cance alone is not an appropriate procedure to determine relatedness
between subscales. . . . The amount of shared variance (r2) between
scales appears to be a more appropriate index of relatedness" (p. 1034).
Certainly even the mostminor correlations are likely to be significant
with such a large sample size, and r is a useful estimate of the import of
the relation between two variables; but one needs to be wary indeed in
throwing out evidence for relatedness (obliqueness) of subscales when
the subscale correlations approach .40 and above. This wariness is espe¬
cially advised given that subscale intercorrelations can only be as high as
subscale reliabilities will allow. Indeed, it is a general psychometric prin¬
ciple that a test cannot correlate with another separate test any higher
than it can correlate with itself—i.e., estimated subscale intercorrela¬
tions will always be lower than the true value for the subscale intercorre-
lation, because of what psychometrists call "attenuation due to
unreliability." Given that generally the test-retest reliabilities for Tobacyk
and Milford's original subscales fell somewhat short of being satisfactory
(only Psi Beliefs and Extraordinary Life Forms were above Kline's [1993]
accepted minimum of .80), we should note a particular degree of
4This is a point well made to me in correspondence from Paul Kline, Professor of
Psychometrics of the University of Exeter, England.
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caution in dismissing evidence for relatedness in the subscales. In fact, if
one calculates corrected Pearson correlations (using the formula for
correction of attenuation due to unreliability given by Kline, 1993, p.
14), then we see, for example, that the revised estimate of intercorrela-
tion between Psi Beliefs and Spiritualism lies at about the .66 level, and
that for Psi Beliefs and Precognition it is around .56. These figures
certainly cannot be dismissed lightly, though I would advise caudon in
placing too strong a faith on an esdmate of an esumate! Nevertheless,
the original correlauons are sufficient evidence for relatedness between
factors for most psychometricians.
Perhaps the most revealing evidence for lack of orthogonality in the
revised PBS is the fact that Tobacyk (1991) reports significant correla¬
uons between the two largest factors of his Predicuon of Future Events
scale and the Supersduon subscale of his PBS. As the reader will be
aware, Tobacyk (1988) used the two largest factors of his Predicdon of
Future Events scale to form the new quesdons for his PBS Precognidon
subscale. Clearly, we must regard the orthogonality of these two
subscales with some suspicion. Unfortunately, Tobacyk (1988) provides
no new evidence to suggest that the revised PBS contains truly orthogo¬
nal factors. Presumably, orthogonality was assumed from the previous
analysis of the old PBS. But as the discussion in the first half of this
secuon shows, the evidence for orthogonality in that scale was based on
a too premature dismissal of the (in some cases quite strong) evidence
for correlauons between subscales.
Evidence for Construct Validity Assessed
Much of the above discussion of the subscales can be regarded as an
in-depth examinauon of the general validity of the PBS subscales, and
we have seen that there is cause to challenge both the face validity of the
subscales (e.g., the item "There is life on other planets" does not even
look like it taps into UFO-type beliefs) and the construct validity (e.g.,
both Psi Beliefs and Precognidon are poor measures of their respecuve
constructs, for reasons of comprehensive coverage and item content
respecuvely). However, Tobacyk and Milford (1983) devote a substantial
portion of their paper to demonstrating the construct validity of the PBS
and its subscales empirically. Construct validity was first introduced into
the psychometric literature by Cronbach and Meehl (1955) in an at¬
tempt to get around the difficulties in establishing certain specific types
of validity for certain sorts of test. Construct validity refers to whether the
concept or construct being measured by the scale is in reality what the
scale measures. Evidence for construct validity may subsume evidence
1_<\$
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for all other kinds of validity (concurrent, predicdve, face, incremental,
and differential) and may be regarded as the most general sort ofvalidity
that one can demonstrate. Thus, to show evidence for construct validity
one needs to show generally that the empirical evidence derived from
use of one's scale accords well with the definition of the psychological
trait one has proposed.
Tobacyk and Milford (1983) established the construct validity of their
scale by collecdng together seven other measures of psychological traits:
the Internal-External Locus of Control Scale (Rotter, 1966); the Sensa-
uon Seeking Scale (Zuckerman, 1971); the Threat Index (Hays, 1974);
a self-esteem measure (Hays, 1974); the Uncriucal Inferences Test
(Haney, 1954); the Dogmadsm Scale (Rokeach, 1960); and an Irradonal
Beliefs Questionnaire (Newmark, Frerking, Cook, & Newmark, 1973).
They went on to correlate these measures with the global score and
subscales for paranormal belief on the grounds that, "due to theoretical
considerations, they were hypothesized to be related to paranormal be¬
liefs" (p. 1034).
Tobacyk and Milford report correlations for these variables with the
PBS ranging from 0-34, and they argue that these results broadly support
the construct validity of the PBS. I could at this point discuss in detail the
discussions of the evidence for construct validity given by Tobacyk and
Milford, but I shall not do this for a simple and basic reason: None of the
evidence reported by Tobacyk and Milford for construct validity is in fact
evidence for such validity. Instead, I want to explain why such evidence
cannot in principle be evidence for the construct validity of the PBS.
To establish the construct validity of a paranormal belief scale, one
needs to show that it is feasible to define a construct—"paranormal
beliefs"—and that the behavior of persons (both in surveys and in life
generally) is consonant with such a construct. To show construct validity
for the PBS, one needs to establish some basic facts. First, one needs to
show concurrent validity, that is, that this measure of paranormal belief
correlates reasonably well with previous measures of paranormal belief
(assuming, of course, that these previous measures are valid). Second,
one needs to show that the PBS can account for differences in persons
that are essential and intrinsic to the notion of paranormal belief. Thus,
itmust be essential to any concept of paranormal belief that to have such
beliefs one must have had some acquaintance with the topic of the
paranormal, from whatever source (experience being the most obvi¬
ous). If the PBS could not account for differences in level of acquain¬
tance with the paranormal (which could take the form of differential or
predictive validity), then we would need to question seriously the validity
of the scale. For example, if we measure the degree of paranormal
experience one has had, we would expect people with high experience
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to show high paranormal belief, and vice versa. Any evidence to the
contrary would suggest that the scale was not measuring paranormal
beliefs. We could provide further evidence of this type for such things as
reading books on the paranormal, visidng mediums, psychics, or astrolo¬
gers for advice, and taking seriously such advice as given. Even more
basically, we would need to predict, for example, that measures of para¬
normal belief taken now will continue to predict levels of paranormal
belief in the future, and that our measure of paranormal belief does not
correlate strongly with measures that are not intrinsic to paranormal
belief (i.e., they are not measures of paranormal beliefs). Thus, we
would not expect a measure of paranormal beliefs to correlate strongly
with a measure of attitudes toward normal things (e.g., smoking, party
politics, tax increases).
It should now be obvious that the "evidence" for construct validity
offered by Tobacyk and Milford is simply not evidence for validity at all.
Tobacyk and Milford's analyses presume the validity of the PBS. None of
the scales used relate essentially or intrinsically to the concept of para¬
normal beliefs (or to events associated with paranormal phenomena).
Indeed, the scales that are used to support the validity of the PBS can be
used only if it is a defining characteristic of such beliefs (i.e., it is a part
of the construct) that they are intrinsically dogmatic, uncritical, irra¬
tional, sensation seeking, death-threat oriented, governed by a concern
with external determinants of behavior, and bound up with self esteem.
In general parlance and in Tobacyk and Milford's definition of the para¬
normal, none of these characteristics appear as intrinsic qualities, and
this is clear evidence that they cannot bear on the evidence for the
construct validity of the PBS. Of course, they may relate to paranormal
beliefs for reasons that are of theoretical interest, but to establish such
relations requires that one has a valid measure in the first place. Thus,
Tobacyk and Milford (1983) provide no good evidence that the PBS
measures what it claims to measure—even if we accept some evidence
for face validity of some of the items—and I say this even though I do not
doubt that had such evidence been looked for, it would have been found
to some extent.
To sum up this section, we may reasonably conclude that despite
some evidence for face validity and content validity, the actual evidence
for the validity of the PBS is very poor. Subsequent evidence from other
researchers has shown some concurrent validity for the PBS—that is, it
correlates with other measures of paranormal belief (Thalbourne has
several unpublished studies reporting high correlations between the
PBS and his sheep-goat scale e.g., Thalbourne, 1994; Thalbourne, Dun¬
bar, & Delin, 1994; see also Irwin, 1985)—but this type of validity on its
own is not sufficient to recommend the use of the scale.
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Problems of Poor Scale Use
At times researchers have not used the scale in the spirit for which it
was designed. The revised PBS presents seven independent subscales of
paranormal belief for the researcher to use as such. The primary radon-
ale in construcung the scale was that paranormal belief is multifaceted
and not just amenable to analysis in terms of a general factor of Paranor¬
mal Belief. (Scales that have treated belief in the paranormal as an
all-or-none property have tended to seem too simple and superficial; see,
for example, Randall 8c Desrosiers, 1980, and Scheldt, 1973.) Neverthe¬
less, in an important and highly consequendal area such as the study of
reasoning and belief in the paranormal, we can observe Wierzbicki
(1985) correladng subjects' scores on a syllogisuc reasoning task with
the global score for paranormal belief and nothing else (see Irwin, 1991,
for a credible attempt to approach the same issue, and Irwin, 1992,
correladng childhood trauma solely with the full-scale PBS score).
There is no pardcular problem with repordng full-scale score corre-
ladons from a muldfactorial scale (this is often done) when the meaning
of the full-scale score is clear. However, I would argue that the meaning
that one should give to a full-scale score on the PBS is not as clear as it
might seem. The full-scale score may be tapping into general paranor¬
mal belief. But let us consider the sort of person who might score high
on general paranormal belief as assessed by the PBS. This person would
necessarily have expressed strong belief in so many diverse phenomena,
varying widely in exouc appeal, that one might just as easily be tapping
into mental health and gullibility factors too—especially since the PBS
was designed to assess as wide a range of phenomena as possible. But the
real problem here stems from the expansive definiuon of the paranor¬
mal. This leads us direcdy to a discussion of the definidon ofparanormal.
Indeed, in this discussion we may get to the heart of the problems
concerning the construct of "paranormal beliefs."
Finally, I would like to raise concerns about Tobacyk's (1988) defini¬
don of the paranormal. In the revised PBS, Tobacyk used only Broad's
(1949/1978) definidon of paranormality: "explicability achieved only by
major revision of the basic limiung principles of science." The problem
with this definidon is that it does not seem to fit the scale items ade¬
quately. Thus, with respect to Big Foot, Nessie, or extraterrestrials, surely
the existence (or not) of any of these things is merely a matter of natural
historical fact. Only detecuon of them with certainty will show that they
Problems in Defining "Paranormal"
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do exist, but their paranormal status would have to be much the same as
that of the Coelacanth fish discovered off the coast of southern Africa in
the 1930s. Until its discovery, the existence of the fish was not in princi¬
ple ruled out, but it was just considered unlikely. But, as a matter of
natural historical fact, it still existed and was later discovered.
However, Tobacyk and Milford (1983) do acknowledge that their defi¬
nition of paranormal is problematic. Indeed, Tobacyk (1988) notes (p. 7)
that the factor "Extraordinary Life Forms . . . does not stricdy conform
to the 'basic limiting principles' definition of paranormality." Broad's
definition of paranormal in terms of "basic limiung principles" is not as
clear-cut as it might seem. As Braude (1979) points out, "Broad has
failed to explain what, in general, a phenomenon must conflict with in
order to conflict with aB[asic] Limiting] P[rinciple]" (p. 251). Clearly,
a better definition is needed.
I propose that we use the far more restrictive definition of paranormal
offered by Irwin (1993; he mistakenly attributes it to Thalbourne, 1982).
Irwin defines a thing as paranormal if it "refers to hypothesized processes
that in principle are physically impossible or outside the realm of human
capabilities as presently conceived by conventional scientists" (p. 1; em¬
phasis added). With this definition, Witchcraft, Psi Powers, Precogni¬
tion, and Spiritualism would be retained as factors. They clearly refer to
human capabilities and hypothesized processes, and all of them share a
certain fundamental relationship: the dependence on unexplained
principles of nature (psi processes apply to Psi, Precognidon, and Spiri¬
tualism, and magical energies apply to Witchcraft).
Conclusions
From what I have oudined in this paper we can only conclude that
one of psychology's most widely used scales for the assessment of belief
in the paranormal, the PBS and revised PBS, is less than satisfactory for
its intended purpose. I have outlined what I believe are serious objec¬
tions to the view that paranormal belief can be accounted for by seven
dimensions. These objections are based in part on problems with selec¬
tion of questionnaire items, and for the most part they result from the
all-encompassing factor selection procedure used in the original factor
analysis. Quite simply, according to a more accurate factor selection
criterion, there are not seven separate factors of paranormal belief, but
four: Traditional Religious Belief, Psi Belief, Witchcraft, and Supersti¬
tion. Further still, although there are most certainly less than seven
significant factors in the PBS, those thatwould remain on more accurate
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criteria would most likely not be orthogonal (based on a perusal of
evidence reported by Tobacyk & Milford, 1983, and Tobacyk, 1991).
Clearly we need a new PBS. Much useful and insightful research has
been produced with the old PBS and its revision, but the problems
present in those scales necessitate a new scale, adequately designed,
analyzed, and implemented. Only then can a firm foundation be made
for further research in this area, and as there are no signs that research
on the topic of paranormal belief (in either psychology or parapsychol¬
ogy) is slowing up, we can only hope to see a new PBS in the not-so-dis-
tant future.
However, before we begin to construct a new PBS, I want to note a
number of concerns that may influence the exact nature of such a scale.
My first concern is that the new PBS, suitably narrowed in content to
contain less that is merely strange and wacky and more that is in line with
the kind of humanly relevant definition of paranormal phenomena that
I advocate, might run the risk of containing subscales (say of ESP, PK,
and Life after Death) that contain litde more than a series of bloated
specifics. Cattell (1973) has shown that scales with excellent reliabiliues
can be obtained merely by filling each scale with items that do nothing
but paraphrase each other. Thus, the two items "ESP allows people to
know each other's thoughts" and "People use ESP to read other's
thoughts" are litde more than minor modificauons on the same theme.
They would correlate highly with each other and give good internal
consistency and test-retest reliability, but either question alone would
work just as well! My suspicion is that it is all too easy to construct
face-valid and reliable belief scales using bloated specifics. This worry is
compounded by a related piece of evidence, taken from the meta-analy¬
sis of the sheep-goat effect that I have previously reported (Lawrence,
1993). In that meta-analysis, Schmeidler's (1943) single-question meas¬
ure of belief ("Do you believe ESP can occur under the conditions of this
experiment?") gave effect-size estimates for ESP success better than al¬
most every multi-item measure of belief in the paranormal. Clearly,
some of this success can be attributed to the enhanced consistency of
attitude-behavior relations found when highly specific measures of atti¬
tude are used (and it is fair to say that Schmeidler's question puts the
subject on the spot). But the implication may also be that one can tap
into beliefjust as well with one, two, or three questions as with 25 or 50.
There are two solutions to the problem of the bloated specific scale,
if it exists. (We need to be sure that the problem exists by comparing, say,
a six-item measure of paranormal belief—measuring clairvoyance, pre¬
cognition, telepathy, PK, life after death, and magic—with a full-blown
multi-item, multi-factorial scale, such as the present PBS. If they yield
similar results, then bloated specifics are a problem.) First, we could use
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the smaller, more convenient scale. Second, we could try to produce a
genuine multifactorial scale that does not contain bloated specifics. One
way to do this would be to index paranormal beliefs through behavioral
indicators coupled with more belief-like statements, akin to the way that
extraversion is measured. However, in doing this we should be aware of
yet a further difficulty: To what extent can we treat paranormal belief
like a basic personality trait at all? Clearly, paranormal belief is more akin
to a socially held attitude, developed through paranormal experience
and socialization by the wider culture. In short, although to measure
someone's level of extraversion is to assess direcdy certain behaviors that
are said to result from a basic biological/social propensity for such be¬
havior essential to that person, to measure someone's level of paranor¬
mal belief is to measure a number of beliefs held upon evidence that is
diverse socially, culturally, and psychologically.
There is a third option, however. In the third option we retain the
benefits of the multifactorial scale but change the function of the scale
from simply measuring beliefs to measuring beliefs in association with
their most obvious and immediate social and phenomenological causes.
This third option does real justice to the aim of measuring belief as
socioculturally and experientially based, while actually enhancing our
capacity to rationally dissect the results of pure paranormal belief re¬
search! How does one do this?
Let us consider the basic causes of paranormal belief. First and most
obviously, there is personal experience of ostensibly paranormal phe¬
nomena. Second, one may be acquainted with relatives or close friends
who have had paranormal experiences. Third, one may have encoun¬
tered in the media popular or serious, academic or occult, or scientific
or religious works relating to paranormal phenomena. Finally, one may
base one's beliefs on a general world view, provided by one's education.
These four basic areas then—personal, interpersonal, sociocultural, and
educational—are the most basic, immediate causes of one's paranormal
beliefs. Note the diversity in sources of belief. Note also that to have
based one's beliefs on influences from any one of these four does not
neccessarily lead to the conclusion that one has influences from any of
the other three causes; in principle the four causes are independent. In
practice, however, these four basic influences will be moderately related.
At present all paranormal belief researchers use measurement de¬
vices relating solely to the beliefs themselves. A most common proce¬
dure in research with these scales is to correlate paranormal belief with
other psychological factors such as paranormal experience in order to
better understand the mind of the paranormal believer. I would argue
that this endeavor is confounded by one simple but devastating flaw—
someone who scores high on a measure of paranormal belief could do
22 TheJournal ofParapsychology
so for any combination of influences from the basic four just outlined.
Thus, psychics score high on measures of paranormal belief, but so do
parapsychologists and people who read about the paranormal in the
Fortean Times. These various groups are a world apart in terms of the
influence on them from the four basic causes, yet on our measure of
paranormal belief and (most perniciously) in our empirical data these
diverse basic differences remain undifferentiated. This obviously has
disastrous, albeit hidden, consequences for the development of under¬
standing in paranormal belief research. Thus, our basic failure to ac¬
knowledge the diversity of types of believer leads us to develop
multidimensional measures of belief that are at other levels more
strangely and subdy one-dimensional! This point of course applies gen¬
erally to any of the present measures of paranormal belief.
Because this is a major problem, a solution becomes particularly per¬
tinent. In short, I propose that we develop a measure more along the
lines of a paranormal beliefs and influences scale (PBIS). This scale
would certainly measure paranormal beliefs, but would also measure the
weight of influence from the four basic causes of belief outlined above.
(I realize that I am making a presumption in supposing paranormal
experience to be a cause of belief, but evidence that I have reported
elsewhere favors this experienual-source hypothesis over other, more
attribudonal hypotheses; see Lawrence, Edwards, Barraclough, Church,
& Hetherington, in press). Only with such a scale will we have a realistic
chance of getting inside the minds of sheep and goats (whatever species
they might be!).
Such a scale is unlikely to be produced for some time. As we have
seen, building a valid and reliable measure of anything is a tricky busi¬
ness. One hopes that future efforts at scale construction can involve
input from both parapsychologists and psychologists, both paranormal-
ists and skeptics. This is indeed necessary if we are to break with the
partisan and frankly irrational distinctions ("these are our scales and
those are yours") that have split psychologists and parapsychologists with
respect to the use of scales concerning paranormal belief.
Thalbourne and Delin (1993) have recently reported a revision of
their Australian Sheep-Goat Scale that shows some promise in the assess¬
ment of the core concepts ofparanormal belief (ESP, Psychokinesis, and
Life after Death). It remains for that scale or any other to prove its worth
as the scale to use. If the PBS is to be even a contender for that distinc¬
tion, it will have to change. If it does change, then the enterprise under¬
taken in this paper will seem to this author all the less negative, and all
the more productive, for it.
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MOVING ON FROM THE PARANORMAL
BELIEF SCALE: A FINAL REPLY TO
TOBACYK
By Tony R. Lawrence
ABSTRACT: In this paper I reply to Tobacyk's detailed response to my critique of his
Paranormal Belief Scale (see Lawrence, 1995; Tobacyk, 1995). Dealing with the points as
outlined by Tobacyk, I pay particular attention to his strongest countercriticism, namely,
that my use of the scree slope test is unconventional and probably invalid. Although I
acknowledge that this might appear to be the case, I present new evidence to suggest that
the scree slope test is almost certainly still valid and that in this and all other respects my
critique remains fully viable. In concluding, I express my agreement with Tobacyk on a
number of issues and end with the hope that our dialogue proves useful for the construc¬
tion of a new and improved measure of paranormal belief.
Tobacyk (1995) has presented a spirited, thought-provoking, and
constructive reply to my paper on the Paranormal Belief Scale (PBS)
(Lawrence, 1995). His reply shows perfectly how critical dialogue can
lead to significant and constructive suggestions for future research and
can help to bring out problematic issues relevant to the enhancement of
our understanding of complex areas of research. Also, it is clear to me
from his reply that there are many areas where Tobacyk and I are in
agreement. Generally, we seem to agree that we need an improvement
to the PBS and that the PBS has a number of problems that only future
research will be able to clear up, although we differ overjust how severe
these problems are. More importantly I think, both our papers have
made substantive contributions on the topic of how new research in this
area might proceed. In what follows I stick closely to the substance of
Tobacyk's reply, dealing primarily with those areas where we disagree,
before concluding my critical efforts with some final comments.
Areas Where We Disagree
Problems ofDefining "Paranormal"
Although I agree with much that Tobacyk says about the problems of
defining paranormal, Tobacyk picks up on a subtlety in Irwin's definition
(the use of the word or rather than and) and goes on to show that Irwin's
S6G
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definition of paranormal is therefore really not as restrictive as Broad's. If
one sticks to the letter of Irwin's definition, then Tobacyk has a point:
Paranormal Irwin-style may be little different from paranormal Broad-
style. Given this subdety, perhaps I need to give my own definition.
Something is paranormal if it is "in principle physically impossible and
outside the range of human capabilities as presently conceived by con¬
ventional scientists." I prefer this more restrictive definition not so much
because I want it to restrict certain phenomena, but because I believe it
is important for our research to be humanly relevant. I do not have
space enough to go into detail, however; instead, I think the problem of
defining the paranormal needs sustained critical discussion. (That will
need another paper!)
We both acknowledge that the Extraordinary Life Forms subscale is
not paranormal (it is, to paraphrase Tobacyk, paranormal by associa¬
tion). Instead, Tobacyk makes much of what I don't say about Tradi¬
tional Religious Belief and Superstition. In fact, I say little about the
paranormal status of traditional religious belief and superstition because
my thoughts on the paranormal status of these beliefs are equivocal. I
can see reasons why religious beliefs might be regarded as paranormal,
but I also see reasons why calling religious beliefs paranormal might be
problematic (e.g., religion depends strongly upon socially organized
faith, whereas paranormal beliefs depend much more on personal hu¬
man experience). As for superstition, there have been two ways of defin¬
ing it in the past. First, superstition has been defined, mostly by
academics, in such a way that it is identical with paranormal belief (e.g.,
Planer, 1988). Second, superstition has been defined, mostly in folklore,
as referring more specifically to certain events and occurrences that
have certain socially signified meanings (i.e., black cats are unlucky, one
should throw salt over one's shoulder if one spills salt). If one adopts the
first definition, then all one needs to do is decide whether the PBS is the
PBS or the SBS (Superstitious Beliefs Scale). This is hardly a substantive
contribution. If one adopts the second definition, then arguably super¬
stition ceases to be paranormal. To say that black cats are unlucky is not
to say that humans are possessed of some unknown capability to be
unlucky in the presence of black cats. To conclude, I think that To-
bacyk's reply establishes the need to discuss problems of definition as an
integral part of empirical research and not as a separate component of
purely philosophical or conceptual interest.
Adequacy of the PBS Factor Analysis
My discussion of the adequacy of the PBS factor analytic evidence
essentially centers around three things: (1) problems of factor selection,
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(2) problems of factor rotation, and (3) evidence for fewer factors from
my scree slope analysis.
Problems offactor selection. On problems of factor selection, Tobacyk
and I may just have to differ over Kaiser-1. He can cite studies that attest
to its accuracy in some circumstances, and I can cite studies that attest to
the opposite. Thus, Kline (1993) notes that
Cattell (1978) has shown that rotation of too few factors tends to produce
second order factors at the first order. Rotation of too many factors causes
factors to split. A common solution to this problem and the default solution
on many computer packages is to rotate all factors with eigen values or latent
roots greater than one. However Cattell (1978) has shown that with large
matrices this is an overestimate of the number of significant factors and Cliff
(1988) has suggested that this criterion be abandoned. Barrett and Kline
(1982) examined a number of methods of selecting the correct number of
factors and showed that two methods appeared to reach the best solution.
. . . These were the Scree Test (Cattell, 1966) and the Velicer method
(Velicer, 1976). (p. 122)
At least one needs to be wary of the Kaiser-1 criterion, but given the
fact that Tobacyk uses three other criteria, I think it quite fair to note
caution over the stability of the factor solution. Thus, with four criteria
for factor selection, does a factor have to satisfy all four criteria, or just
three, or does one chop and choose criteria in order to get the factors
that one desires? I think these are significant issues that may have played
a role in determining the seven-factor solution.
Also, I don't think that a factor solution that accounts for 60.7% of
the variance with 13 factors can be seen as satisfactory. Generally, satis¬
factory solutions, even when one takes into account error-ridden social
and psychological data, tend to be more in the region of 60%-70%
variance with 4—5 factors. Factor analysis is essentially about reducing
complex sets of observed variables to their essential latent causes. When
one needs 13 factors to achieve 60% accountability, or 7 factors to
achieve 48% accountability (which is actually the case with the PBS),
then this is hardly a victory for parsimony. Rather, it suggests that the
researcher has brought together a wide and disparate set of unrelated
variables, of little general explanatory consequence.
Problems offactor rotation. As my comments about the orthogonality of
the PBS show, the PBS does contain a core of beliefs that do correlate—
and strangely they are precisely those factors that meet the human capa¬
bilities definition of paranormal. Note that Tobacyk simply doesn't ad¬
dress my concerns over subscale orthogonality; instead, he simply
reasserts that promax oblique rotations showed up little evidence for
correlated factors. At the least I would suggest that future researchers
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look strongly at the evidence for oblique factors in paranormal belief
research. Consequently, I maintain that the problems of factor selection
and orthogonality/rotation in the PBS remain.
Problems of the scree plot analysis. As Tobacyk points out in his reply,
"Lawrence's use of the scree plot analysis to determine the meaningful-
ness of rotated factors is unconventional and probably invalid" (p. 6). In
fact, the scree slope analysis, if performed on rotated factors, is definitely
invalid. The reason for this is as follows: As Tobacyk himself notes, the
scree plot analysis is used to determine the number of factors for rota¬
tion, by plotting a visually judged line of best fit through the smaller
factors (expressed as eigenvalues) of the initial unrotated factor solu¬
tion. Although subsequent rotation of factors does not change the over¬
all amount of variance explained by the factor solution, it does change
the specific amount of variance accounted for by each individual factor.
Thus, for my scree slope to be valid, we must be sure we have the initial
solution eigenvalues. On the face of it, I appear to have made a mistake.
However, two points made to me by a colleague who specializes in psy-
chometiics set me on a quest, the resolution of which proved highly
revealing. The two "problems" pointed out to me are as follows:1
1. Given Tobacyk's use of principle factor analysis with Varimax rota¬
tion, the distribution of his eigenvalues is highly unlikely if they are
genuinely from the rotated solution. Thus, when we look at Tobacyk's
plotted eigenvalues, we see that there are some marked factors which
account for a great deal of variance and many other factors which ac¬
count for a very small amount. The problem is that Varimax rotation
very rarely produces this kind of factor distribution. Indeed, Varimax
rotations by definition tend to maximize and hence equalize the vari¬
ance accounted for by factors in the rotated solution. In short, Tobacyk's
data look much more as though they come from the initial solution and
could only really have come from the rotated solution if Tobacyk and
Milford had markedly different numbers of items for each factor.
2. Although the published data from Tobacyk and Milford (1983)
are given in percentages of variance accounted for, the list of factors sent
to me by Tobacyk clearly gives eigenvalues alone. But eigenvalues are of
no consequence in the rotated solution, and many factor analysis pack¬
ages do not give them for the rotated solution.
Now, these two pieces of evidence clearly suggest that Tobacyk has
sent me the details of his initial solution results. We can confirm this by
finding out whether Tobacyk's statistical package gave eigenvalues for
the rotated solution. If the statistical package used by Tobacyk did not
give eigenvalues in the rotated solution, then the validity of my analysis
1 Thanks to Dr. Ian Deary, Professor of Psychology at the University ofEdinburgh.
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stands. Tobacyk used a pre-1983 version of SAS to perform his factor
analysis, and so I contacted the SAS Institute in Britain to ask if that
version gave eigenvalues for the rotated solution. People at the SAS
Institute were very helpful, and Mark Dawson, technical support advisor,
contacted SAS in the United States, where details of earlier versions were
kept.
SAS in the United States still had a mainframe running a pre-1983
version of SAS(!), and so they ran a principle factor analysis with Vari-
max rotation on some old sample data. The results were clear: SAS
pre-1983 does not give eigenvalues for the rotated solution. Thus, from
the two points made above and the confirmation from SAS, we can only
conclude that Tobacyk unwittingly sent me the eigenvalues for the initial
solution and also apparently used them in his published report. I should
perhaps add that it is not at all uncommon to find researchers reporting
initial solution eigenvalues as though they were the rotated solution
results. (Indeed, I gather that with SPSS the way in which data are pre¬
sented often leads to this error.)
The above discovery validates my use of the scree slope analysis. How¬
ever, Tobacyk argues that even if the analysis were valid, the accuracy of
the slope is dubious. Thus, Tobacyk suggests that the data from Factors
14 to 25 are needed to really do the scree plot. This statement reveals
two basic errors, however. First, Tobacyk forgets that he performed prin¬
ciplefactor analysis and not principle component analysis. Thus, 13 factors is
in fact how many factors need to be analyzed by the scree slope method,
not 25. Second, even if principle component analysis had been used,
Tobacyk is wrong in saying that there would be 25 factors. Principle
component analysis extracts as many factors as variables, and in To-
bacyk's original unfactored sample there were 61 variables.
In any case, Tobacyk's claim that we need those factors to identify the
departure from linearity (i.e., random factors) is not appropriate. If the
smaller factors were essentially random (as is usual and as Tobacyk seems
to indicate), then they would generally show a linear increase in value
from close to 0 to close to 1; in this case approximating this rough
linearity with a smooth line would not give great inaccuracy. But even if
my estimation of the plot of unknown factors is inaccurate, how much
room for a radical departure from linearity is there between an eigen¬
value ofjust above 1 (for Factor 8) and exactly 1 (for Factor 13)? It is in
fact impossible for there to be a jump in the smaller factors larger than
the jump that is clearly evident in the larger factors (from 2.31 for
Superstition to 4.09 for Witchcraft, an increase in accountability larger
almost than the whole range of accountability possible in the factors
from Spiritualism to Factor 13).
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Indeed, one could even argue that my placing of the line is conserva¬
tive, because the rationale of the scree slope is to identify a marked
increase in variance explained sufficient to show that the "mountain" of
genuine factors "starts here," all the rest being mere rubble and debris.
The first truly marked deviation from linearity is represented by the
jump from Superstition to Witchcraft, and placing a line to reflect this
gives only three factors! Thus, I think that the scree slope analysis is both
valid and largely accurate (any error is unlikely to make a difference).
But we could argue over small details ad infinitum, so is there any new
evidence for the factorial structure of the PBS?
I have details of at least one attempt to factor analyze the PBS, per¬
formed recendy by the Dutch researchers Tomic, van der Sijde, and
Snel, in which they found only five factors.2 Of Tobacyk and Milford's
seven factors, only two were reproduced without change in the Dutch
study: Traditional Religious Belief (their strongest factor) and Witch¬
craft (their third strongest). Of particular interest is that the Dutch Psi
subscale consumed Tobacyk's Psi, Spiritualism, and Precognition
subscales, and that the Superstition and Extraordinary Life Forms
subscales loaded onto the same factor (which the Dutch group termed
"Superstition"). The last factor, which the Dutch group termed "impos¬
sible," is a strange little factor composed of items that were negatively
phrased. In general, then, the Dutch data, based on a moderately large
sample of over 300 Dutch men and women, support fewer than seven
factors. Interestingly, the Dutch Psi subscale shows a clear degree of
relatedness between just those subscales of the PBS that come under the
human capabilities definition of paranormal.
In short, the problems of factor selection and orthogonality remain,
and on deeper analysis my scree slope analysis proves to be valid also.
When we incorporate new empirical evidence bearing on the number of
factors problem, we once again find fewer than seven factors.
The Correct Dimensionality ofParanormal Beliefs
In a somewhat paradoxical maneuver, Tobacyk resorts to relativis-
tic/constructionist arguments to challenge the notion that one can
determine the correct dimensionality of paranormal belief. This at¬
tempt to bypass the substance of my critique is thoroughly unsatisfac¬
tory, however. Thus, if we take the relativist position seriously, then we
simply cannot legitimately ask questions about the factorial structure of
2This research is not yet published. Details about this study may be obtained from Dr.
Peter van der Sijde, Transfer, Research, and Development, University of Twente, Holland.
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paranormal belief at all. But Tobacyk's efforts surely presuppose that
factor analysis has some value for research purposes.
Perhaps Tobacyk means to advocate a weak relativist position whereby
cultures, people, and societies will simply differ in one or another re¬
spect on the PBS. But this weaker position turns out to express little
more than trivia; we all know that people and cultures differ. The ques¬
tion is whether there is some invariant factor structure of beliefs within
which we can express these differences. The PBS is highly problematic
when viewed from this nonrelativistic perspective (e.g., how can African
natives be expected to express agreement with an item on the Loch Ness
monster?). I feel, in contrast to Tobacyk, that we can ask legitimate
questions about the general structure of paranormal belief and that it is
a challenge to devise such scales in a way that makes their underlying
factors culturally invariant, even if average level of belief on the scales
differs across cultures.
The Reasonableness ofMy Critique of the PBS
This section of Tobacyk's reply deals largelywith my comment on the
Extraordinary Life Forms and Precognition subscales. I believe that I
have said about as much as I need to say about the Extraordinary Life
Forms subscale in my original paper: (a) This subscale is not strictly
paranormal (as Tobacyk agrees), and (b) it is clear that some of the
items in that scale are far from adequate.
As for Tobacyk's lengthy defense of the PBS Precognition subscale, I
would say that it is excellent save for one thing: Unfortunately, all the
points made by Tobacyk only really bite if his Precognition subscale
actually measures precognition. As I have already noted in my earlier
paper, the Precognition subscale of the revised PBS barely measures
precognition. First, it is composed of two factors, one of which is totally
unrelated to the notion of precognitive prediction of the future, whereas
the other contains only one definite item on precognition. Second, and
worse still, the two factors that make up the "factor" of precognition are
unrelated to each other! Consequently, anything Tobacyk says about the
validity of precognition in the revised PBS needs to be weighed against
the fact that his revised Precognition subscale barely measures precogni¬
tion, and anything he says about the validity of the old Precognition
subscale needs to be weighed against his own admission that the items in
that subscale were ambiguous enough to warrant a new scale. Under
these circumstances, it is highly debatable whether one can say anything
of consequence about the validity of the Precognition subscale.
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The Construct Validity of the PBS
Tobacyk doubts my assertion that his evidence for construct validity of
the PBS is in principle not such evidence, and he asserts that in any case
the PBS has "strong face and content validity" (p. 43). I do not doubt
that the items on the PBS are face valid, although I am sure that some of
the items on the PBS have no content validity (i.e., the precognition
items of the new PBS, or the extraordinary life forms item). Even if the
PBS did have strong face and content validity, I do not think this is
sufficient to recommend its widespread use. Ultimately, construct valid¬
ity is required, and I maintain that Tobacyk's initial evidence for this was
no such evidence at all. Also, I disagree that construct validity is estab¬
lished through the construction of a rich nomological network of inter¬
relations with other nonparanormal factors. Insofar as Tobacyk
genuinely intends this to mean that the PBS interacts with other types of
scales that do not themselves refer to the concept of the paranormal,
such evidence could only presume construct validity and not establish it.
Thus, if we establish that the PBS correlates with gullibility, as some
might predict from their construct of paranormal belief, this may only
establish that our PBS is an obscure indicator of gullibility.
Nevertheless, Tobacyk suggests that evidence for the construct validity
of the PBS is present, and he cites one example (Tobacyk & Mitchell,
1987). I think this evidence is instructive in that it does establish some
construct validity, but not of the sort that Tobacyk's construct of paranor¬
mal would require (whatever that might be). Instead, Tobacyk's evi¬
dence for construct validity supports a notion of paranormality with
which we should now be quite familiar, by revealing a cluster of paranor¬
mal beliefs that all refer to "hypothesized human capabilities or proc¬
esses"! Just take a look. They all fit this definition. Obliqueness rears its
ugly head again. But given the remarks of Beloff (1963, p. Ill), we
should perhaps not be surprised at the human focus:
Paranormal phenomena . . . almost invariably occur in connection with a
human person. Now there is no a priori reason why this should be the case.
One could conceive of a world in which inanimate objects took an occa¬
sional paranormal holiday during which they behaved entirely capriciously.
But as it is, with the dubious exception of certain phenomena of a so-called
poltergeist type and with perhaps the marginal exception of animal ESP,
paranormal events are always bound up with people.
Thus, the human connection seems to be a central defining element in
paranormal phenomena, of just the sort that a solid construct of the
paranormal could be built on.
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Despite our disagreement over the substance ofmy critique, Tobacyk
makes many valuable points, including good suggestions about how fu¬
ture research might proceed. My own recent efforts to improve the
methodological and theoretical rigor of paranormal belief research
echo many of the points raised by Tobacyk (see Lawrence, Edwards,
Barraclough, Church, 8c Heatherington, 1995). Perhaps most impor¬
tant, however, is the fact that Tobacyk clearly sees a greater role for
understanding paranormal belief than merely enhancing knowledge.
Indeed, in his parting statement emphasizing the fundamental human
questions and the relevance of paranormal experience/belief research
to answering these questions, Tobacyk displays a sensitivity to the wider
issues sadly lacking in much contemporary parapsychology. In this re¬
spect, Tobacyk and I share the same basic attitude. It is precisely because
these issues are important that we must devote sustained critical atten¬
tion to the improvement of our scales for the measurement of paranor¬
mal belief (and indeed, of any variable). What is more, lest we waste time
improving scales that are beyond improvement, we must focus our criti¬
cal efforts on those scales that do show promise.
Tobacyk's PBS has proved a useful tool in the assessment of paranor¬
mal belief (I do not think it totally withoutmerit!), and it is for precisely
this reason that I chose to devote my attention to its shortcomings.
Having performed this often painful and thankless task, I am pleased—
indeed honored—to say that the sentiments expressed in the last sen¬
tence of my previous paper seem likely to be fulfilled. Even at this early
stage, Tobacyk's reply has made my efforts seem "all the less negative,
and all the more productive." So, as I say my last on this topic, I wish to
thank Tobacyk for the dignified, temperate, and productive nature of his
reply. May we soon see someone produce a new PBS, rising like the
proverbial phoenix from the ashes of the old!
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